poornamelessme
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April 27, 2014, 08:29:25 PM |
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A lot of people are having trouble with the latest non-beta wallet. And I don't believe we have a RC1 Mac wallet yet. The second problem is an issue because the code is closed. Evan is trying to get a setup where he can compile a mac wallet, but I don't think he's gotten there yet???
If I want to go with the win wallet, which version is the newest (or I should say most reliable)? I do keep antivirus on win, firewall, and all that, so it should be safe. I just figured the mac side of my dualboot may be safer, since I rarely use mac os. But if it's flakey, I may just go with the win version for now. And any issue if I want to move coins from a really old wallet (like back when drk was still cpu only mining)? I left about 100 stranded drk on an old laptop and would like to move them off. Well, 2 things. First, you don't even have to have your coins on a machine. just make a backup of your wallet while it's running, ie: Files => Backup Wallet and give it a name so you know where it came from, such as DRK_Old_Laptop.dat and put it on a jump drive (or take all your backups and put them on several jump drives, then keep those safe in different areas.) Second way to backup is to simply open up the darkcoin folder when the wallet in NOT running, (in windows it's User/You/AppData/darkcoin/wallet.dat), rename the wallet as above to show which wallet it is and back it up on a jump drive again. Finally, you can always download the RC1 wallet for windows, deposit all your distributed coins into that one, make a backup of that single wallet.dat file and close out the program (remove the darkcoin folder) from your windows machine. NOw your coins are in "cold storage" and off line. 1. Please make sure you set a passphrase before you save your wallets, and that it is both complex and that you DON'T FORGET IT EVER!!! 2. You can even write your passphrase down in a txt file and store it with the jump drives. But remember, anyone that can get ahold of your jump drives can get your coins. This can be a good thing if something should happen to you and you want family members to have access to the coin. This is like having cash hidden away in your home. Someone could still physically break into your home and steal it. 3. To get your coins back out of cold storage, install a wallet, then replace the wallet.dat in the darkcoin folder with your DRK_Old_Laptop.dat and rename it to wallet.dat. Do this when the wallet is closed, not running, then restart the wallet and your coins will immediately be there (as long as the wallet was sync'd) Thanks. I always do that with my wallet backups, I have backups on flash drives... and extra flash drives... and external drives. I'm umm... very backed up, I guess. I was just concerned with the old wallet, since I read some people here stating an issue getting coins transferred from them. Just checking before I attempt it if I need to do anything... besides make backups, which I have plenty of. I guess I could install a new wallet, use the old wallet .dat on it, and it should be good? That may be the easiest way to go. Out of curiosity, do most here use multiple wallets for storing coins, or one wallet? I mean for safety purposes? I don't have a ton of DRK (1Kish), but just trying to figure out the safest way to store them. If DRK shoots up to $10+ eventually, I'd like to keep them safe.
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TanteStefana
Full Member
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The Future Of Work
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April 27, 2014, 08:32:04 PM |
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can we raise the price a bit?
Can I smack you in the face with a salmon ?? ![Grin](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/grin.gif) (f´ing credit card... not even an overdraft or anything, stupid web banking mistake....) check out my sig, use paypal its quick easy and no need for credit card ![Smiley](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/smiley.gif) I know you have been trying to teach this to me since forever... maybe an inkling of understanding is entering my brain. Do I need to deposit SLL's because then I'd have a balance... wait no... I have to have SLL's in VirWox to trade for bitcoin, yet I can't deposit SLL's into VirWox from SL, I have to buy the SLL's from VirWox with fiat before I can trade for BTC, is that finally right? Very hard to tell what my final price for BTC would be then?? I just don't understand why I can't buy BTC with the USD? Or why I can't use the SLL's I already own to buy the BTC's? Ugh! Why all the complications? BTW, you can smack me in the face with a (Non-frozen) Salmon if I get to eat it ![Wink](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/wink.gif)
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humanitee
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April 27, 2014, 08:32:22 PM |
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Ok, I have verified it works.
Start darkcoind on remote machine. On your local machine specify the IP at launch with -masternodeaddr=YOUR_SERVER_IP Unlock your local machine wallet with your passphrase. On your local machine, ./darkcoind masternode start
Slickness indeed.
So you have to keep it running on another machine, presumably your home machine, with the wallet unlocked? You don't have to keep your local machine's wallet unlocked permanently, or even open. Once the remote machine master node starts you can close the local machine's wallet and hide it away for safe keeping. Ok, and nobody can sell those coins, or withdraw? They system will know? It's no different than them just sitting there in your open qt wallet. If you have an encrypted Darkcoin wallet it must be unencrypted for a short time while you are starting the master node. All coins remain on the local machine's wallet and do not move. Your local machine has to get the private keys, sign a message with them, send it to the server, and then have the server broadcast it proving you own them in order to start a masternode, which is why it must be unencrypted (btw I'm guessing that's what he's doing). If Evan didn't do this, a single 1000 DRK wallet could be copied to infinite machines to run master nodes.
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| | | Fast, Secure, and Fully
Decentralized Trading | BACKED BY: ─────────────────────────
| BINANCE ─────── LAB | & | █████████████████████████████████ █ ███ █▀ ▀█ ███▀▀▀▀▀████████ ████▀▀███▀ █ █ █████ ▄▄▄▄▄ █ ▀ █ ███ █ ██ █▄ ▀█ ██ █ ▄███ ██████ ███ █████ █ ██ ███ █ ████ ████ ▄ ███ █▄ ▄█▄ ▄█▄ ▀ ████▄ ▄█ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████████████ |
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LimLims
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:32:50 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.
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TanteStefana
Full Member
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The Future Of Work
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April 27, 2014, 08:34:49 PM |
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Ok, I have verified it works.
Start darkcoind on remote machine. On your local machine specify the IP at launch with -masternodeaddr=YOUR_SERVER_IP Unlock your local machine wallet with your passphrase. On your local machine, ./darkcoind masternode start
Slickness indeed.
So you have to keep it running on another machine, presumably your home machine, with the wallet unlocked? You don't have to keep your local machine's wallet unlocked permanently, or even open. Once the remote machine master node starts you can close the local machine's wallet and hide it away for safe keeping. Ok, and nobody can sell those coins, or withdraw? They system will know? It's no different than them just sitting there in your open qt wallet. If you have an encrypted Darkcoin wallet it must be unencrypted for a short time while you are starting the master node. All coins remain on the local machine's wallet and do not move. Your local machine has to get the private keys, sign a message with them, send it to the server, and then have the server broadcast a message proving you own them in order to start a masternode, which is why it must be unencrypted. If Evan didn't do this, a single 1000 DRK wallet could be copied to infinite machines to run master nodes. Okee Dokee! Will have to get on this asap...
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humanitee
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:36:49 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. I very much doubt the remote master node knows the private keys, because as you have pointed out, it would be of no advantage.
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| | | Fast, Secure, and Fully
Decentralized Trading | BACKED BY: ─────────────────────────
| BINANCE ─────── LAB | & | █████████████████████████████████ █ ███ █▀ ▀█ ███▀▀▀▀▀████████ ████▀▀███▀ █ █ █████ ▄▄▄▄▄ █ ▀ █ ███ █ ██ █▄ ▀█ ██ █ ▄███ ██████ ███ █████ █ ██ ███ █ ████ ████ ▄ ███ █▄ ▄█▄ ▄█▄ ▀ ████▄ ▄█ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████████████ |
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BitcoinFX
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https://youtu.be/DsAVx0u9Cw4 ... Dr. WHO < KLF
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:42:20 PM |
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This is off topic but bitcoinfx is your avatar from desert punk?
Yes. Sunabōzu - https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_Punk ![Grin](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/grin.gif)
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LimLims
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:43:47 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. I very much doubt the remote master node knows the private keys, because as you have pointed out, it would be of no advantage. The way I'm thinking about this is that an attacker follows this path: Get static IP of masternode --> compromise masternode --> figure out IP of secondary node by [magic] --> compromise secondary node The [magic] part I'm assuming must be possible because the masternode must at some point communicate with the secondary node. But maybe there's some reason why this is infeasible?
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kaene
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:44:10 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB. I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.
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kaene
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:48:39 PM Last edit: April 27, 2014, 09:18:05 PM by kaene |
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On Switchercoin open Darkcoin Pool with autochange your earned coins on Litecoin! Reward type - PPLNS, 1% - pool fee. For connect to pool - stratum+tcp://switchercoin.com:2222. More details about mining and settings for popular video cards Getting Started page. Now we already find first block. We would like it the other way around, mine other coins and have DRK as payment ![Wink](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/wink.gif)
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LimLims
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:50:24 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB. I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network. If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?
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blajde
Sr. Member
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Pre-sale - March 18
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:53:28 PM |
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can we raise the price a bit?
I don't like how you leech the money out for DRK for your tropical vision. Go to economics section for your brewing, minidumps, price alteration wishes please
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kaene
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:55:08 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB. I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network. If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine? I'm not saying it is, that should be Evan, because he hasn't left details about it, but my guess is that the idea should be something like that. You need the second machine because it must run the masternode, if you run the initial verification but then close the wallet you are also closing the masternode (masternode code is within the wallet).
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camosoul
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April 27, 2014, 08:57:07 PM |
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Darkcoin is #3 as far as volume for last 24 hours, only behind BTC and LTC. Watchout! DRK could take over LTC spot very quickly!
It is Darkcoin rightful place. LTC became ASIC b!tch and its going down . LTC is still a functional coin... What makes it unusable? Pretty sure there are a bunch of ASICs hashing BTC... Miners live in their own cryptobubble... just because they can't mine a coin as well "it's dead"... lol. We all know that BTC *really* died when ASICs came onboard, lol. Then again, LTC "sold" itself as the solution to the |ASIC problem" and failed. So, in a sense, it fails to deliver on it's core promise. DRK, on the other hand, makes no promise for long-term ASIC resistance (as litecoin devs admitted, anything GPU mineable is ASIC-able) neither is ASIC immunity its main selling point. Waaahhhh I lost my money hose!!! ASICs ensure CPU server farms can't break a coin. It's a good, and inevitable, thing for any cryptocoin. DGW should keep any X11 ASIC's price down enough that people can afford them. Maybe low enough that nobody makes an ASIC for it. Speculative, of course. If the value goes high enough, even DGW won't stop an ASIC from being made.
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. .OROCOIN. ▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀▀ | | █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ | | █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ | | █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ |
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humanitee
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 08:57:32 PM |
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My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.
I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.
If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine? Because why ever have them on the machine at all? You could use TOR to send the message to your remote master node and no one would know your native IP. As long as you aren't running services off your local machine and have pretty much all your ports closed down you are better protected than on a server.
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| | | Fast, Secure, and Fully
Decentralized Trading | BACKED BY: ─────────────────────────
| BINANCE ─────── LAB | & | █████████████████████████████████ █ ███ █▀ ▀█ ███▀▀▀▀▀████████ ████▀▀███▀ █ █ █████ ▄▄▄▄▄ █ ▀ █ ███ █ ██ █▄ ▀█ ██ █ ▄███ ██████ ███ █████ █ ██ ███ █ ████ ████ ▄ ███ █▄ ▄█▄ ▄█▄ ▀ ████▄ ▄█ ██ ██ ████████████████████████████████████████ |
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AlexGR
Legendary
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April 27, 2014, 08:59:24 PM |
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Me thinks we need to issue a few bounties for hackers to test the possible attack vectors against masternode operation, cheating, payments etc, prior to going live (perhaps RC3+?). There's too much new stuff in there and code does have the annoying tendency to break, so... better harden it now than have nasty surprises later on.
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blajde
Sr. Member
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Pre-sale - March 18
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April 27, 2014, 09:03:52 PM |
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Me thinks we need to issue a few bounties for hackers to test the possible attack vectors against masternode operation, cheating, payments etc, prior to going live (perhaps RC3+?). There's too much new stuff in there and code does have the annoying tendency to break, so... better harden it now than have nasty surprises later on.
agreed
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Kai Proctor
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 09:11:57 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB. I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network. If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine? If it was like this nothing could prevent someone to build thousand masternodes with the same 1000 DRK.
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fearcoka
Legendary
Offline
Activity: 1008
Merit: 1000
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 09:13:50 PM |
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can we raise the price a bit?
I don't like how you leech the money out for DRK for your tropical vision. Go to economics section for your brewing, minidumps, price alteration wishes please Want to shut your mouth? I can say that I am one of the earlier adopters and hold over 100k darks. Im trying to get more darks so people like you don't fuck the growth of this coin. gtfo douchebag
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Just Nao Tomori and Bitcoin ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°)
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kaene
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![](https://bitcointalk.org/Themes/custom1/images/post/xx.gif) |
April 27, 2014, 09:14:01 PM |
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I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.
Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win. If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win. Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into. My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB. I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network. If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine? If it was like this nothing could prevent someone to build thousand masternodes with the same 1000 DRK. Network would reject a masternode registering twice with the same address, and if you think about moving the 1k DRK to another wallet, network would detect it and stop accepting you as a masternode.
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