Pieter fixed the "100% usage on OSX bug" and I created and uploaded a fixed version 0.6.2.2 especially for the Mac.
RE: upgrading: the best upgrade practice is to:
1) Backup your wallet someplace safe (if you're running an 0.6 release then use the Backup Wallet menu item).
2) Shutdown. Make sure Bitcoin isn't still in your system tray-- don't just close the window, shut it down.
3) Wait a minute or two (it can take older versions a minute or two to completely shut down)
4) Install and run the new version.
I know the new version is "faster" to shut down, but how much faster should I expect it to be? I haven't really timed it, but the old version seemed to take between 30 sec and 1 min to shut down completely. |
|
|
|
Please don't blame genjix. It's definitely not his fault.
He's not in our mailing list so it couldn't be him.
Well, shit just happens and it's not anyone's fault or incompetence here. I'm the only guy awake when the incident happens.
Ofcourse it's not his fault... It's not your fault either. It's the hackers' fault. But if you, as a corporation, management and operators included, decide not to reimburse your customers losses, then it's your fault and you should be labeled for what you are. Take a hint from TradeHill. Ok. The password reset email was sent to four addresses. I can already confirm that two of them are not compromised. We are waiting for the rest to wake up and check their email accounts. The email account compromise is the direct cause. Doesn't Rackspace offer you the option of requiring more than one person to sign off on a password change? |
|
|
|
I am angry that our name is being dragged through the mud for something we had no part in.
i dint see your name dragged in mud, less cry more solutions You must be either blind or oblivious? |
|
|
|
There is an awfully lot more noise than signal in this thread.
Definitely. People are reacting emotionally, not rationally. |
|
|
|
|
If you are going to be pushing bitcoin on merchants that are new to it, you should recommend a merchant solution of some sort to go with it. MtGox has the lowest fees, but is very basic, Bit-pay has a complete polished product with reasonable (to some) fees, and I haven't looked into Paysius (sp?) since they started, but they offer more competitive fees. There may be others as well.
|
|
|
|
what happens once all the coins are mined ? do these devices become redundant, or can they be used for other purposes, and other virtual currencies ?
Mining will always be necessary to confirm transactions, and can continue beyond the cessation of the block reward. Once the block reward stops, you can still make blocks by mining them, but they won't have an inbuilt value other than the transaction fees that you choose to include. |
|
|
|
|
I can haz live stream pls?
|
|
|
|
Just read that NVIDIA announces a Open-Source CUDA Compiler.
Anyone interested in seeing if this can provide better hashing results on NVIDIA based cards.
--
Kris
Poor mining performance on NV has precious little to do with the compiler. It's just something their H/W is bad at because of missing circuitry. Pretty much. But damn is it cool for everyone else that can make use of the video card to do computations. Wonder how much speed various supercomputing things will gain. |
|
|
|
the theft won't "devalue" Bitcoins. even if the thief sells it's just another buying opportunity and might cause a temporary dip in the price. but that's assuming he wants to sell. he could be long term speculator like the rest of us hoping the price goes to $100 before he unloads. at the very least it will take him time to sell to get the right price and there's also the possibility mtgox intervenes once again. the only one's who will take a loss here are Zhou and possibly some of his customers.
But of course it will, doc, even if they buy the Bitcoins back at market! Hackers are not speculators, just think about every hack that has happened in Bitcoin’s history and the dumping that followed therafter (it is not as easy anymore since Gox collaborates to track stolen coins, but they just arbitrage it from a different exchange, and I suspect it is usually BTC-E.com). In addition, there is the breach of confidence that this currency is perhaps nothing but a collective subsidy to hackers. Quit trolling, asswipe. Unfounded accusations aren't cool. Also, you are the hacker, send me the money  |
|
|
|
Refund was received. You rock.
I know, but say it again I like it.  TWSS |
|
|
|
...
Gaming rig.
Euh, resize? Click it.... |
|
|
|
My order (3/8/12) was shipped on 5/7 and I received it on 5/8
It's a rev 3 with the smaller extra fan on the bottom.
The thing came with absolutely no documentation, not that I really need it, but perhaps BFL should at least include a piece of paper saying to go to bitcointalk.
Are you sure you didn't miss the nice bit of card stock with links and info? Maybe it's at the bottom of the box. I double checked the box, there's nothing, even stuck under the little flaps of the box.  What info is on that card? Sorry I don't have it beside me otherwise I'd scan it and upload it. You could probably email them for the info. The most important bits are the links to download mining software, but those are on their site anyways. |
|
|
|
|
"Unknown" isn't necessarily a single entity, and often consists of mis-identified known pool blocks.
|
|
|
|
My list of honest buyers:
MasonIII
yunk3r
the joint
And to think that I had doubts. Forgive me for ever considering it. |
|
|
|
The above post was made with a lot of haste, due time constraints. However, I had a little time to think about it, and have refined the procedure a little bit below, to hopefully be a bit more clear: Key #1 is a standard message signing key, and it could be any valid format such as RSA, PGP, GPG, etc. Key #2 is the private key to the bitcoin address that you wish to prove that you own. - Create a message that contains the fingerprint of Key #1, the bitcoin address, the current date and time, and optionally any other info that you want to include such as your -otc nick, you bitcointalk.org nick, your name, etc.
- Sign the message with the bitcoin private key (Key #2).
- Sign the previous signature with Key #1
- Timestamp the whole works with a signature and a time from a trusted timestamp server such as Verisign et al.
- Publish the blob of data on a website somewhere.
The timestamping part of the process is explained somewhat generally here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_timestampingMy understanding is that the data is hashed with a one way hash (perhaps SHA256?) and then the hash is signed by the trusted time stamping authority. I will attempt to demonstrate using my signature donation address, my -otc GPG key, and a public timestamp server. I fear that the process may fall apart at the timestamp step, but hopefully we can figure this out for ease of use in the future. My donation address is: 1NgLdhjHfLbcVawMk4DNEv8yf9ZzzNJV6U My -otc data is here: http://bitcoin-otc.com/viewgpg.php?nick=rjk and the fingerprint is 585C086DAD92DCA4080BD9740B9FF092ACB50C08 My message is as follows: I (rjk) control this bitcoin address: 1NgLdhjHfLbcVawMk4DNEv8yf9ZzzNJV6U My key fingerprint is: 585C086DAD92DCA4080BD9740B9FF092ACB50C08 This message was created 5/10/2012 8:40PM Eastern time When I sign that message with the key for 1NgLdhjHfLbcVawMk4DNEv8yf9ZzzNJV6U, I get the following: G9fe7xx/dCESzyxkpISxCzNXCXYRA7u1ALR8aG8LC4eRGXhApqA9/Q4OSzJiKgf0Pgi5ifnwkHcVSJH93/tadsI= I then sign the signature with my -otc ID: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
G9fe7xx/dCESzyxkpISxCzNXCXYRA7u1ALR8aG8LC4eRGXhApqA9/Q4OSzJiKgf0Pgi5ifnwkHcVSJH93/tadsI=
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPrF8WAAoJEAuf8JKstQwIt4oIAIBTOMSf8Dfa0PcXTlzuhniZ
VdcecUUILR28Ikvq5xux2TrW6dm9hpnkwUcluPeq6pCo9bMlYF+jgN1iTnYUFdN0
wMlB9PSPs5GSN4WDyu5sKdLaN5hVZTXb4IabGJNvDyqkIMco02VgLZR5+AoX6BJj
wh4qk26Ckv/bLjPxRWW57rdUUOw83I/YTTFuPwMQbp8AsJADpRhQJhuNo5aE6SGW
R5c6TiTg9n4Mva02a4YZjzZ+dNuX21mH6hMDroI4pk8gQJz9gWLotGCO0JF59Y7e
uSnWRzT0YJ84cP8uc46LrUWHvgK4kM9jbFlSr8WhPpp/WsH7eGn8sbbH5fH6eFE=
=pKQ2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Now I need to hash the above blob and sign it with a trusted timestamp server. There is a web service at http://timemarker.org/en/GetStamp.aspx but it doesn't seem to load reliably. There may be better services, or it might be possible to do it a different way. I was able to get it to work though, and the result is: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Timestamp-version: 1.0
Description: timestamp
Signed-by: http://timeMarker.org/
Timestamp: Fri, 11 May 2012 00:45:03 GMT
Number: 13080
Ref-Hash-SHA512: 546100a6ee3597206d5997322978960e6abf5afdb66823198bdea632b4d7877d9d9a42ec352eed8a37ab1710730e21cfedafc616eca7a700e1989ffa1e051328
Ref-Hash-RIPEMD160: 83d20c3a748cd05a6bc55daad2c720d6b4b3cb1f
Hash-SHA512: 7d2a8a4319c01bfef0e404948ab0fe9fa28cf012e1e7a9a45c5da53bed1a0a363e6aadb7aab20f6e8dab96d9b9885a1222ccb6dc4f2289dea60d44ed5113b1c0
Hash-RIPEMD160: 868e087ef8f9024209e73e0fee52d2971513c657
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: BCPG v1.32
iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPrGEPAAoJEPKfyyzv5FwHGTAIAJeBSIPa9SedxzsdhnnfHI8i
EDgZH/H6qt2JvmLxr9oPnGFc2jb6+45cTjS8c3LsbKMk8eFt0afF+S4D7POiXl9M
fs6sW8TzkAxbEf1qvIO4c0js4iohBY2UnfmfcPH018b3a/PYVYy06qcaMzJq3IP8
O09msBgT/LyXNw37fuf3eaXTbUVYJxcYvPYKydE8IZ4W1IHVH0coMWKcCg6AT6SY
mcxwxgichIi1HQr82bM1MpSsWKE3v+hao1dvRORTpbjM+FQR6tgQ8baYL2uAkHBK
6RGs/JDVmcqhtx5u67tDq4oHEpxoMOk2EGZ9puJMetdaI4Z2tNRK0oUedBSDvRM=
=ZkFP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- So theoretically, that should be able to prove that I controlled 1NgLdhjHfLbcVawMk4DNEv8yf9ZzzNJV6U prior to 00:45:03 GMT 5/11/2012, as per the time stamping service. |
|
|
|
So these days, it seems that bitcoin private keys are being stolen all the time. I'd like to know the best way for a victim to prove that they owned the keys FIRST, potentially enabling them to recover funds. As we know, anyone with the private key can sign a message from it. I would like to know whether my idea would work - basically it is as follows: Before you are hacked, and when you have reasonably good proof that your keys are secure and un-hacked, perform the following steps: - This assumes that you have an existing -otc signing key, or that you can create one and keep it completely separate from your bitcoin keys, and protected with a strong password.
- Take the key fingerprint from the RSA signing key, and create a message that contains that fingerprint, as well as a statement that you control it, plus any other identifying information that you wish to include.
- Sign that message with your RSA key.
- Sign the previously signed message with the bitcoin key.
- MOST IMPORTANT STEP: Sign the final message with a signature from a known timestamp server, such as Verisign. This is the part that I am not sure about - can you timestamp arbitrary data in the same manner that you can timestamp an executable?
Once you have done this, you can prove that you owned a compromised key prior to it being compromised, and you can sign messages to that effect with your RSA key. Obviously, if both are stolen, you are SOL. Would this work? Does anyone have any reason why it might not work, or perhaps a better way to do it? |
|
|
|
You need a version of CGMINER compiled with --enable-bitforce
All the official binaries are. I wish it was but it's not. I'm in the process of compiling them again with --enable-bitforce. Is it possible that the windows version only supports COM1-COM10 then? For high COM numbers, you need to use "\\.\COM25" for example. Anything over 9 requires \\.\COMxx |
|
|
|
You need a version of CGMINER compiled with --enable-bitforce
All the official binaries are. |
|
|
|
|
Show Posts
