GAW / Josh Garza discussion Paycoin XPY xpy.io ION ionomy. ALWAYS MAKE MONEY :)

[MinermanNC]

Who designed the dancing Josh Jester? that's pretty good! 

[Paul Revere]

Ya, xpy at .77 cents ,,, I feel for those who bought in at $4.. or higher.... I am still scratching my head at all of this  

Who designed the dancing Josh Jester? that's pretty good!  

My GIF skillz are improving.  

And here some people actually pay to sit in a classroom to learn this stuff!

P.S; The dancer is from this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGNiXGX2nLU

Pump and Dump! Round Round Baby!

[owlcatz]

Ya, xpy at .77 cents ,,, I feel for those who bought in at $4.. or higher.... I am still scratching my head at all of this  

This shitshow never ends, it's amazing. you could make a movie probably once all the truths finally come out like with BFL.  

[jimmothy]

You don't know what you are talking about.  Faster blocks doesn't mean anything.  If bitcoin forked to 1 minute block times, then a transaction with 10 confirmations would be just as secure as one with one confirmation how it is now.  It's not the number of confirmations, its TIME.

That's not true. Each block race is a discrete event, so the chance of a specific miner beating the world to a set of, say, six blocks in a row should be roughly the same regardless of the time between blocks. Difficulty might change the curve a little, but, for the most part, it's the chance of winning a set of races cumulatively that matters.

Given X amount of hashpower and Y difficulty, the time to find a block on average is 10 minutes.  The block time is manipulated by adjusting the difficulty, so your statement is incorrect.  If you want 1 minute bitcoin blocktimes with the same amount of hashpower that exists today, you must decrease the difficulty by a factor of 10, you can't get around that.  So you see, decreasing the time between blocks does nothing, it just decreases the difficulty and thus the security.

So I say again..security of the blockchain given X amount of hashpower is proportional to time, not blocks.

Your belief is a common misconception.

If I understand it correctly, this paper:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
on page 8 argues that the probability of an attacker generating an alternate chain depends on the number of confirmations (z), not on the time between confirmations. Is the analysis wrong?

I believe that paper is referring to the likelihood per attack. If the attacker has 10% hashrate and confirmation time is 4 blocks, they have a 1% chance of a successful brute force attack. If there are ~10,000 blocks per hour, they could have thousands of tries.

[bananafana]

If I understand it correctly, this paper:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
on page 8 argues that the probability of an attacker generating an alternate chain depends on the number of confirmations (z), not on the time between confirmations. Is the analysis wrong?

I believe that paper is referring to the likelihood per attack. If the attacker has 10% hashrate and confirmation time is 4 blocks, they have a 1% chance of a successful brute force attack. If there are ~10,000 blocks per hour, they could have thousands of tries.

The first results at the top of page 8 would be the case of an attacker having 10% of the total hashrate. The calculated result is that if you have four confirmations (z=4) then P=0.0035, i.e., the probability of a successful attack is 0.35%. With six confirmations the probability of a successful attack drops to 0.02%. With ten confirmations the probability of a successful attack is 0.0000012 or about one in a million.

Note that this is independent of the confirmation rate. You can make the confirmation time as short as you want, and the analysis is the same.

[TheReaper]

Finally got banned. LOL
here's what finally did it:

I made a post about cryptowarehouse selling physical paycoin and how I bought one as a momento of the time I got scammed by Josh and as a reminder to myself to always keep your eyes open. Then Josh sends me a chat message and this is how it went.
http://s2.postimg.org/7nq1t4vt5/josh_mad.jpg

[buddhamangler]

If I understand it correctly, this paper:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
on page 8 argues that the probability of an attacker generating an alternate chain depends on the number of confirmations (z), not on the time between confirmations. Is the analysis wrong?

I believe that paper is referring to the likelihood per attack. If the attacker has 10% hashrate and confirmation time is 4 blocks, they have a 1% chance of a successful brute force attack. If there are ~10,000 blocks per hour, they could have thousands of tries.

The first results at the top of page 8 would be the case of an attacker having 10% of the total hashrate. The calculated result is that if you have four confirmations (z=4) then P=0.0035, i.e., the probability of a successful attack is 0.35%. With six confirmations the probability of a successful attack drops to 0.02%. With ten confirmations the probability of a successful attack is 0.0000012 or about one in a million.

Note that this is independent of the confirmation rate. You can make the confirmation time as short as you want, and the analysis is the same.

You may be right banana, I had never really looked at that equation.  If I was wrong, I can own that.  Still, this idea that a confirmation of a minute vs 10 minutes.  The block size is about to go to 20MB, can you imagine a 1 minute block time with 20MB block?  It would cause so many forks.

[eoakland]

Finally got banned. LOL
here's what finally did it:

I made a post about cryptowarehouse selling physical paycoin and how I bought one as a momento of the time I got scammed by Josh and as a reminder to myself to always keep your eyes open. Then Josh sends me a chat message and this is how it went.

the craziest thing about this is the "CEO" really believes he is in the right.  outside of crypto, i cannot think of anything else that could have been more misleading, misrepresented, and flat out fraud that would not have some legal ramifications by now.  how is Josh not behind bars ? 

[Paul Revere]

Now that I am about ready for beddy bye my price alarm goes off. Not going to buy in now though, this was where I was looking to ride the turdwagon earlier.



P.S: Welcome aboard Reaper. If you can stick out the inevitable barrage of shit heading your way I think you will find this forum a lot more beneficial than HT.

[siampumpkin]

Finally got banned. LOL
here's what finally did it:

I made a post about cryptowarehouse selling physical paycoin and how I bought one as a momento of the time I got scammed by Josh and as a reminder to myself to always keep your eyes open. Then Josh sends me a chat message and this is how it went.

I am amazed he bothers chatting and replying to most of these messages. He reminds me of the trolls on BBS's when I was 14. I think Homero's mental age is no higher than 15. LOL , What a fool Josh is.

[vObh0n]6W]

If I understand it correctly, this paper:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
on page 8 argues that the probability of an attacker generating an alternate chain depends on the number of confirmations (z), not on the time between confirmations. Is the analysis wrong?

I believe that paper is referring to the likelihood per attack. If the attacker has 10% hashrate and confirmation time is 4 blocks, they have a 1% chance of a successful brute force attack. If there are ~10,000 blocks per hour, they could have thousands of tries.

The first results at the top of page 8 would be the case of an attacker having 10% of the total hashrate. The calculated result is that if you have four confirmations (z=4) then P=0.0035, i.e., the probability of a successful attack is 0.35%. With six confirmations the probability of a successful attack drops to 0.02%. With ten confirmations the probability of a successful attack is 0.0000012 or about one in a million.

Note that this is independent of the confirmation rate. You can make the confirmation time as short as you want, and the analysis is the same.

You may be right banana, I had never really looked at that equation.  If I was wrong, I can own that.  Still, this idea that a confirmation of a minute vs 10 minutes.  The block size is about to go to 20MB, can you imagine a 1 minute block time with 20MB block?  It would cause so many forks.

By the time there are actually enough transactions to make a block 20MB, bandwidth and related things will be much higher.

You want to do your own analysis of how a larger block size affects forking rate?

[WaffleMaster]

Finally got banned. LOL
here's what finally did it:

I made a post about cryptowarehouse selling physical paycoin and how I bought one as a momento of the time I got scammed by Josh and as a reminder to myself to always keep your eyes open. Then Josh sends me a chat message and this is how it went.
http://s2.postimg.org/7nq1t4vt5/josh_mad.jpg

wow never expected to see you here lol



here you can have this back lol

Oh shit this made my night. Glad you came around Reaper. Although you were a very active part in the whole streaming thing.

[Paul Revere]

A little blast from the past:

[buddhamangler]

If I understand it correctly, this paper:
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
on page 8 argues that the probability of an attacker generating an alternate chain depends on the number of confirmations (z), not on the time between confirmations. Is the analysis wrong?

I believe that paper is referring to the likelihood per attack. If the attacker has 10% hashrate and confirmation time is 4 blocks, they have a 1% chance of a successful brute force attack. If there are ~10,000 blocks per hour, they could have thousands of tries.

The first results at the top of page 8 would be the case of an attacker having 10% of the total hashrate. The calculated result is that if you have four confirmations (z=4) then P=0.0035, i.e., the probability of a successful attack is 0.35%. With six confirmations the probability of a successful attack drops to 0.02%. With ten confirmations the probability of a successful attack is 0.0000012 or about one in a million.

Note that this is independent of the confirmation rate. You can make the confirmation time as short as you want, and the analysis is the same.

You may be right banana, I had never really looked at that equation.  If I was wrong, I can own that.  Still, this idea that a confirmation of a minute vs 10 minutes.  The block size is about to go to 20MB, can you imagine a 1 minute block time with 20MB block?  It would cause so many forks.

By the time there are actually enough transactions to make a block 20MB, bandwidth and related things will be much higher.

You want to do your own analysis of how a larger block size affects forking rate?

I agree.

In terms of 0 confirmation spends, 1 minute might as well be 10 minutes might as well be 100 minutes.  Your average credit card transaction is on the order of seconds.  NO store is going to be willing to wait for a confirmation in either case.  This is why coinbase exists, they don't need to wait, the store gets the green light immediately and coinbase takes the risk.  As the volume goes up, that fee will go down no doubt.  This is also totally separate from sidechain solutions.

[strangerdanger101]

We're totally not stalkers

[bumpershot]

In terms of 0 confirmation spends, 1 minute might as well be 10 minutes might as well be 100 minutes.  Your average credit card transaction is on the order of seconds.  NO store is going to be willing to wait for a confirmation in either case.  This is why coinbase exists, they don't need to wait, the store gets the green light immediately and coinbase takes the risk.  As the volume goes up, that fee will go down no doubt.  This is also totally separate from sidechain solutions.

This is exactly right. Bitcoin's block rate still has everything settled with very high certainty after a couple of hours. No matter what coin you use, there's going to have to be a third party that charges a fee to assume the transaction risk, and two hours isn't really different from 20 minutes. Although I still contend that a faster block creation rate is more secure, I also understand that it doesn't really matter in normal use because a third party will be assuming the same amount of risk regardless.

[Crestington]

Finally got banned. LOL
here's what finally did it:

I made a post about cryptowarehouse selling physical paycoin and how I bought one as a momento of the time I got scammed by Josh and as a reminder to myself to always keep your eyes open. Then Josh sends me a chat message and this is how it went.

the craziest thing about this is the "CEO" really believes he is in the right.  outside of crypto, i cannot think of anything else that could have been more misleading, misrepresented, and flat out fraud that would not have some legal ramifications by now.  how is Josh not behind bars ?  

The fact that Josh offered all these services in the first place without even knowing what was legal and what was not is the problem. It doesn't take a genius to think "oh hey maybe we should consult with Walmart, Target, and the legalities of a $20 floor and have it all in place BEFORE we start offering it to people"

PayCoin is still shit after 1130 pages and still no features and people are still losing money every day because now they have no money, no staff and are tied up with all their attorneys and have to dump Coins into the market to pay for it, no way you can work on features when all of your time is being spent talking to lawyers....

If you bought and held PayCoin at any time before this moment, you have lost money. Only traders have made money playing the market and Josh dumping all his compounding premined Coins.

Of course you can keep drinking the Kool-Aid and ride the XPY train hoping to make back some of that loss but there are tons of Coins (like NXT, BitShares, HoboNickels, BlackCoin, HyperStake, Bottlecaps to name a few) that will actually make you profit over time.

[bumpershot]

If you bought and held PayCoin at any time before this moment, you have lost money. Only traders have made money playing the market and Josh dumping all his compounding premined Coins.

There's also the weird blip in all of this of the hashpoint conversion. If you have Paycoins from the hashpoint conversion, they're still worth more than if you had "mined" BTC instead of getting hashpoints. I think Paycoins would have to dip below 50 cents for the hashpoint "mining" to have not been worth it.

That's still the one part of this that gives me a bit of pause. That hashpoint conversion cost him money, as it released Paycoins into the market depressing the price, and it gave tons of people a way to break even, or even make some profit, at his expense. It's the one thing that makes me think that all of this fraud wasn't really meant to be a scam. That he really thought these lies would lead to everyone making money.

Or it could have been a confidence trick. IDK. It still stands out, though.

[gawneedstobestopped]

http://pastebin.com/srQawuAE

Some fun quotes between Carlos and Rishab...

Thanks my friend do let me know the details of new
products in advance so we can work out a good deal.

I'll see what I can found out in detail of the new
product releases and what would be the most profitable approach.
I sincerely appreciate your
business.

Referring to insider trading on Hashlets being released and/or hitting the hash market... Carlos was giving Rishab the inside scoop to help him be "most profitable".

[jimmothy]

If you bought and held PayCoin at any time before this moment, you have lost money. Only traders have made money playing the market and Josh dumping all his compounding premined Coins.

There's also the weird blip in all of this of the hashpoint conversion. If you have Paycoins from the hashpoint conversion, they're still worth more than if you had "mined" BTC instead of getting hashpoints. I think Paycoins would have to dip below 50 cents for the hashpoint "mining" to have not been worth it.

How did you come up with that number?

That's still the one part of this that gives me a bit of pause. That hashpoint conversion cost him money, as it released Paycoins into the market depressing the price, and it gave tons of people a way to break even, or even make some profit, at his expense. It's the one thing that makes me think that all of this fraud wasn't really meant to be a scam. That he really thought these lies would lead to everyone making money.

Or it could have been a confidence trick. IDK. It still stands out, though.

Initially the promoter will pay out high returns to attract more investors, and to lure current investors into putting in additional money. Other investors begin to participate, leading to a cascade effect. The "return" to the initial investors is paid out of the investments of new entrants, and not out of profits.

Often the high returns encourage investors to leave their money in the scheme, with the result that the promoter does not have to pay out very much to investors; he simply has to send them statements showing how much they have earned. This maintains the deception that the scheme is an investment with high returns.

Promoters also try to minimize withdrawals by offering new plans to investors, often where money is frozen for a longer period of time, in exchange for higher returns. The promoter sees new cash flows as investors are told they cannot transfer money from the first plan to the second. If a few investors do wish to withdraw their money in accordance with the terms allowed, their requests are usually promptly processed, which gives the illusion to all other investors that the fund is solvent.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ponzi_scheme

This was a textbook ponzi scheme.