1. Without forging fees, how will you combat spam? I have only talked to one developer that has said he can do this and his coin hasn't been released so there you go.
Transaction fees, if implemented to prevent spam, don't automatically have to go to forgers as a "prize". They can go to a single pot under control of the Crypsi Foundation and be spent by committee vote on worthy projects that benefit everybody. Then it's a "tax", not a "prize", and Crypti would still be the only legal cryptocoin not running an illegal lottery.
2. The approach of putting it all on vendors and their hardware is in theory a sustainable model, and one I think is a good idea, just not from Crypti. The problem is the bootstrap. It would literally take a company like Apple or Google to release their iBits or Gbits to get mass amounts of retailers to update their hardware.
Crypti doesn't have the money, power, or pull of Google or Apple, so trying to get vendors to install new hardware is a dream. Your best bet would be to find some pre-existing hardware that would be compatible with Crypti and try to get a firmware update. It couldn't be a hack because nobody is going to trust a third party changing the code in their POS terminal. That is unwise. Sooooo, that means talking directly to the manufacturer and good luck with that. I'm not sure if you could even get somebody high up to even answer the phone.
The Coinbox guys are talking to pcDuino about using their $39 nano :
http://liliputing.com/2014/09/pcduino3-nano-smaller-cheaper-mini-pc-arduino-support.htmlI totally agree that getting vendors to buy in cold and install one of these as JUST a Crypti node is a fantasy. However, if it ALSO supported Bitcoin transactions at the same time as it was running Crypti node software, Bitcoin vendors would buy it for the flexibility it would offer their existing Bitcoin transactions. The initial sales pitch would educate them by highlighting that Bitcoin is an illegal lottery and is going to be declared illegal soon, Bitcoin is on the decline, Cryptsi is on the upswing and this board is not only a valuable tool for today but insurance for an uncertain tomorrow as well. On the day a State AG issues a ruling that Bitcoin mining is illegal in his State and violates his lottery laws, our message goes viral and demand for our dual-purpose board would skyrocket.
3. As Starik pointed out, then this system isn't decentralized which of course is not necessary, but it is, because it is an established cannon rule that whatever crypto win the alt wars be, it must be decentralized and open sourced.
I presume you are talking about the various proposed PoT system upgrades. As I understand it (and I may be wrong, and maybe the consultant can come up with some other approach), the original PoT implementation used identical decentralized peers but wouldn't scale beyond 50 nodes. The upgrades being evaluated to allow PoT scaling involve either (a) a tree structure with comm-linked "super-peers" controlling groups of identical peers under them, with ALL nodes having the possibility of forging a block every blocktime, or (b) numerous small networks of comm-linked identical peers that are rotated in to forge a block by some central authority when their turn comes, with only SOME nodes having the possibility of forging a block every blocktime. Neither (a) nor (b) is a decentralized approach.
There are only three possible outcomes here. First, Crypti gets its original decentralized all-equal-peer PoT algorithm working despite initial latency problems. Second, Crypti goes with a PoT system that is not decentralized and has one-or-more privileged "super-peers" at centralized locations within the algorithm. Third, Crypti goes with a non-PoT system.
If Boris & Co. are successful with the
first outcome (and if there is no community effort made to change the development course for Crypti), then there is no further decision to be made. The Crypti team delivers a PoT algorithm exactly as they said they would, forgers are selected by
decentralized PoT and get paid exactly as they expected to be paid, and as vendors slowly come to dominate the Crypti system in the future, forgers will eventually "weed themselves out naturally" over RoI considerations.
If the first possible outcome fails, Crypti will be forced to go with the second or third outcome.
If Boris & Co. are successful with the
second outcome (and if there is no community effort made to change the development course for Crypti), then there is no further decision to be made. The Crypti team delivers a PoT algorithm exactly as they said they would, forgers are selected by
centralized PoT and get paid exactly as they expected to be paid, and as vendors slowly come to dominate the Crypti system in the future, forgers will eventually "weed themselves out naturally" over RoI considerations. Plus, Crypti is a weaker-than-desired cryptocoin because of its unfortunately-necessary embedded centralization.
Note second outcome ("centralized super-peer PoT") may be infeasible and so never released by the devs. It may also be undesirable to a point where it is rejected by the community even if released by the devs. Note that infeasible and undesirable are two different sets of circumstances, but both lead to selecting the
third option (non-PoT). There are many possible non-PoT variants for Crypti. My proposed vendor-oriented, no forging version and starting an illegal-lottery PR war with Bitcoin is only one possibility. Let's hear yours.
4. There is some great theoretically ideas being tossed around here about how to solve many of the PoW problems that Bitcoin has plagued us with, but the [final] answer just hasn't come yet.
We're not done introducing new ideas yet, either. At least, I'm not. Stay tuned.
