It seems this plan would require the digger to be completely oblivious to what's going on?
While it is quite possible that the current digger would insta-dig all his remaining wallets in the face of such a change, at least then we would know what we are looking at in terms of the total money supply. Without this change, we never know when the next massive digger will come along and add another million or two to the supply.
If it ever looked like his digging was going to be stopped, what's stopping him just digging everything at once? I guess this is mildly better than the current situation, as he'd be forced to show his entire hand but he could even likely start using his clams to vote "digging-allowed" and prevent an overwhelming majority consensus.
He'd have to dig up his CLAMs to use them to vote, and having done so it would presumably be in his own best interest to vote not to allow anyone else to dig at a later date.
This process could be completed without scorched-earthing the chain, re: orphans, etc.
It is essentially nothing more than voting - no reason to make it live on chain, unless there is benefit in making the transition period tumultuous.
Yes, of course. I wrote the post as it occurred to me, and arrived at the conclusion that voting works better than fighting on-chain by the end of it. I should have gone back and removed the talk of orphaning.
The only reasoning I can think to make such 'voting' via block consensus as opposed to wetware would be to edge in a restriction on claims prior to a final decision - which would be negligible, imho.
Wait, what do you mean about wetware? How do you imagine any such voting working? It can't just be a poll on JD, since there are coins staking elsewhere, and they should have their vote. Are you suggesting we should just like - talk about it? And reach a consensus? So I was thinking that voting using messages in the coinbase of new stakes would be the way forward. Or do you not agree that the people holding CLAM should get to vote?
That said, I think everyone accepts and understands that CLAM was created with the intention of applying consensus. This can manifest as users updating their client to new "official" versions, and hence applying new rules, or in the case of JD's commanding presence on the network, a forced fork.
I don't intend to use JD's presence to force anything. As I see it, people with coins on JD should get to decide how their coins vote, and I shouldn't get to decide how any coins other than my own vote.
I think there is value in a smooth, thought-out fork and update, as opposed to competition on chain. Though, competition on chain is likely to occur regardless with a large chain to some extent.
I agree, but I don't see it happening. You have said you're willing to go with what the community wants, but how do we gauge that?
I still think a re-alignment of the fee structure is the most logical change that would positively change the dynamics around this digging. This is also, unfortunately, a very complicated and involved change.
That's always your "go to" when the question of the digger comes up, but I don't think it addresses the problem at all does it? It looks like it could maybe address the issue, because it makes fees depend on the length of time an output has been stored on the chain, but (a) it only starts counting from when the fork is made, and so the distribution coins pay no more fee than anyone else's and (b) the fees are collected by the stakers, who could well be the digger himself.
I may have misunderstood the proposal though. Could you give as simple as possible an explanation of how the full complicated and involved change helps out with this particular issue we're facing? To restate the problem it is that we have a digger who has been steadily selling fresh CLAMs for over 2 months and can probably continue to do so for another year at the current rate. This steady sell pressure causes a steady decline in the market price of CLAMs and makes them undesirable to hold for anyone.
However, I believe the simplest, easiest and quickest to implement "solution" which maintains the original promises of the network AND has a redeemable benefit to the network is to simply require that "digs" are restricted to staking transactions. This restriction would add incentive to stake with the client, require diggers to "contribute" in the process of digging and add some predictability to the rate of "dig" inflation.
It would not remove dig inflation, or take away un-dug coins from users who have yet to claim.
Instead, it would rate-limit and add predictability to the process.
He's already digging very slowly. If he had to stake every output before spending it, he could do so easily at the rate he is currently digging. By insisting that distribution outputs are staked before being spent you are only penalising small holders - the guy who has 5 or 10 old addresses, digs them up, then finds that he can't spend anything until they stake. He's likely to walk away, "I knew it was too good to be true".
At the moment, a ~4.6 output of CLAM un-dug would take a great deal of time to stake.
To offset this, you would provide additional weight to "dig" outputs.
If you make it possible for the small holder to stake in a reasonable time, you also make it possible for the big digger to continue flooding the market.
I don't think this proposed change works, and even if it was successful in slowing his dumping, that doesn't make any difference. He still ends up dumping his 500k into the market, it just takes him 5 years instead of 1 year.
I think this is a great idea as long as you give plenty of warning of end dig date. So doing it the way you suggest, could you make it so that all digs after the 2 year mark are invalid? I think 2 years is a very fair compromise to claim your free CLAM, especially considering the generous stake rewards.
I guess it goes something like this:
1. We come up with a list of proposals, for example:
a. leave everything as it is
b. disallow all digging
c. some kind of decay in value of undug CLAMs over time
d. CC's very complicated and involved change
e. CC's quick and simple change
They'd need to be specified in detail.
2. Every time anyone stakes a block, they vote for their favourite proposal(s). In the CLAMspeech, or coinbase input, or wherever it fits.
3. As soon as any proposal has more than X% support when looking over the last Y% of blocks, that proposal is deemed to have been selected by the community. To avoid 2 similar proposals splitting the vote and making "tactical voting" a viable strategy, we could use
instant-runoff_voting to decide the winner. It's unclear what X and Y should be. I guess 75% and "6 months worth" are reasonable starting points to consider.
As many others have said the CLAM distribution has done its job, now it needs to evolve in order to avoid the security risk of a single entity controlling a vast majority of the supply. and you'd still be giving 6 months of advance notice at this point. if the digger wants to dig them all at once, so be it.. at least there would be an end in sight.
I tend to agree, though I had to cringe at the "single entity" bit... Then again, it doesn't matter whether I agree. I shouldn't get a casting vote even though the coins are mostly in my physical control.
BayAreaCoins, you sound unstable... are you the digger? The beauty of dooglus proposal is it involves the community..your vote is not any more special than someone else's
He gets heated at times. I find that engaging him while he's being like this tends to escalate things.
