Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP.

[Natalia_AnatolioPAMM]

Yeah I am a type A personality and a fighter. I hate to lose. I also talk too much for my own good. And all this ego noise in this thread is just a huge waste of time. My first posts were about technical and correcting incorrect statements. This caused a firestorm of egos and character assassination attempts.

I've been pointing out that you seem to be exhibiting the most ego-driven behavior around here. But the nature of one with a big ego is that they do not respond to feedback concerning their ego so the reaction will be aggressive.

What a shame. Your self-proclaimed superior intelligence is going to waste, because you package your messages in a way which makes it very hard to respond to the message itself (which is often obfuscated) and instead lends itself to focusing on your ego-mania. You'll mostly get other egos lashing out at you, further fueling your story about sub-par beta-males being jealous of your superiority, ignorance or trolling. We could have a useful discussion but instead it seems to me that in spite of your rhetoric that is not what primarily motivates you - instead you write lengthy posts focusing on your person, supposedly "proving" your superiority, demanding admiration and constructing negative feedback as admiration clothed in jealousy. No fun and no profit in that I fear. You cut yourself off from valuable feedback and we don't get anything useful out of the interaction either.

I have respect for many people frequenting this thread and posting material which makes me think and I am grateful for that. I have respect for you because of the same thing - your writings have made me think and research as well. That is why I care and keep pointing this out to you. If you really want to be useful and harvest your abilities for the advancement of common good, get off your high horse, stop making everything about yourself and talk to us like a decent human being.

Communication is possible only between equals

I disagree. From my pov, everybody here has ego issue to some extend. Anonymint just has a slight différent view of the situation worldwide. Maybe more desperatly cynical. But i value his inputs as much as others around here. On the end i think we all want the same: bitcoins success, pocket money, and a fairer world.

You're talking about TPTB, not Anonymint, I quite enjoined Anonymint'w posts in other threads. The boxing video inputs pushed the topic of Bitcoin out of my entertainment zone. On the leval of digital binary his signal to noise ratio was very low.

One's attention is the most valuable commodity today, approximately 50% of the cost of making a new car today is spent on getting your attention.

TPTB (no pun intended) would be a little more effective if he understood the value of attention.

Aren't they the same person/thing?

I also thought so

[thezerg]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

Is this idle curiosity or important to you?  If important probably I could fork the satoshi client and instrument it.  But then we'd have to collect data, etc. Its a medium time length project.

WRT TPTB/Anonymint, I vote that we put the speculation and constructive advice to bed at this point (I think he's heard enough), and rely on volunteers to very selectively quote and respond to his few information-filled bitcoin-related sentences.

[sickpig]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

[Erdogan]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

I have glanced over that page a few times, and it seems, when it is high (4000 tx or more), it is filled with transactions that are never going to be included; dust, and zero fee transactions that should have a fee due to size and output age. Logically, when blocks are not full, the queue of valid transactions should be zero. I think we will not see a long list of valid unconfirmed transactions before we are quite close to the block size limit on a 24 hour basis.

[cypherdoc]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

Is this idle curiosity or important to you?  If important probably I could fork the satoshi client and instrument it.  But then we'd have to collect data, etc. Its a medium time length project.

i ask b/c of this bloated block attack being floated around.

we know that full nodes have unconf tx sets that correspond by somewhere over 90%; which is why IBLT could work to communicate across the network that a new block has been solved.  the ppl who argue against raising the 1MB cap say that an attacker could create these bloated blocks to torment small miners.  the question is, where would they get the extra tx's to construct this bloat?  from the unconf tx set or would they have to construct them themselves at considerable cost?  to answer this, it would be helpful to know the extent to which the unconf tx set gets cleared out every 10 min per block and the absolute size of the set so as to determine how many unconf tx's are left over that could be used in such an attack.

if i look at my 4 full nodes memory use, it's averaging around 200MB, but with around 500-600MB VSwap.  as i understand it, VSwap is to be considered a form of memory use so the total is around 800MB, which is consistent across my nodes:

[cypherdoc]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

2MB, not much.  thus, it appears an attacker would have to construct and broadcast all his own fake or withheld tx's to try and perform this bloated block attack which, imo, is way too expensive and risky even though he would be paying himself his own tx fees.

[cypherdoc]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

I have glanced over that page a few times, and it seems, when it is high (4000 tx or more), it is filled with transactions that are never going to be included; dust, and zero fee transactions that should have a fee due to size and output age. Logically, when blocks are not full, the queue of valid transactions should be zero. I think we will not see a long list of valid unconfirmed transactions before we are quite close to the block size limit on a 24 hour basis.

that's even stronger evidence against this attack.

if the available unconf tx's are mostly invalid b/c of dust limits or being non-std, then those couldn't be included in such a bloated block.

[Erdogan]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

I have glanced over that page a few times, and it seems, when it is high (4000 tx or more), it is filled with transactions that are never going to be included; dust, and zero fee transactions that should have a fee due to size and output age. Logically, when blocks are not full, the queue of valid transactions should be zero. I think we will not see a long list of valid unconfirmed transactions before we are quite close to the block size limit on a 24 hour basis.

that's even stronger evidence against this attack.

if the available unconf tx's are mostly invalid b/c of dust limits or being non-std, then those couldn't be included in such a bloated block.

Well they are valid in the sense that the outputs exist and the signatures are correct, so an attacking miner could just include them all. Not that it concerns me.

Rant: in the beginning, I had the blockchain page up at all times, a bit concerned when there was no new block in an our or so. Not any more /Rant'

[sickpig]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

I have glanced over that page a few times, and it seems, when it is high (4000 tx or more), it is filled with transactions that are never going to be included; dust, and zero fee transactions that should have a fee due to size and output age. Logically, when blocks are not full, the queue of valid transactions should be zero. I think we will not see a long list of valid unconfirmed transactions before we are quite close to the block size limit on a 24 hour basis.

that's even stronger evidence against this attack.

if the available unconf tx's are mostly invalid b/c of dust limits or being non-std, then those couldn't be included in such a bloated block.

Go to statoshi.info and look at "tx and blocks" section to have an idea of the trend

[rocks]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

2MB, not much.  thus, it appears an attacker would have to construct and broadcast all his own fake or withheld tx's to try and perform this bloated block attack which, imo, is way too expensive and risky even though he would be paying himself his own tx fees.

Well to be fair, the reason why we don't see this attack is because with the 1MB limit it is not possible to pull off. If BTCGuild started to do this, they could only take 3% of the blocks to 1MB, which is immaterial.

I think it would technically be very easy for a pool/miner to add a huge number of transactions into a block. For every address they have with 1BTC, they could create 10,000 transactions with 0.0001 fee each  (which they receive back in the coinbase transaction) by simply creating a chain of transactions in rapid succession. With 100BTC, they cloud create 1M transactions at zero cost because they would only include the transactions in their own block and recover the fees.

In the real world though, a pool could only do this a few times before miners would abandon them en mass, destroying the pool's business in the process. So it seems unlikely

At large solo miner with maybe 0.1% or 0.3% of the hash rate could start to inject very large 1GB blocks every 200 or 400 blocks or so, but in that case I could very easily see the rest of the pools agreeing to ignore those massive blocks. And even if they didn't coordinate to ignore them, the large blocks would propagate so slowly they might not be included anyway. (The attack requires transmitting a full block since Gavin's IBLT wouldn't help here).

Another way to address the issue of one or two rouge pools making large blocks, is to set a floating blocksize cap that resets with each difficulty adjustment and is based on an average of the last x number of blocks plus some overhead. Now to implement the attack an attacker would need to create false transactions that everyone mines on to bring up the average, but this would become too expensive since the fees would be lost to other miners.

[rocks]

I disagree. From my pov, everybody here has ego issue to some extend. Anonymint just has a slight différent view of the situation worldwide. Maybe more desperatly cynical. But i value his inputs as much as others around here. On the end i think we all want the same: bitcoins success, pocket money, and a fairer world.

At a basic level, we all are here because we believe the current system is broken, that most others are wrong,  and that we know why and know of a better system (Bitcoin or some other form of sound money). It takes a certain amount of ego to take on that view of the world.

The fact that we are right in knowing that Bitcoin is a better system, is immaterial. It takes a large amount of Ego to believe you are right and the vast majority are wrong.

[Erdogan]

I disagree. From my pov, everybody here has ego issue to some extend. Anonymint just has a slight différent view of the situation worldwide. Maybe more desperatly cynical. But i value his inputs as much as others around here. On the end i think we all want the same: bitcoins success, pocket money, and a fairer world.

At a basic level, we all are here because we believe the current system is broken, that most others are wrong,  and that we know why and know of a better system (Bitcoin or some other form of sound money). It takes a certain amount of ego to take on that view of the world.

The fact that we are right in knowing that Bitcoin is a better system, is immaterial. It takes a large amount of Ego to believe you know better than most others.

I'd like to diffuse that a bit: We know it is a better system, because we know the economics of sound money, the cryptography, the computer security and a few special things we have learnt from the whole bitcoin discourse. So, when someone here says that NN does not understand money, even if it is an academic with a life long career in research, writing books, talking to conferences, having had multiple high level jobs and even an economic prize from the swedish central bank in memory of Alfred Nobel, he does not necessarily have a big ego, but rather the courage to say what he knows to be right and unafraid to be coerced (by display of power) into holding back. And, not having a stake in academia (and being anonymous) helps.

[molecular]

At large solo miner with maybe 0.1% or 0.3% of the hash rate could start to inject very large 1GB blocks every 200 or 400 blocks or so, but in that case I could very easily see the rest of the pools agreeing to ignore those massive blocks. And even if they didn't coordinate to ignore them, the large blocks would propagate so slowly they might not be included anyway. (The attack requires transmitting a full block since Gavin's IBLT wouldn't help here).

ah, of course. IBLT doesn't help the rogue miner because his transactions haven't been broadcast. And he can't broadcast because then he risks losing the tx fees. I had overlooked that.

[kodtycoon]

all you math heads and CS guys will find this a very interesting read i think.. lost of ground breaking tech and lots of examples of algorithms etc.. i dont understand the maths at all so any expert input into this would be appreciated.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7wAe2jt1MMzYVJhUUFnMHQxZ1U/view?usp=sharing

[cypherdoc]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

2MB, not much.  thus, it appears an attacker would have to construct and broadcast all his own fake or withheld tx's to try and perform this bloated block attack which, imo, is way too expensive and risky even though he would be paying himself his own tx fees.

Well to be fair, the reason why we don't see this attack is because with the 1MB limit it is not possible to pull off. If BTCGuild started to do this, they could only take 3% of the blocks to 1MB, which is immaterial.

I think it would technically be very easy for a pool/miner to add a huge number of transactions into a block. For every address they have with 1BTC, they could create 10,000 transactions with 0.0001 fee each  (which they receive back in the coinbase transaction) by simply creating a chain of transactions in rapid succession. With 100BTC, they cloud create 1M transactions at zero cost because they would only include the transactions in their own block and recover the fees.

In the real world though, a pool could only do this a few times before miners would abandon them en mass, destroying the pool's business in the process. So it seems unlikely

At large solo miner with maybe 0.1% or 0.3% of the hash rate could start to inject very large 1GB blocks every 200 or 400 blocks or so, but in that case I could very easily see the rest of the pools agreeing to ignore those massive blocks. And even if they didn't coordinate to ignore them, the large blocks would propagate so slowly they might not be included anyway. (The attack requires transmitting a full block since Gavin's IBLT wouldn't help here).

Another way to address the issue of one or two rouge pools making large blocks, is to set a floating blocksize cap that resets with each difficulty adjustment and is based on an average of the last x number of blocks plus some overhead. Now to implement the attack an attacker would need to create false transactions that everyone mines on to bring up the average, but this would become too expensive since the fees would be lost to other miners.

I was assuming the unconfirmed TX set to stay relatively the same size if the cap was lifted.

First off, you can't take a 1BTC address and create 10000 zero balance outputs  with 0.0001BTC fees. They are invalid and wouldn't be accepted by the rest of network.

Second, even if the attacking miner constructs  non zero output  TX's, he  can't just spring this block onto the network filled with those TX's if the network nodes haven't heard about them beforehand. They will reject  the bloated block since they don't recognize any of the content.

[cypherdoc]

Russia back onboard apparently:

http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/362f12/bitcoin_websites_unblocked_in_russia_court_was_won/

[rocks]

Let me ask again.

Does anyone know the average number of unconfirmed TX's that exist in mempool at any given time, the average size in MB (i know <1) and what % of them get cleared into a block every 10 minutes or so?

https://blockchain.info/en/unconfirmed-transactions

2MB, not much.  thus, it appears an attacker would have to construct and broadcast all his own fake or withheld tx's to try and perform this bloated block attack which, imo, is way too expensive and risky even though he would be paying himself his own tx fees.

Well to be fair, the reason why we don't see this attack is because with the 1MB limit it is not possible to pull off. If BTCGuild started to do this, they could only take 3% of the blocks to 1MB, which is immaterial.

I think it would technically be very easy for a pool/miner to add a huge number of transactions into a block. For every address they have with 1BTC, they could create 10,000 transactions with 0.0001 fee each  (which they receive back in the coinbase transaction) by simply creating a chain of transactions in rapid succession. With 100BTC, they cloud create 1M transactions at zero cost because they would only include the transactions in their own block and recover the fees.

In the real world though, a pool could only do this a few times before miners would abandon them en mass, destroying the pool's business in the process. So it seems unlikely

At large solo miner with maybe 0.1% or 0.3% of the hash rate could start to inject very large 1GB blocks every 200 or 400 blocks or so, but in that case I could very easily see the rest of the pools agreeing to ignore those massive blocks. And even if they didn't coordinate to ignore them, the large blocks would propagate so slowly they might not be included anyway. (The attack requires transmitting a full block since Gavin's IBLT wouldn't help here).

Another way to address the issue of one or two rouge pools making large blocks, is to set a floating blocksize cap that resets with each difficulty adjustment and is based on an average of the last x number of blocks plus some overhead. Now to implement the attack an attacker would need to create false transactions that everyone mines on to bring up the average, but this would become too expensive since the fees would be lost to other miners.

I was assuming the unconfirmed TX set to stay relatively the same size if the cap was lifted.

First off, you can't take a 1BTC address and create 10000 zero balance outputs  with 0.0001BTC fees. They are invalid and wouldn't be accepted by the rest of network.

You start with 1BTC and send 0.9999BTC to a new address with a 0.0001BTC fee -> then 0.9998BTC -> 0.9997BTC and so on until you have created a chain of 10,000 transactions, each paying a 0.0001BTC fee. This is a chain of valid transactions.

Since these fees are recovered by yourself, you don't mind paying them and can do this over and over and over again. For every 100BTC that you control you can create 1M transactions in every block you mine with this attack.

Second, even if the attacking miner constructs  non zero output  TX's, he  can't just spring this block onto the network filled with those TX's if the network nodes haven't heard about them beforehand. They will reject  the bloated block since they don't recognize any of the content.

Blocks can include any transaction, even ones that network nodes haven't heard about. Today nodes receive transactions a minimum of 2 times today, once as it is broadcast, and a 2nd time in the block it is picked up in.

The entire reason for Gavin's IBLT proposal is to eliminate this wastefulness and take advantage of the fact nodes already have heard of most of the blocks.

However even after IBLT is implemented you can still include unannounced transactions in blocks. You just would have to send the whole block and not the IBLT diff.

[Erdogan]

Russia back onboard apparently:

http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/362f12/bitcoin_websites_unblocked_in_russia_court_was_won/

The discussion on reddit was about this being reported in the main stream media.

The answer is, if it can be used to smear Russia, it will be reported, if not, it will not be reported (I hope I am wrong).

[Peter R]

I was assuming the unconfirmed TX set to stay relatively the same size if the cap was lifted.

First off, you can't take a 1BTC address and create 10000 zero balance outputs  with 0.0001BTC fees. They are invalid and wouldn't be accepted by the rest of network.

Second, even if the attacking miner constructs  non zero output  TX's, he  can't just spring this block onto the network filled with those TX's if the network nodes haven't heard about them beforehand. They will reject  the bloated block since they don't recognize any of the content.

There's a difference between non-standard transactions and invalid transactions.  Non-standard transactions are a subset of valid transactions. Examples of non-standard transactions are TXs with outputs less than the dust limit or TXs with insufficient fees; such transactions may still be valid, however.  

Clients do not relay nonstandard transactions, nor accept them into mempool, but will nonetheless accept a solved block that contains them (provided each TX in the block is still valid).    Example of blocks full of nonstandard (and pointless) transactions are Block #309657 and Block #309740.  They each contain thousands of 1 satoshi dust outputs that will pollute the UTXO set for a long time!

Code:

BLOCK #309740:  10,486 DUST OUTPUTS 
        ADDRESS SENT FROM                                            TX HASH                              N_OUTPUTS     
===================================================================================================================                      
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	b2b6112e73cbe0937a1b60c9abfc4c2ca6e26b2612c90ec598b1cd28787a553e	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	5e5d17901378b8835861d8cc0df2b5f9bf3c86759c3821f96470cd852344d799	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	b2bf7525618ed5402024d5bff6f477a2093965d3f11ececbc2b6a9b5bbe1f5d5	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	3df8f4a7e06486bb3b0700935a16fc6d4fad397dcb6c88b9c4b6a7453301aa54	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	ae05ddfc8aa206b213c71ec0e96723dcd4ff03a71ca76b469d225d1c60d9e262	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	f75b455b4df94bcdcd54985b4aeea9948d2a1dca0f63c65b85ad2d941050c5cf	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	ee61b911610f66f539832699fbbf4ab3955c8bd5ad0cfa570ff500dedcde5bf8	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	a22186cbcf82cac66da17183209f20f76088934c931bec131fe71ad2f250e8f8	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	0469286403543b7d794fe52661135a80142c47ac541793c703fd637a4e9dc0bf	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	a71dc9abd8bae377b661b0c288222acf2ab62fc7bf96b0bab2dd5354fbc91643	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	f437d94c1cfe818c44f4505f3e6506839113ec747d815a867e953a4164276047	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	eb95d902eb841ce23c9c1466e010cbb05d43d1c248376440f9dd56ee1bc8b3e5	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	b62416ceb3453d6dcba95213e4e222915438a4b70eba37e09099110b20be0d52	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	f3aba1c064e9c9a1d49db3bce42c07c184a0b329366994000fa49f0bc8f3ba16	749

BLOCK #309657: 7,490 DUST OUTPUTS
        ADDRESS SENT FROM                                            TX HASH                              N_OUTPUTS     
===================================================================================================================  
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	2e7fdb43e2a0fe17cfe2d283a2da4d375204700aef4bf2c31056125f4383b121	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	3d1105d7c2cd36705b2163fa2d0f74973377467aefea72156a30444f330acf71	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	5c4e56943f3128629ebecb41f5916bd7bc1dceaccc37f29e59c385464f2bf558	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	536adfb745ffaa8c1fb698414475f5ca7d82846eadd912cfe0a76045d78c3198	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	45c7544374e88de47d9be2e3e100f4aa10aafd9469c4dba8d55a870f83c312ab	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	e7ae2378a44a940a8c872a63e43fa67c5a023df4df3f9ca8011611422fc2861c	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	d864e3cc07dc79f221bd91210b274e136159ccbb5c9eafad906d9d08c5558ce5	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	3dedbc086d5cfc81bd3614a1b3fab1bb4d73d8982d9552e811f84f0118a1fc12	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	7337d7ac353a9283c65a1ab99d28f97997784a0fb26d0dc0b59f2fa2556c4460	749
1Enjoy1C4bYBr3tN4sMKxvvJDqG8NkdR4Z	634a7fdcba3fe91da07f44e6b9bee1c659cbfca27076bd8b61984d062c071651	749

A miner can fill a block full of nonsense transactions very easily.  

[rocks]

I was assuming the unconfirmed TX set to stay relatively the same size if the cap was lifted.

First off, you can't take a 1BTC address and create 10000 zero balance outputs  with 0.0001BTC fees. They are invalid and wouldn't be accepted by the rest of network.

Second, even if the attacking miner constructs  non zero output  TX's, he  can't just spring this block onto the network filled with those TX's if the network nodes haven't heard about them beforehand. They will reject  the bloated block since they don't recognize any of the content.

There's a difference between non-standard transactions and invalid transactions.  Non-standard transactions are a subset of valid transactions. Examples of non-standard transactions are TXs with outputs less than the dust limit or TXs with insufficient fees; such transactions may still be valid, however.  

Clients do not relay nonstandard transactions but will accept a solved block that contains them (provided each TX in the block is still valid).    Example of blocks full of nonstandard (and pointless) transactions are Block #309657 and Block #309740.  They each contain thousands of 1 satoshi dust outputs that will pollute the UTXO set for a long time!

Code:

BLOCK #309740:  10,486 DUST OUTPUTS 
        ADDRESS SENT FROM                                            TX HASH                              N_OUTPUTS     
===================================================================================================================                      
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BLOCK #309657: 7,490 DUST OUTPUTS
        ADDRESS SENT FROM                                            TX HASH                              N_OUTPUTS     
===================================================================================================================  
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A miner can fill a block full of nonsense transactions very easily.  

Good point on the inclusion of non-standard but valid transactions. What I outlined just included standard & valid transactions. What you outlined is how much further an attacker could push this, here 1BTC could turn into 100M satoshi dush outputs....

On the UTXO topic, the distribution of balances here

http://bitcoinrichlist.com/charts/bitcoin-distribution-by-address?atblock=350000

shows that 96.97% of addresses contain less than 0.001 BTC. Now these are address totals, any analysis of UTXO outputs would show that more than 96.97% of UTXO outputs contain less than 0.001BTC.

I think this shows that the UTXO is already vastly populated by dust nonsense that simply sits around. If UTXO size becomes an issue any intelligent implementation could easily swap these out to a lower tier of storage. Most of this dust will never be spent simply because you'd have to pay more in fees than the output is worth, spending them is literally burning money.