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Author Topic: [ANN]CureCoin - CURECOIN TEAM HAS TAKEN RANK 1 ON FOLDING@HOME!!!  (Read 667164 times)
cryptohunter
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July 03, 2014, 12:29:37 AM
 #2461

the development team are not active enough really, the premine for ipo and dev fund was too large. It has crushed the price. Things will recover as the ipo dumpers eventually run out of coins, but with the current BTC coming in per day it will take a long time. This team didn't really get this off to a good start.

What makes you think it was IPO dumpers and not early folders dumping? The market volume is extremely low; it doesn't require IPO holders dumping to keep the price low.

IPO addresses were published; you could try to research it if you think that's true.

The Dev Funds are largely untouched at the moment, so you're off base there.


Off base where ? never said the dev funds were being sold. IPO holders or early miners? even if they are not the same people doesn't really matter. Too many cure coins floating around for the amount of buyers. Need some reason for people to want cure coins. IPO wasn't really required and too many coins given out.

The future gets brighter as time goes on for this coin. I bough at stupidly high levels. I will hold until i make profit anyway. Could do with a decent marketing team behind it and some mainstream advertising outside of the usual crypto channels.

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viperbite
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July 03, 2014, 04:37:07 AM
 #2462

I think curecoin needs a feature similar to veribit

Veribit allows vericoins to be used at anywhere bitcoins are accepted.

Curecoin NEEDS this !
cryptoconomist
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July 03, 2014, 05:24:43 PM
 #2463

I think curecoin needs a feature similar to veribit

Veribit allows vericoins to be used at anywhere bitcoins are accepted.

Curecoin NEEDS this !


also add trezor please ASAP

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=122438.0
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July 03, 2014, 05:38:22 PM
 #2464

Bit of a progress update, we have finalized most of our materials for the Bitcoin:Chicago conference, here's a sample of the poster:



Fold Proteins, earn cryptos! CureCoin.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=603757.0
Aboy68
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July 03, 2014, 07:19:00 PM
 #2465

Bit of a progress update, we have finalized most of our materials for the Bitcoin:Chicago conference, here's a sample of the poster:




I like it!
//Aboy68

ranlo
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July 03, 2014, 09:28:34 PM
 #2466

Bit of a progress update, we have finalized most of our materials for the Bitcoin:Chicago conference, here's a sample of the poster:




This is awesome! Are you all going to be getting video of the conference to share as well? I won't be able to go, but I'd love to see how it all works out.


 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 




















Earn Devcoins by Writing
Vorksholk
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July 03, 2014, 10:38:32 PM
 #2467

Bit of a progress update, we have finalized most of our materials for the Bitcoin:Chicago conference, here's a sample of the poster:

Snipped Image: http://curecoinfolding.com/forumpreview2.png


This is awesome! Are you all going to be getting video of the conference to share as well? I won't be able to go, but I'd love to see how it all works out.

We'll certainly be putting up some content from the conference, video footage from those usually doesn't turn out too great, but we'll see Smiley

Fold Proteins, earn cryptos! CureCoin.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=603757.0
ATXsilver
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July 04, 2014, 05:33:47 PM
 #2468

I am sorry guys. I will be dumping my 100,000 plus curecoins today on the open market. Please put your buy orders out there. I have had enough of watching these incompetent fools who pass as devs watch idly as the price just slowly dies toward 0. I will put it at 0 where it belongs since no one else seems to give a $hit. Sad that such a great idea will become a worthless afterthought in crypto world and will never be a major force. They should have partnered with a charity or had someone with half a brain get a PR on a major news line. I guess this is what happens when programmers try to create a coin with a sizeable IPO (Red flag - they obviously have been dumping big time, did the devs not try to get people who cared about the long term goals of this coin? They just sold to whoever had shiny money in their hands and let them dump whenever they want?)

All the free coins going to the devs personal piggy bank and they refuse to sell any of them on this terrible slide down to put in bids to help buoy the price at a reasonable level?

They will not do any measures to stabilize this price and create some investor confidence? Just attending some conference in the future is not good enough, they need concrete measures to stabilize this coin.

Donate a bunch of the coins you get free everyday to a marketing firm, how about that? Or hire someone who is huge on twitter like @Bryce_Weiner to help with the coin and get a solid following.

I loved the idea, but I am not a stupid person, and I know I can buy 10x as many coins next month when the price is 100 satoshi. So you will be seeing my sell orders crashing the price today and tomorrow if I can't get out of all my coins.

I have had enough. This $hit pisses me off and unfortunately I think this may just be another clever way to enrich a few at the expense of the many. After all, the path to HELL is paved with good intentions.

SHAME ON YOU DEVS - SHAMEFUL!

Use your personal fortunes you've made off this coin to do something to support the FU$)*NG PRICE!

Look out below!

 

Cryptsy Trade Key: fa9ad1332f179b704068b9a8a3cac5e08951b516

Sign up to trade on 100+ Alt Cryptos on Cryptsy Here: https://www.cryptsy.com/users/register?refid=100996

(I will send you a EAC Bonus for signing up under my link above - PM me your Cryptsy trade key once registered)

EAC: eVbBNty7AGwA26ZQpkyVjkoM5XoMiQCoLY

Contact ATXSilver@Gmail.com
LasersHurt
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July 04, 2014, 07:08:58 PM
 #2469

I am not a stupid person

You claim to have 100,000 coins, and are unable or unwilling to use the publicly available information to verify your claims that the devs are somehow rolling in daily fortunes. You suggest that they SELL their coins in order to somehow bring up the price. You're looking at a CryptoCurrency that's a month old complaining that you're not rich enough yet, and threatening to "destroy it" to get your way.

I am not a doctor, but if it walks like a stupid duck and talks like a stupid duck...

Of course, I could be wrong. If I am, you can post your Address so people can use the Block Explorer to verify your fortunes.

Surely if I am wrong, you have no problem with backing up your post, right?
ATXsilver
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July 04, 2014, 08:53:48 PM
 #2470

I guess you don't understand the idea of creating a 'stabilization fund'. Go read up on Nautilus coin and Brian Kelly and how he supports Nautilus coin by selling some coins to raise BTC and place orders to 'protect' the price from just being raped by miners and to keep the price from being overly volatile, which always shakes out long-term investors, and attracts speculators, miners, and others who don't give a damn about anything but profit.

And YES. You can SUPPORT THE PRICE BY SELLING SHARES!!!!!!!!!

You see, with all those coins the devs have, and they get more by skimming off the top everyday, they could have been selling on a shedule, or when the price goes up 25% in 1 day, or some other parameters, and they use that BTC they raise to put in the stabilization fund. Then when a big dumper comes in, they can place bids below the market to offer some support and protection from the price getting slaughtered and scaring out all the long-term investors who don't care to watch all their BTC disappear for some pie in the sky idea that is half-ass executed.

You see, a lot of what success in Alt Coins is about is 'PERCEPTION'. When you allow miners, rapers, and speculators to drive a price down into the dirt, you destroy the 'belief' that this coin can pass the test of time, AND THE AVERAGE INVESTOR IN CRYPTO-CURRENCY WILL NOT BUY AND HOLD YOUR COIN!

This creates the vicious cycle we have seen play out with almost every Alt. Coin to date. The stabilization fund is a brilliant way to cut down on 'volatility' and help stop the cycle of never ending selling that will happen if there is not a belief in higher prices in the future.

I understand curing cancer is great, but you have to also understand that a HIGHER SATOSHI price will lead to more folding and lead to curing cancer faster. Letting this coin go down to 5 satoshi will not HELP IN THAT GOAL!!!!!

THINK ABOUT IT. Every 1,000 Curecoins the devs could have sold above 100,000 satoshi could be used now to buy 10X as many coins on the bid, and support the price. They could have done the same thing the whole way down. This would enable them to create some stability and stop the panic selling that is inevitable when you allow the price to tumble without any clear way to stop it.

SO yeah, call me STUPID. Why the hell do you want me to prove how many coins I own? How is that relevant to helping this coin succeed? You will get a good idea of how many coins I have by looking at the volume at the end of the day today and seeing where the price ends up.

I am not trying to 'destroy' this coin. I truly liked the idea and believed in it, but the lack of action from the developers and support structure to outside ideas is pathetic. They sit in their ivory tower, getting more coins into their private 'funds', so I guess they don't give a $hit if the price goes down right? That just hurts the 'small guy' or the average investor' The almighty geniuses who created this coin can just sit back on their a$$es now and high-five eachother about how smart they are curing cancer.

Too bad that is a sure path to destruction, not me selling my coins on the open market. I am just calling a spade a spade. I know that the truth hurts sometimes, and therefore you attack my intelligence ad hominem because you CANNOT attack my argument about WHY they would not create a stabilization fund with all those coins that are sitting in their coffers for some 'future wonderful idea'.

Guess what, that future Idea won't buy you a cheeseburger if you sell those coins when this goes to 5 satoshi. So lets use that BTC that could be raised now to start SUPPORTING THIS COIN proactively. I feel the devs hearts are in the right place, but they obviously don't understand how to market or the economics of Price/ Supply / Demand in regards to Alt. Coins.

Hell, sell all their stash now and bribe a major publication to publish an article about what that coin does. That would be worth 5x whatever they will be trying to do at the conference. Are the 'astute investors' paying for the devs plane tickets, hotels & fancy steak dinners also? This is very reminiscent of some wall street companies I knew who have fleeced investors over and over again all for their own good.

Like the old saying goes, I take 'your money' and 'my experience', and turn it into 'my money' and 'your experience'.


Cryptsy Trade Key: fa9ad1332f179b704068b9a8a3cac5e08951b516

Sign up to trade on 100+ Alt Cryptos on Cryptsy Here: https://www.cryptsy.com/users/register?refid=100996

(I will send you a EAC Bonus for signing up under my link above - PM me your Cryptsy trade key once registered)

EAC: eVbBNty7AGwA26ZQpkyVjkoM5XoMiQCoLY

Contact ATXSilver@Gmail.com
FifthGhostbuster
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July 05, 2014, 02:50:13 AM
 #2471

Actually I paid for my tickets and hotel all by my self thank you.
Please sell your coin I would love to buy it.
Thanks in advance.
FGB

Go CureCoin!
FifthGhostbuster
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July 05, 2014, 04:52:04 AM
 #2472

Quick Dev Update:

We had a G+ Chat for a few hours to hammer down the conference details. We are planning on having two standing banners, and a table runner. FifthGB made an awesome Android informational app you can download here: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.conduit.app_f160cb96dde1445793dc95ed77265ae3.app and I'll be working with him to get it onto the iOS store as well. Bitcoin conference reservation is set in stone, and the Curecoin booth will be open for business. Smiley

In other news, I'm putting the finishing touches on a simple visually-oriented document outlining how a certificate-based blockchain will work, though keep in mind the development and integration of such a system is quite a ways in the future, and involves multiple participating universities. For clarification, if such a system is implemented, all curecoins *will* transfer over to the new system. We're not going to start fresh or anything silly like that.

So excited for the conference should bring alot of press and attention to this project!

Go CureCoin!
Aboy68
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July 05, 2014, 05:22:35 AM
 #2473

Quick Dev Update:

We had a G+ Chat for a few hours to hammer down the conference details. We are planning on having two standing banners, and a table runner. FifthGB made an awesome Android informational app you can download here: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.conduit.app_f160cb96dde1445793dc95ed77265ae3.app and I'll be working with him to get it onto the iOS store as well. Bitcoin conference reservation is set in stone, and the Curecoin booth will be open for business. Smiley

In other news, I'm putting the finishing touches on a simple visually-oriented document outlining how a certificate-based blockchain will work, though keep in mind the development and integration of such a system is quite a ways in the future, and involves multiple participating universities. For clarification, if such a system is implemented, all curecoins *will* transfer over to the new system. We're not going to start fresh or anything silly like that.

So excited for the conference should bring alot of press and attention to this project!

You are doing a great work, keep on believe in cures!
//Aboy68
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July 05, 2014, 03:11:56 PM
 #2474

Thank you! I personally will never give up until we find the cure.

Go CureCoin!
Hippie Tech
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July 05, 2014, 04:10:29 PM
 #2475

Thank you! I personally will never give up until we find the cure.

Compute this. Wink

Top Secret Water --> http://youtu.be/mJhogR7YLps

Structured Water, The Future of Medicine part 1 --> http://youtu.be/taBWLJ9mrZQ

Wilhelm Reich - Man's Right to Know --> http://youtu.be/gNYmBDvSwOw

The Rick Simpson Story - Run From the Cure --> http://youtu.be/0psJhQHk_GI

Simply Raw --> http://youtu.be/2pjkC71exKU





ChasingTheDream
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July 05, 2014, 07:59:28 PM
 #2476

@ATXsilver

It sounds like you have invested some money into this coin and are now in the hole so-to-speak.  That is unfortunate!
I understand your anger at the price decline, but I don't think insulting the dev's is going to help your situation.  The volume on the exchanges would imply that very few if any have done "massive" dumping.  There simply isn't enough volume on the exchanges to support a massive dump.

I do hope more awareness comes to CureCoin because I believe using our processing power for something useful (science) to get coins is a lot more valuable than mining other algorithms for coins and doing nothing useful at all in the process.

In any event, the chips will fall where they may so-to-speak, but I'll keep folding regardless.  I'm not in a hurry to be rewarded for my folding.  I treated this as a gamble from the beginning but this gamble just might save lives.
Aboy68
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July 05, 2014, 09:28:51 PM
 #2477

Thank you! I personally will never give up until we find the cure.

Compute this. Wink

Top Secret Water --> http://youtu.be/mJhogR7YLps

Structured Water, The Future of Medicine part 1 --> http://youtu.be/taBWLJ9mrZQ

Wilhelm Reich - Man's Right to Know --> http://youtu.be/gNYmBDvSwOw

The Rick Simpson Story - Run From the Cure --> http://youtu.be/0psJhQHk_GI

Simply Raw --> http://youtu.be/2pjkC71exKU

Yes I think there are a lot of stuff to learn about water.
We used before have a natural water spring we did drink from and it felt energizing. I hope I find a new one again!
//Aboy68



Kuttingcorners
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July 05, 2014, 09:39:15 PM
 #2478

I am sorry guys. I will be dumping my 100,000 plus curecoins today on the open market. Please put your buy orders out there. I have had enough of watching these incompetent fools who pass as devs watch idly as the price just slowly dies toward 0. I will put it at 0 where it belongs since no one else seems to give a $hit. Sad that such a great idea will become a worthless afterthought in crypto world and will never be a major force. They should have partnered with a charity or had someone with half a brain get a PR on a major news line. I guess this is what happens when programmers try to create a coin with a sizeable IPO (Red flag - they obviously have been dumping big time, did the devs not try to get people who cared about the long term goals of this coin? They just sold to whoever had shiny money in their hands and let them dump whenever they want?)

All the free coins going to the devs personal piggy bank and they refuse to sell any of them on this terrible slide down to put in bids to help buoy the price at a reasonable level?

They will not do any measures to stabilize this price and create some investor confidence? Just attending some conference in the future is not good enough, they need concrete measures to stabilize this coin.

Donate a bunch of the coins you get free everyday to a marketing firm, how about that? Or hire someone who is huge on twitter like @Bryce_Weiner to help with the coin and get a solid following.

I loved the idea, but I am not a stupid person, and I know I can buy 10x as many coins next month when the price is 100 satoshi. So you will be seeing my sell orders crashing the price today and tomorrow if I can't get out of all my coins.

I have had enough. This $hit pisses me off and unfortunately I think this may just be another clever way to enrich a few at the expense of the many. After all, the path to HELL is paved with good intentions.



SHAME ON YOU DEVS - SHAMEFUL!

Use your personal fortunes you've made off this coin to do something to support the FU$)*NG PRICE!

Look out below!

 









poor guy have you never bought a coin that dropped in value ? In my mind money making was second when it comes to cure coin i hope I'm not being taking advantage of having a sick mom but until i find out that i am i will mine this coin.


sling!
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July 06, 2014, 04:53:07 AM
 #2479

Hey guys! Work continues on conference-related stuff, but we developers are also brewing a few other elixirs of interest.

One of the ideas thrown around the virtual, coffee-stained conference table recently was the use of quantum-computer-resistant signature algorithms. Without going too deep into concepts tangentially related the matter at hand, hashing functions, due in part to the 'loss' of data that occurs during the function (Imagine a simple example of a 'secret' being the two numbers 12 and 20. A *very* simple, collision-prone, insecure method of verifying those numbers at a later point in time without storing the actual numbers would be to store some mathematical, repeatable function of the two, something such as multiplication. If a person were able to acquire the hash '240' and try to find the original inputs, they would get a ton of matching input pairs: (1, 240), (2, 120), (3, 80), ... (15, 16). This availability of collisions makes the actual function 'lossy'. Such an example is clearly an exploitable system, and is only for visualization purposes. The complex reduction, data loss, and mixing occur primarily through logical (AND, OR, XOR) operations, rolling reels of numbers effecting each other, sponge functions, etc., and make reversing an output back to an input 'impossible'.) are assumed to map inputs to realistically-unique outputs of a (usually) fixed length. As such, they are not prone to math-based attacks from quantum computing algorithms against classical computational encryption algorithms (RSA, ECDSA...).

What's so important about cryptographic signatures? For the purposes of a terribly inaccurate analogy, imagine your cryptocurrency wallets as a checkbook. You can write an amount, a destination, and a dollar value, but without your signature, the filled-out check has absolutely no ability to actually transfer currency. However, once you put your signature (which is, historically, important since they are *relatively* hard to imitate as well as hard for the signer to deny signing the check) on the check, it can be used to transfer funds. If you wrote a check for $10 to your friend but never submitted it to the bank (blockchain), the money never gets transferred. However, once the check gets cashed by your friend, the funds get transferred from your account to your friend's, and if you later deny signing the check, someone can simply show your signature. Either your signature was compromised, or you signed the document. This is known as a promise of non-repudiation. Signatures on the blockchain work to ensure that anyone can see the balance of an address (to verify you have the money you are trying to spend), but you can only spend money from an address you have control over. Asymmetrical cryptography allows for signatures to be privately generated but publicly verified.

Bitcoin addresses are formed in the following manner: address = Base58(versionByte + RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(publickey)) + SHA-256(SHA2-56(RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(publickey)))).substring(0, 4)) where ‘+’ represents a concatenation operator. Fun, right? If you prefer a visual simplification:


As such, simply accepting coins at an address does not reveal your public OR private key to the network. As such, the Bitcoin network is unable to differentiate between a valid and an invalid address--the only possible sanity check is a built-in checksum as shown above (the second, partial SHA256D hash appended to the end) which helps to eliminate mistypes. However, due to the nature of hashing functions being assumed to be one-way, the only way we can prove we own such a certain address, when we decide we want to spend the coins, is to publicly reveal the public key. In the absence of an efficient way to factor large numbers (either by an *extremely* unlikely breakthrough in mathematics, or more likely through the practical implementation of Shor's algorithm (or in the case of ECDSA, a modified derivative) or another quantum-computer-algorithm), ECDSA and RSA are extremely secure. However, when very large numbers can be efficiently factored, there are serious concerns about the safety of classic computational cryptography as it exists today. The only way the Bitcoin network would be safe in the event of a quantum computer capable of factoring large numbers would be to switch to a one-time-use address system. Today, one Bitcoin address can send and receive as many transactions as desired with safety. However, due to the nature of address generation above, after the address signs one transaction, the public key is revealed, in order to prove ownership of the address. Until a valid transaction originates from an address, the public key behind the address is safely masked by one-way cryptography (hashing functions). However, upon signing a transaction and broadcasting the public key, quantum computer attacks on that address become possible.

In a post-quantum-computing environment, as soon as an address signs a transaction, and remaining coins on the address are put at risk. As such, the various methods by which Bitcoin addresses are used multiple times today (tip jars, many payment processing services, etc.) would have to transition to a system of one-time address use, which not only decreases the compressibility of the blockchain, but also acts to make the currency harder to use. Imagine having to give your workplace a new bank account to deposit for every payday...

ECDSA has several properties that make it desirable for use in efficient cryptocurrencies: small signature size, fast verification, and small public key size. Additionally, the computational power required for key generation is trivial.

Any alternative to ECDSA aimed at being quantum-computing-resistant must, to avoid blockchain bloat and computational bloat, have relatively small signatures, public keys, and be easy to verify, allowing for network growth. Under the validated assumption that cryptographic one-way algorithms such as the popular SHA-family of hashing functions are secure against quantum-computers based on their reliance on lost data rather than on mathematically-hard problems, signatures built on top of hashing algorithms inherit similar properties. One simple example of such a signature method is the Lamport Signature, which is a one-time signature.
To summarize Lamport (when used with SHA256, and where 'User' refers to a computer generating and using an address):
-> User generates 256 random inputs (preferably somewhat long, and a mix of numbers, letters, symbols, and even non-printable characters if desired)
-> User divides these 256 inputs into 128 pairs of two inputs
-> User hashes each input and stores the hash output
-> User publishes all 256 outputs to the network (for our purposes, consider this group of 256 outputs to be the public key and address!)
-> User signs away coins the network recorded as belonging to the published public key/address by:
--->User writes and hashes a transaction message (simplification: "I sign all 8.3 coins from transaction (TxID) to address (address)")
--->User lays out the SHA256 hash in binary
--->User submitts the corresponding private keys (For example, if they were signing the four bits "0110", they would submit the first (position: zero) private key from the first group, the second (position: one) from the second group, the second (position: one) from the third group, and finally the first (position: zero) from the fourth group) to the network. The network can then hash the private keys and see that they match the public keys, and can also verify that the user signed that particular message by hashing the message, and seeing that only the private keys corresponding to the binary representation of the hash of the message are published, while the others (the 2nd in the 1st set, the 1st in the 2nd set, the 1st in the 3rd set, and the 2nd in the 4th set) are not made public. If the address owner were to sign another message, he or she would have to reveal other parts of their private key, which compromises the security by allowing full sets (rather than one of two hashes in a set) to be published, allowing an attacking party to possibly forge messages. As such, Lamport signatures are one-way, one-use.

Lamport signatures have two obvious shortcommings: huge public key sizes, and one-time use.

However, the basic logic lamport signatures are based on can be extended in such a way that a Lamport-esque signature scheme can be reduced to a *very* small public key (in some capacity smaller than ECDSA) as well as having reasonable signature sizes (larger than ECDSA, but not large enough to be impractical for blockchain usage). Such implementations use merkle trees to make signatures able to sign huge amounts of transactions (think 2^20 to 2^40, far beyond practical application, and thus not limiting the effectiveness of an address generation/transaction signing algorithm pair) while only adding much size to the blockchain when actually creating a transaction, and when creating a transaction adding what iss still a manageable amount of data. Such a system would allow the network to be resistant to quantum computing attacks against every implemented cryptographic method, and would make addresses reusable, while not drastically increasing the footprint of the blockchain. Optimized versions of such a signing algorithm (such as CMSS and GMSS) offer all of the above properties, and, given an efficient, cryptographically-sane, time-tested hashing algorithm, are extremely secure. GMSS, currently, is mildly impractical due to the time taken to generate private keys, and thus CMSS is the valid, considered option of the pair.

The hashing algorithm can be comprised of several chained hashing algorithms, so that if some of the hashing algorithms were ever cracked, or at the least attacked with some form of reduction function, the network would still be secure, as there would still stand unbreakable links in the signing algorithm due to the unbroken hashing algorithms. For a simplification, imagine I have the ability to perform four processes on a string. I do all four in order, twice, such that I take the output of process one, put it into process two, take that output, into process three, from three to four, then from four to one to two to three back to four, so they are stacked and none end the chain without also appearing elsewhere in the chain. A mild acquaintance of mine knows how to reverse processes four and two, but is unable to undo processes three and one. Given the output, he is able to reverse it from 8 stages to seven stages of length (or how the string of text I had appeared once it went 1->2->3->4->1->2->3 when it was about to enter process four again). From here, he would have to reverse process three in order to continue on. Since he is unable to do so, he is unable to reverse the entire function, despite having a fully functional attack against one of the components. Likewise, if several hashing algorithms are chained together (such as is done in X11/X13/X14/X15/X<your weekly flavor>), multiple algorithms can be broken without causing insecurities in the currency.

While the isn't the guaranteed be-all-end-all solution to the quantum computing problem, lamport-based signature schemes and other similar schemes based only on the cryptographic integrity intrinsically provided by hashing functions is a promising next step in future-proofing cryptocurrency networks. Such a system also opens the interesting possibility of a tradeoff between computational power to generate a private key, and the security/size of the keypair, though the security offered by a default-parameter implementation of aforementioned algorithms would provide more than sufficient security.

Fold Proteins, earn cryptos! CureCoin.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=603757.0
ChasingTheDream
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July 06, 2014, 10:02:54 PM
 #2480

Hey guys! Work continues on conference-related stuff, but we developers are also brewing a few other elixirs of interest.

One of the ideas thrown around the virtual, coffee-stained conference table recently was the use of quantum-computer-resistant signature algorithms. Without going too deep into concepts tangentially related the matter at hand, hashing functions, due in part to the 'loss' of data that occurs during the function (Imagine a simple example of a 'secret' being the two numbers 12 and 20. A *very* simple, collision-prone, insecure method of verifying those numbers at a later point in time without storing the actual numbers would be to store some mathematical, repeatable function of the two, something such as multiplication. If a person were able to acquire the hash '240' and try to find the original inputs, they would get a ton of matching input pairs: (1, 240), (2, 120), (3, 80), ... (15, 16). This availability of collisions makes the actual function 'lossy'. Such an example is clearly an exploitable system, and is only for visualization purposes. The complex reduction, data loss, and mixing occur primarily through logical (AND, OR, XOR) operations, rolling reels of numbers effecting each other, sponge functions, etc., and make reversing an output back to an input 'impossible'.) are assumed to map inputs to realistically-unique outputs of a (usually) fixed length. As such, they are not prone to math-based attacks from quantum computing algorithms against classical computational encryption algorithms (RSA, ECDSA...).

What's so important about cryptographic signatures? For the purposes of a terribly inaccurate analogy, imagine your cryptocurrency wallets as a checkbook. You can write an amount, a destination, and a dollar value, but without your signature, the filled-out check has absolutely no ability to actually transfer currency. However, once you put your signature (which is, historically, important since they are *relatively* hard to imitate as well as hard for the signer to deny signing the check) on the check, it can be used to transfer funds. If you wrote a check for $10 to your friend but never submitted it to the bank (blockchain), the money never gets transferred. However, once the check gets cashed by your friend, the funds get transferred from your account to your friend's, and if you later deny signing the check, someone can simply show your signature. Either your signature was compromised, or you signed the document. This is known as a promise of non-repudiation. Signatures on the blockchain work to ensure that anyone can see the balance of an address (to verify you have the money you are trying to spend), but you can only spend money from an address you have control over. Asymmetrical cryptography allows for signatures to be privately generated but publicly verified.

Bitcoin addresses are formed in the following manner: address = Base58(versionByte + RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(publickey)) + SHA-256(SHA2-56(RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(publickey)))).substring(0, 4)) where ‘+’ represents a concatenation operator. Fun, right? If you prefer a visual simplification:


As such, simply accepting coins at an address does not reveal your public OR private key to the network. As such, the Bitcoin network is unable to differentiate between a valid and an invalid address--the only possible sanity check is a built-in checksum as shown above (the second, partial SHA256D hash appended to the end) which helps to eliminate mistypes. However, due to the nature of hashing functions being assumed to be one-way, the only way we can prove we own such a certain address, when we decide we want to spend the coins, is to publicly reveal the public key. In the absence of an efficient way to factor large numbers (either by an *extremely* unlikely breakthrough in mathematics, or more likely through the practical implementation of Shor's algorithm (or in the case of ECDSA, a modified derivative) or another quantum-computer-algorithm), ECDSA and RSA are extremely secure. However, when very large numbers can be efficiently factored, there are serious concerns about the safety of classic computational cryptography as it exists today. The only way the Bitcoin network would be safe in the event of a quantum computer capable of factoring large numbers would be to switch to a one-time-use address system. Today, one Bitcoin address can send and receive as many transactions as desired with safety. However, due to the nature of address generation above, after the address signs one transaction, the public key is revealed, in order to prove ownership of the address. Until a valid transaction originates from an address, the public key behind the address is safely masked by one-way cryptography (hashing functions). However, upon signing a transaction and broadcasting the public key, quantum computer attacks on that address become possible.

In a post-quantum-computing environment, as soon as an address signs a transaction, and remaining coins on the address are put at risk. As such, the various methods by which Bitcoin addresses are used multiple times today (tip jars, many payment processing services, etc.) would have to transition to a system of one-time address use, which not only decreases the compressibility of the blockchain, but also acts to make the currency harder to use. Imagine having to give your workplace a new bank account to deposit for every payday...

ECDSA has several properties that make it desirable for use in efficient cryptocurrencies: small signature size, fast verification, and small public key size. Additionally, the computational power required for key generation is trivial.

Any alternative to ECDSA aimed at being quantum-computing-resistant must, to avoid blockchain bloat and computational bloat, have relatively small signatures, public keys, and be easy to verify, allowing for network growth. Under the validated assumption that cryptographic one-way algorithms such as the popular SHA-family of hashing functions are secure against quantum-computers based on their reliance on lost data rather than on mathematically-hard problems, signatures built on top of hashing algorithms inherit similar properties. One simple example of such a signature method is the Lamport Signature, which is a one-time signature.
To summarize Lamport (when used with SHA256, and where 'User' refers to a computer generating and using an address):
-> User generates 256 random inputs (preferably somewhat long, and a mix of numbers, letters, symbols, and even non-printable characters if desired)
-> User divides these 256 inputs into 128 pairs of two inputs
-> User hashes each input and stores the hash output
-> User publishes all 256 outputs to the network (for our purposes, consider this group of 256 outputs to be the public key and address!)
-> User signs away coins the network recorded as belonging to the published public key/address by:
--->User writes and hashes a transaction message (simplification: "I sign all 8.3 coins from transaction (TxID) to address (address)")
--->User lays out the SHA256 hash in binary
--->User submitts the corresponding private keys (For example, if they were signing the four bits "0110", they would submit the first (position: zero) private key from the first group, the second (position: one) from the second group, the second (position: one) from the third group, and finally the first (position: zero) from the fourth group) to the network. The network can then hash the private keys and see that they match the public keys, and can also verify that the user signed that particular message by hashing the message, and seeing that only the private keys corresponding to the binary representation of the hash of the message are published, while the others (the 2nd in the 1st set, the 1st in the 2nd set, the 1st in the 3rd set, and the 2nd in the 4th set) are not made public. If the address owner were to sign another message, he or she would have to reveal other parts of their private key, which compromises the security by allowing full sets (rather than one of two hashes in a set) to be published, allowing an attacking party to possibly forge messages. As such, Lamport signatures are one-way, one-use.

Lamport signatures have two obvious shortcommings: huge public key sizes, and one-time use.

However, the basic logic lamport signatures are based on can be extended in such a way that a Lamport-esque signature scheme can be reduced to a *very* small public key (in some capacity smaller than ECDSA) as well as having reasonable signature sizes (larger than ECDSA, but not large enough to be impractical for blockchain usage). Such implementations use merkle trees to make signatures able to sign huge amounts of transactions (think 2^20 to 2^40, far beyond practical application, and thus not limiting the effectiveness of an address generation/transaction signing algorithm pair) while only adding much size to the blockchain when actually creating a transaction, and when creating a transaction adding what iss still a manageable amount of data. Such a system would allow the network to be resistant to quantum computing attacks against every implemented cryptographic method, and would make addresses reusable, while not drastically increasing the footprint of the blockchain. Optimized versions of such a signing algorithm (such as CMSS and GMSS) offer all of the above properties, and, given an efficient, cryptographically-sane, time-tested hashing algorithm, are extremely secure. GMSS, currently, is mildly impractical due to the time taken to generate private keys, and thus CMSS is the valid, considered option of the pair.

The hashing algorithm can be comprised of several chained hashing algorithms, so that if some of the hashing algorithms were ever cracked, or at the least attacked with some form of reduction function, the network would still be secure, as there would still stand unbreakable links in the signing algorithm due to the unbroken hashing algorithms. For a simplification, imagine I have the ability to perform four processes on a string. I do all four in order, twice, such that I take the output of process one, put it into process two, take that output, into process three, from three to four, then from four to one to two to three back to four, so they are stacked and none end the chain without also appearing elsewhere in the chain. A mild acquaintance of mine knows how to reverse processes four and two, but is unable to undo processes three and one. Given the output, he is able to reverse it from 8 stages to seven stages of length (or how the string of text I had appeared once it went 1->2->3->4->1->2->3 when it was about to enter process four again). From here, he would have to reverse process three in order to continue on. Since he is unable to do so, he is unable to reverse the entire function, despite having a fully functional attack against one of the components. Likewise, if several hashing algorithms are chained together (such as is done in X11/X13/X14/X15/X<your weekly flavor>), multiple algorithms can be broken without causing insecurities in the currency.

While the isn't the guaranteed be-all-end-all solution to the quantum computing problem, lamport-based signature schemes and other similar schemes based only on the cryptographic integrity intrinsically provided by hashing functions is a promising next step in future-proofing cryptocurrency networks. Such a system also opens the interesting possibility of a tradeoff between computational power to generate a private key, and the security/size of the keypair, though the security offered by a default-parameter implementation of aforementioned algorithms would provide more than sufficient security.

Very interesting post!  I had no idea the issues you are talking about were actually issues.  Thanks for sharing your thoughts.
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