[ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency

[afbitcoins]

Thanks for that link qwizzie

I just been looking at some of the mining pool websites and found this interesting on the Luxor Mining pool website

https://medium.com/luxor/dash-block-reward-proposal-62204cf71c96

It seems they at least are voicing concerns, (even though apparently supporting the change).

Our View on the Impact on Miners & Mining Community

Price Appreciation Due to Reduction in Inflation

We do not think a scatter plot of 22 points can be used to determine the effect of a reduction in inflation in today’s market. While long term we do believe inflation does have downward pressure on an asset, right now crypto markets are driven by speculation.

Shifting from Masternodes from Miners

While we think Dash takes a unique approach to PoW and PoS (and ChainLocks), in the near term, Proof of Work is the only provably trustless decentralized consensus mechanism. Any further implementation of PoS should be considered highly experimental and should require significant peer review before being considered for mainstream blockchain projects like Dash.

PoW is in reality Proof-of-Burn. It is the validation that energy (resource) was burnt to create consensus. PoW is the most simplistic and fair way for the physical world to validate something in the digital world.

Impact on the Mining Ecosystem

With this new proposal many miners will get hurt financially. Miners who just made thousands of dollars into Dash hardware will have their revenue impacted. This is unfair given that when they made the purchase decision this proposal was not made aware to them.

Miners have been some of the best community members for Dash and other PoW networks. They invest real time and capital into the projects. They usually sponsor and host the a lot of meetups around the world. Losing a large % of these will be bad for Dash as they were valuable community members.

[qwizzie]

Thanks for that link qwizzie

I just been looking at some of the mining pool websites and found this interesting on the Luxor Mining pool website

https://medium.com/luxor/dash-block-reward-proposal-62204cf71c96

It seems they at least are voicing concerns, (even though apparently supporting the change).

Our View on the Impact on Miners & Mining Community

Price Appreciation Due to Reduction in Inflation

We do not think a scatter plot of 22 points can be used to determine the effect of a reduction in inflation in today’s market. While long term we do believe inflation does have downward pressure on an asset, right now crypto markets are driven by speculation.

Shifting from Masternodes from Miners

While we think Dash takes a unique approach to PoW and PoS (and ChainLocks), in the near term, Proof of Work is the only provably trustless decentralized consensus mechanism. Any further implementation of PoS should be considered highly experimental and should require significant peer review before being considered for mainstream blockchain projects like Dash.

PoW is in reality Proof-of-Burn. It is the validation that energy (resource) was burnt to create consensus. PoW is the most simplistic and fair way for the physical world to validate something in the digital world.

Impact on the Mining Ecosystem

With this new proposal many miners will get hurt financially. Miners who just made thousands of dollars into Dash hardware will have their revenue impacted. This is unfair given that when they made the purchase decision this proposal was not made aware to them.

Miners have been some of the best community members for Dash and other PoW networks. They invest real time and capital into the projects. They usually sponsor and host the a lot of meetups around the world. Losing a large % of these will be bad for Dash as they were valuable community members.

Interesting link, good to see some thoughts of mining pools on this topic.

Proof of Work is the only provably trustless decentralized consensus mechanism

I think Dash governance system is an equally provably trustless decentralized consensus mechanism.
Also i have to emphasize that this blockreward allocation change takes place over 4.5 years.

Reading that article i don't really get the impression that these miners are also operating masternodes. Do you get that impression ?

[afbitcoins]

Reading that article i don't really get the impression that these miners are also operating masternodes. Do you get that impression ?

No I don't get the impression from that.  It looks like these mining pools are not dash focused and cater for many different crypto currencies. At the level of this pool anyway, they are worried small miners may no longer participate in the pool, ie they will lose contributors.
 

[birdonthewire]

Yes, the masternode reward far exceeds the cost to operate a masternode on face value. Are there hidden costs? Maybe, cost to acquire 1000 DASH and not trade or use it for another investment maybe?

That isn't a cost, it's a capital investment and so cannot be offset against the operating revenue of a masternode. It doesn't affect the margin. There are no hidden costs (I know cos I've run one for years) apart from the capital loss incurred when the market devalues the coin. That's how it can destroy these margins if we fail to put them to good use. Which would be either:

 • protecting a larger proportion of the coin supply scarcity with competitive mining (restoring mining reward) or
 • having masternodes invest a large part of the margin back into the network in some service provision capacity

Why would anyone hold a masternode right now if the rewards were reduced substantially?

This depends on how you denominate the "rewards". Since Dash isn't a stablecoin the reward is dependent on the exchange rate. At its peak, the masternode reward was around $83k per projected annum. Right now it's around $5k per annum. I ask you the same question: "why would anyone hold a masternode when the potential capital loss far outweighs the reward itself ?"

The idea is that by restoring the mining reward we'd become more competitive in terms of investment (by needing to draw less capital from fiat markets as I've outlined in other posts) and restore price growth. This would INCREASE (dollar denominated) masternode rewards, not decrease them.

I realise this conclusion is counter-intuitive but it's rational all the same when you work through things on a fiat measured basis and consider the cryptocurrency market as a whole rather than simply draw a line around Dash miners and masternodes.It's at least as justifiable as the "shot in the dark" that's being taken now - IMO more so since it's based on known quantities and relationships rather than on speculated ones.

It also has observable evidence on its side while the current proposal does not. 10% change may not seem much but the problem is it's in the wrong direction and we're already suffering enough from loss of marketcap share.

There are 3 groups of voters to be convinced here, not just 1:

 • masterndoes
 • non-masternode Dash holders (who vote in markets)
 • non-Dash holders (who vote in markets)

Convincing the first group is not enough. Their interests may or not be in conflict with the other 2 so people need to be slightly more sophisticated and not think like a turkey. I know what I will vote and which of those 3 groups I need to appeal to, unfortunately it's not the popular option. Which one of us ends up the turkey, only the second & third of those groups can decide.

******************************************
Fork it.

I think DCG should just fork the code. One at 30% mining reward and the other at 70%. Then let the miners & market discover which priority is more valuable. It would be an amazing experiment and worthwhile because it would empirically prove one or other priority as viable with market endorsement. A "controlled burn" version of the Ethereum fork minus the community contention. All current investors would be on both sides anyway and it would be a piece of research that's pioneering, instructive and at the same time would generate media interest and ultimately investment as people bet on one side or the other.

Agree. The role of fiat - and even substitutes - in crypto can be decisive, just look at BTC.

But if a higher economic performance in those terms can justify that the percentage for Mnodes does not skyrocket and their returns are satisfactory ... it is also for the miners. And what I don't see is that a higher return to miners implies conferring a higher and more stable value, which, basically, is the basis of your approach.

I do accept that adequate fiat growth is a good point on which to organize a deal. And also, without accepting that it is the POW's heritage, a soil of real wealth, the capacity to retain that wealth. Although there, the role of the miners may remain questionable ... and according to some positions, even expendable.

Regarding the final approach, in the BTC forks there are also holders on both sides ... for that part, there is nothing "pioneer". And at the level of "instruction", I am more attracted to optimizing a marked declaration of DASH principles such as that of "financial independence, decentralization and resistance to censorship" which are really susceptible to being improved and affects de facto the WHOLE real community (which the mining "added value" to do so is a merely theoretical possibility that you play with - imo, you oversize - so that your approach is "of general interest", because if it were not, it would simply not have any option to impose itself ... and I understand that a Fork is a measure of such forcefulness that it needs much more palpable and concrete scenarios than "probable theories" to be executed, which I find disproportionate - In addition to not seeing any possibility of arousing sufficient consensus for a "voluntary" Fork, I don't think your thesis triggers enough interest to have "two versions of DASH dancing in the ranking " ... for a measure of such importance,sincerely, it sounds frivolous, imo (Although I would be willing to contemplate a satisfactory FIAT performance for both Mnodes and miners, both, as an important premise ... through a fiat revaluation strategy that with RTaylor's measures to improve DASH as a store of value, I don't see...understanding therefore the logic disenchantment of the miners ) -).

Nor do I see DCG as essential at this crossroads, perhaps it can assume a certain continuity or conservatism based on its current role in the DASH hierarchy ... and that, although in a group and clearly notorious, are particular interests. If technically possible, I prefer a "non-friendly" fork that prioritizes the maximum possible optimization of the potential of DASH, of the collective project as a whole.

[qwizzie]

If technically possible, I prefer a "non-friendly" fork that prioritizes the maximum possible optimization of the potential of DASH, of the collective project as a whole.

Impressive, two weeks on this Dash forum and already all-in for a Dash hard fork. A 'non-friendly' Dash hard fork at that. Bound to split and divide this Dash community.
Well, that is one bird flying very fast  

Nor do I see DCG as essential at this crossroads, perhaps it can assume a certain continuity or conservatism based on its current role in the DASH hierarchy

Why am i not surprised ? Sure, lets just bypass DCG altogether.

Good luck with all that.
 

[toknormal]

The question is, do chainlocks do anything to prevent a contentious hardfork ?

How does the "we don't need all this hashrate" contender fare in such a contest ?

A greeting.

[qwizzie]

The question is, do chainlocks do anything to prevent a contentious hardfork ?

How does the "we don't need all this hashrate" contender fare in such a contest ?

What happened to the greetings, guys ?

Link : https://imgur.com/4yAdv0Q

No more greetings ?  
Maybe this will kickstart it again....

A greeting.

Edit : ahh there it is, nice.



So far i know ChainLocks protects the longest chain by performing 'a verifiable network-wide measurement/vote of the “first-seen” rule'
Source : https://blog.dash.org/mitigating-51-attacks-with-llmq-based-chainlocks-7266aa648ec9

LLMQ-based ChainLocks
The idea of ChainLocks is to perform a verifiable network-wide measurement/vote of the “first-seen” rule. For each block, an LLMQ of a few hundred masternodes is selected and each participating member signs the first block
that it sees extending the active chain at the current height. If enough members (e.g. >= 60%) see the same block as the first block, they will be able to create a P2P message (CLSIG) and propagate it to all nodes in the network.
There are some more details to this process, especially when multiple miners find a block at approximately the same time. These details are described in DIP8.

The CLSIG message can only be created if enough quorum members agree on it. This is because LLMQs use BLS M-of-N Threshold Signatures and the CLSIG message is required to have a valid threshold signature included.
This threshold signature is internally just like a normal BLS signature, and can be verified by all nodes without knowledge of who signed it. This verification only requires the LLMQ’s quorum public key, which can be retrieved
from on-chain data. Due to the nature of how LLMQ Signing Requests/Sessions work, there can only be either one valid CLSIG message or none, so there is no uncertainty due to conflicts.

Presence of a valid CLSIG message indicates that most members (e.g. 60%) of the LLMQ have seen the specified block as the first block. As LLMQs are randomly composed from Dash’s Masternode set (currently about 4900 nodes),
the distribution of nodes that have seen this block first across the whole network is statistically the same as inside the LLMQ. This means, that if 60% of LLMQ members have seen the block first, about 60% of the whole network should
also have seen it first.

If a valid CLSIG message is received by a node, it should reject all blocks (and their descendants) at the same height that do not match the block specified in the CLSIG message. This makes the decision on the active chain quick,
easy and unambiguous. It also makes reorganizations below this block impossible.

My guess would be that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted in its code for a contentious hardfork to work. I suspect ChainLocks currently protects Dash from contentious hardforks, by preventing reorganizations below a certain block.  

[toknormal]

My guess would be that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted in its code for a contentious hardfork to work. I suspect ChainLocks currently protects Dash from contentious hardforks, by preventing reorganisations below a certain block.

But the whole point of a hardfork is to revise the protocol lock stock & barrel. So don't you just end up with 2 chains: 1 with a 40% mining reward ratio and one with a 80%-90% mining reward ratio, both of which have internal protection from double-spends with chainlocks ?

[qwizzie]

My guess would be that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted in its code for a contentious hardfork to work. I suspect ChainLocks currently protects Dash from contentious hardforks, by preventing reorganisations below a certain block.

But the whole point of a hardfork is to revise the protocol lock stock & barrel. So don't you just end up with 2 chains: 1 with a 40% mining reward ratio and one with a 90% mining reward ratio, both of which have internal protection from double-spends with chainlocks ?

I suspect in the event of an intended chain split / contentious hardfork, that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted to the specifics of the forked off chain. Also i suspect separate masternodes (to get those 10% of the blockrewards) will need to be setup and be in sync on that forked off chain. That will require some really skillful developers that know every in and out of ChainLocks. I think that is currently out of reach for most developers. Then there is a possible problem of getting enough masternodes up and running to run ChainLocks on that forked off chain in the first place, which will be difficult when they only receive 10% of the block rewards. You could end up with a very weak full nodes forked network (a bit like Monero) and a severely restricted ChainLocks on that forked off chain.

[toknormal]

Then there is a possible problem of getting enough masternodes up and running to run ChainLocks on that forked off chain in the first place, which will be difficult when they only receive 10% of the block rewards. You could end up with a very weak full nodes network (a bit like Monero) and a severely restricted ChainLocks on that forked off chain.

But the great thing about it would be that it would have a restored a robust scarcity to the chain which would turn-around the marketcap drain by making the primary supply expensive again. That would in turn attract all the expertise needed since legacy holders would still have their stake in it.

[qwizzie]

Then there is a possible problem of getting enough masternodes up and running to run ChainLocks on that forked off chain in the first place, which will be difficult when they only receive 10% of the block rewards. You could end up with a very weak full nodes network (a bit like Monero) and a severely restricted ChainLocks on that forked off chain.

But the great thing about it would be that it would have a restored a robust scarcity to the chain which would turn-around the marketcap drain making the primary supply expensive again. That would in turn attract all the expertise needed since legacy holders would still have their stake in it.

You would have a growing gap between what is possible and being developed on one chain, and what is not possible and not being developed on the forked off chain.
Only miners would be drawn to the forked off chain, not masternode operators. Miners will most likely view the forked off chain only in terms of profitable / not profitable to mine.
Switching to other PoW coins if they are more profitable on the fly. They may even switch to the Dash chain, if they perceive that chain having more price value on the long run.

I am not sure i would even take the trouble to claim my forked off Dash. Most that do claim it, will most likely just sell it. Putting sell pressure on that forked off chain.
I think Dash actually already had a hard forked crypto project, where you could claim Dash, i just forgot its name (not PIVX).

Edit : SAFE --> https://forkdrop.io/safe (i have no idea how trustworthy or SAFE the information there is)

I never felt a need to claim that '1 SAFE for every 1 DASH held at the fork point'. I still don't.

 

[birdonthewire]

If technically possible, I prefer a "non-friendly" fork that prioritizes the maximum possible optimization of the potential of DASH, of the collective project as a whole.

Impressive, two weeks on this Dash forum and already all-in for a Dash hard fork. A 'non-friendly' Dash hard fork at that. Bound to split and divide this Dash community.
Well, that is one bird flying very fast  

Nor do I see DCG as essential at this crossroads, perhaps it can assume a certain continuity or conservatism based on its current role in the DASH hierarchy

Why am i not surprised ? Sure, lets just bypass DCG altogether.

Good luck with all that.
 

I hang up the hierarchy of Graham's disagreement so that your message is valued in its own right. Repeated, in your case in just a few hours. Really enlightening.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Graham_(programmer)#/media/File:Graham's_Hierarchy_of_Disagreement-en.svg



I do not know why you are surprised, with two minutes you can already release a wide sample of tricks designed to censor, disavow and troll the rest.

Anyway, you have a serious identification problem: You associate two weeks of a nick in this forum with a history in DASH. The same dyslexia of associating 5000 Mnodes with a decentralization at 5000 points. Who will consider after the nonsense consequences of that perspective and that DASH seems to you a model of decentralization ? All clear, man.

Finally, between not considering DCG indispensable for a fork to ignoring it completely, there is the same long distance as between the logical interpretation of a message and your tortuous deformation, generating another of your own harvest ... modus operandi that you make more than clear in a couple of messages, with whoever it is, pretty much everyone who has been through this thread in just a couple of days.. Because, coincidentally, I am only the last of those who have posted in recent days whose judgments you are trying to overrule. That's also very characteristic of the DASH hierarchy ... on its worst side, I mean.

Well ... that censorious attitude from privileged positions embedded in a centralized hierarchy is one of the causes that most limits, corrupts and projects a lousy image of a project that should be pure gold in the eyes of the sector ... so doubtfully Productive changes could be addressed with a friendly fork of those who increasingly concentrate the beneficiary population of the project (Today, the miners ... tomorrow, who knows?). Of course, looking after the reasons why "Saint Market" does not digest DASH Stock to Flow due to minor nuances, dismissing obvious structural defects is really "consequential". Of your "characteristic" logic, of course.

Anyway ... surely anyone who reads us will have an idea of ​​their own. They may even be able to think without the help of your "translations".

A greeting.

[afbitcoins]

My guess would be that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted in its code for a contentious hardfork to work. I suspect ChainLocks currently protects Dash from contentious hardforks, by preventing reorganizations below a certain block.  

I'm not sure thats the case. One can just diverge the blockchain at an agreed height, some mining will occur on one chain and some on the other, each then sailing into the sunset in their own particular directions. I would presume the developers on the new blockchain could disable chainlocks during the initial stages via disabling spork 19 which is the one controlling chainlocks activation, if it needed to.

[qwizzie]

My guess would be that ChainLocks will need to be adjusted in its code for a contentious hardfork to work. I suspect ChainLocks currently protects Dash from contentious hardforks, by preventing reorganizations below a certain block.  

I'm not sure thats the case. One can just diverge the blockchain at an agreed height, some mining will occur on one chain and some on the other, each then sailing into the sunset in their own particular directions. I would presume the developers on the new blockchain could disable chainlocks during the initial stages via disabling spork 19 which is the one controlling chainlocks activation, if it needed to.

The authentication for disabling / enabling sporks is in the hands of our Dash Core Group, not in the hands of other developers possibly planning to hard fork Dash.
It seems highly unlikely (not to mention dangerous) that our Dash Core Group would provide that authentication controlling the Dash sporks, to other developers.

Specially in the case of a non-friendly fork.

[toknormal]

The authentication for disabling / enabling forks is in the hands of our Dash Core Group, not in the hands of other developers possibly planning to hard fork Dash.

Only on the fork that they control. In the event of a hardfork all bets are off surely because it's open source. You just disable the spork logic itself and replace it with one that's independent on the high-mining fork.

[qwizzie]

The authentication for disabling / enabling sporks is in the hands of our Dash Core Group, not in the hands of other developers possibly planning to hard fork Dash.

Only on the fork that they control. In the event of a hardfork all bets are off surely because it's open source. You just disable the spork logic itself and replace it with one that's independent.

Which means there is a lot more work to do then just activating or disabling a spork. If i were to guess i would say most of the stuff that works on Dash would not work on a Dash forked-off chain and would require major
re-coding. And you would pretty much loose all current active masternodes (because they get more of the blockrewards on the main Dash chain).

[toknormal]

Which means there is a lot more work to do then just activating or disabling a spork. If i were to guess i would say most of the stuff that works on Dash would not work on a Dash forked-off chain and would require major
re-coding.

But it would be worth it to get the mining quota restored and thereby recover our store-of-value performance.

[qwizzie]

Which means there is a lot more work to do then just activating or disabling a spork. If i were to guess i would say most of the stuff that works on Dash would not work on a Dash forked-off chain and would require major
re-coding.

But it would be worth it to get the mining quota restored and thereby recover our store-of-value performance.

No, it would not be worth it. Risks are too high for this 'experiment' of yours. But by all means try if you want to.

[toknormal]

No, it would not be worth it. Risks are too high. But by all means try if you want to.

Bitcoin is back at near ATH. We are at 4.6% of ATH and we still haven't even found a bottom yet against BTC after 3 years of continuous descent paying masternode margins out of blockchain capital that doesn't get replenished with mined value.

The "risks" have already been taken. We don't have very much to loose.

[qwizzie]

Oh my, a plane going down  
Seems a bit dramatic.

A full page of discussing just hard forks. What is next to discuss ? Anyone ?
Let me just put this up, in case anyone overlooked it :

Dash Core v0.16.1.0 has been released
This is a new minor version release, bringing various bugfixes and improvements.
Download:
https://www.dash.org/downloads/#wallets
Release Notes:
https://github.com/dashpay/dash/blob/v0.16.1.0/doc/release-notes.md