rpietila Wall Observer - the Quality TA Thread ;)

[brg444]

What about bet, Monero has BIG security flaw and will be ZERO next week ?

I will take that bet. 

What about:
 publish your monero address
 I'll publish bitcoin address

You will have to pay 1:10 (0.0004 BTC) of the current price 0.004 to published bitcoin address (in bitcoins) for every incoming transaction in monero otherwise you are liar. ?

if every monero coin is so easily "hackable" why do you not do it.

why is it no one has successfully done what you are suggesting?

hint : maybe because you're wrong

Excuse me but Stealing your shit brings me nothing. Maybe you would try to steal my shit.

surely there's plenty of crypto hacker out there looking for easy money.

what are they waiting for, there's a 6 million market cap coin up for grabs 

[1714491061]

1714491061

[1714491061]

1714491061

[1714491061]

1714491061

[fluffypony]

I do not talk about bitcoin here. Bitcoin is signing transaction perfect. It does not use ring signatures.

Edit:
Alice, Bob and Carol do not want spend their Monero. But hacker Dave wants their money. A ring signature obscures identities because it only proves that a Dave belongs to a group. So Dave ring-signing Alice, Bob Carol and Dave inputs and send XMR to his new stealth addresses.

Edit2:
Monero is same as money on the pavement. So easy to just pick up them from the pavement. Easy money ... but worthless, who can use them?
(Am I wrong ? Why ?)

You're right. What you've pointed out is clearly a gaping hole that allows an attacker to just take everyone's money, and somehow myself, tacotime, smooth, the rest of the Monero core team, andytoshi, gmaxwell, Wladimir v d Laan, Peter Todd, the Monero Research Lab mathematicians / cryptographers, and everyone else that has read the whitepaper and/or looked at the implementation missed this obvious and gaping flaw. Clearly you have the superior intellect and knowledge, I look forward to seeing your published research and PoC code for this flaw soon.

Until then, have a good day.

[klee]

The only way for Bitcoin to lose now is by being overtaken by another cryptocurrency. So, the question now is, what do you think the odds are of Bitcoin failing (let's say going to a market cap <100 Million).

Well that is very unlikely to happen. Also I don't want to be losing 99% of my wealth so I would jump out first, much before.

This jumping out, if it for some reason gains traction, could make the air (market cap) go from one balloon to another really fast.

Nobody can be complacent.

Risto,

You pointed to the SSS strategy for raking a % in case BTC/USD climbed at a given price range, a strategy I fully agree to.

You also pointed to hedging BTC position with an equivalent position in XMR, wich I also agree.

I'm interested to know about your exit strategy in case Bitcoin values come below certain USD values. I mean, what percentage of BTC would you sell (for USD or XMR) at each price range?

Thanks.

Bitcoin has a long history of steep dips, yet it has always gone higher. I think it is prudent to never sell below ATH.

Same applies to Monero of course.

Don't invest in BTC/XMR any money that you cannot lose. And sell so much in the tops that you can take the dips to zero if need be, without getting tempted to sell at the bottom.

What about bet, Monero has BIG security flaw and will be ZERO next week ?

Look, an insider!

[Odalv]

Look, an insider!

Not insider :-), only looking for answer to my question:
Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).
What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

Edit:
q1: How much money was mined(emitted) and what is total sum of all accounts :-) ?
Edit2:
if you know answer to q1 then you must to know all accounts and their balances.
q2: Do you know how balances change every minute ? [yes] In case, your money are secure, can be blockchain analyzed ? [yes]

[brg444]

Look, an insider!

Not insider :-), only looking for answer to my question:
Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).
What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

Edit:
q1: How much money was mined(emitted) and what is total sum of all accounts :-) ?
Edit2:
if you know answer to q1 then you must to know all accounts and their balances.
q2: Do you know how balances change every minute ? [yes] In case, your money are secure, can be blockchain analyzed ? [yes]

read above




hint : you're too stupid

[Odalv]

Look, an insider!

Not insider :-), only looking for answer to my question:
Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).
What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

Edit:
q1: How much money was mined(emitted) and what is total sum of all accounts :-) ?
Edit2:
if you know answer to q1 then you must to know all accounts and their balances.
q2: Do you know how balances change every minute ? [yes] In case, your money are secure, can be blockchain analyzed ? [yes]

read above




hint : you're too stupid

You are too smart. ... or blind sheep ?

[dEBRUYNE]

1. Good thing for hacker(one member of group) to wipe out your wallet by modifying orginal transaction and send all your XMR to his address.

Not possible. Once a transaction is mined its permanent. If you mean after broadcast and before its mined, then you need to follow the maths in the whitepaper. Individual *inputs* are ring-signed, not the whole tx. You can't change an input without mucking up the signature for the whole transaction.

2. How can you guarantee, there is no miner or passive listener who is building unobscured private blockchain and sell this data ? (why not to store internal data unobscured when it takes 6 times less space than monero blockchain)

How? In order for them to do this they'd need to own a massive portion of the utxoset. Maybe you need to read our research bulletin on chain reactions and traceability in the CryptoNote protocol, as it explains exactly why this is impossible without a huge amount of utxos under your private control: http://lab.monero.cc/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf

3. How you can prove that you really paid or even did not want to pay.to hacker :-)

Because even though the inputs are ring signed (and thus you can (ostensibly) never know if an input was genuine or merely part of a group signature) the outputs are signed by you and you alone. Thus, verification is trivial - you merely need to reveal the one-time key for that transaction to verify it.

Once I know your PUBLIC key I can add you to my GROUP (adding my and your public key together). Then create ring signature and no one knows who signed message you or me. Then I can fork blockchain !!!  (maybe even from genesis block)

Again, you're conflating ring-signed inputs with individually-signed outputs. The trick here is the combination of stealth addresses and ring signatures, not one or the other. I'd suggest you start with the whitepaper and fully grok the maths behind it as a first step towards understanding.

Didn't give fluffypony answers to your questions here?

Look, an insider!

Not insider :-), only looking for answer to my question:
Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).
What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

Edit:
q1: How much money was mined(emitted) and what is total sum of all accounts :-) ?
Edit2:
if you know answer to q1 then you must to know all accounts and their balances.
q2: Do you know how balances change every minute ? [yes] In case, your money are secure, can be blockchain analyzed ? [yes]

read above

[Odalv]

Once I know your PUBLIC key I can add you to my GROUP (adding my and your public key together). Then create ring signature and no one knows who signed message you or me. Then I can fork blockchain !!!  (maybe even from genesis block)

Again, you're conflating ring-signed inputs with individually-signed outputs. The trick here is the combination of stealth addresses and ring signatures, not one or the other. I'd suggest you start with the whitepaper and fully grok the maths behind it as a first step towards understanding.

Didn't give fluffypony answers to your questions here?

Maybe, but I do not get it. Can you explain ?

[smooth]

Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).

You can't send the money without the private key corresponding to that output. Nothing about including an output in a ring signature gives you access to the private key. The whole point of ring signatures is that you can construct a ring signature using only the public, not private keys of the other possible signers.

You have only your own private key, so you can only spend your own outputs.

What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

It guarantees that someone in the group has the private key that enabled him to sign a transaction spending the output. This allows an observer to verify that the output has been spent by the authorized party (someone with the private key) but does not allow the observer to determine which of the group is the authorized party.

[Odalv]

Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).

You can't send the money without the private key corresponding to that output. Nothing about including an output in a ring signature gives you access to the private key. The whole point of ring signatures is that you can construct a ring signature using only the public, not private keys of the other possible signers.

You have only your own private key, so you can only spend your own outputs.

What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

It guarantees that someone in the group has the private key that enabled him to sign a transaction spending the output. This allows an observer to verify that the output has been spent by the authorized party (someone with the private key) but does not allow the observer to determine which of the group is the authorized party.

Thank you.
Example:
I have(I know private keys) 2 unspent "addresses"  a1=5 XMR and a2=5 XMR, I want pay for goods 2 XMR (address g1.) and send the rest to a3. To confuse observer I'll use both input addresses.

Transaction
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )
I'll ring-sign with  a1 private key, Is this correct ?

[smooth]

Who or what prevents me from ring-signing your input and send your money to my address(output).

You can't send the money without the private key corresponding to that output. Nothing about including an output in a ring signature gives you access to the private key. The whole point of ring signatures is that you can construct a ring signature using only the public, not private keys of the other possible signers.

You have only your own private key, so you can only spend your own outputs.

What this ring signature guarantees. (may I spend all inputs ? is this agreement of this group ? If it guarantees nothing (because anybody can create signature) then why is there (just "smoke screen" for propaganda we are untraceable?))  ... or I'm too stupid.

It guarantees that someone in the group has the private key that enabled him to sign a transaction spending the output. This allows an observer to verify that the output has been spent by the authorized party (someone with the private key) but does not allow the observer to determine which of the group is the authorized party.

Thank you.
Example:
I have(I know private keys) 2 unspent "addresses"  a1=5 XMR and a2=5 XMR, I want pay for goods 2 XMR (address g1.) and send the rest to a3. To confuse observer I'll use both input addresses.

Transaction
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )
I'll ring-sign with  a1 private key, Is this correct ?

Almost. You will will sign with both a1 and a2 private keys, allowing you to spend both outputs.

If you want to ring sign (it is optional) you can also include in the ring sig additional public keys from other outputs that you don't control (you just pull them from the blockchain). The observer can't tell which of the outputs was the actual source (where you hold the private key) but can verify that there is a valid private key being used for each input.

Hope that helps!

[meanig]

In a practical sense how is Amero Monero different from Darkwallet?

[Hunyadi]

In a practical sense how is Amero Monero different from Darkwallet?

This is what I would love to know 

[smooth]

In a practical sense how is Amero different from Darkwallet?

Darkwallet uses a form of stealth addresses that is similar to Monero. This won't work with regular Bitcoin users though, you will have to use regular address unless both parties are using Darkwallet (or some wallet using a compatible stealth scheme). In a sense this feature makes Darkwallet a bit like an altcoin that is sharing the Bitcoin blockchain. If you are exchanging with regular Bitcoin users you will lose the unlinkability benefit of stealth addresses (but you can still do it and you can keep unlinkability if you never reuse addresses).

Darkwallet uses CoinJoin style mixing. This has issues that have been widely discussed elsewhere, especially when there aren't a large number of people wanting to mix at the exact same time. (There is a rendezvous process in CoinJoin where people making truncations at the same time are mixed together.) This can be still be used even with regular Bitcoin addresses, but only if the sender is using Darkwallet. A Darkwallet user who receives coins from a non-Darkwallet user will receive non-mixed coins, and also will potentially have address linkability if the address is reused. By contrast Monero uses ring signatures for mixing which doesn't require a rendezvous process the way CoinJoin does, but does have some other issues (some discussed in MRL-0001)

Since Darkwallet is based on Bitcoin it shares the rest of Bitcoins advantages and disadvantages (biggest advantage being its relatively wide adoption, but again when interacting with non-DW users your feature set is reduced). Monero is a new code base that does some things differently (for example not having a fixed block size), which again has advantages and disadvantages. The relative immaturity of the code is a big disadvantage.

[Hunyadi]

In a practical sense how is Amero different from Darkwallet?

Darkwallet uses a form of stealth addresses that is similar to Monero. This won't work with regular Bitcoin users though, you will have to use regular address unless both parties are using Darkwallet (or some wallet using a compatible stealth scheme). In a sense this feature makes Darkwallet a bit like an altcoin that is sharing the Bitcoin blockchain. If you are exchanging with regular Bitcoin users you will lose the unlinkability benefit of stealth addresses (but you can still do it and you can keep unlinkability if you never reuse addresses).

Darkwallet uses CoinJoin style mixing. This has issues that have been widely discussed elsewhere, especially when there aren't a large number of people wanting to mix at the exact same time. (There is a rendezvous process in CoinJoin where people making truncations at the same time are mixed together.) This can be still be used even with regular Bitcoin addresses, but only if the sender is using Darkwallet. A Darkwallet user who receives coins from a non-Darkwallet user will receive non-mixed coins, and also will potentially have address linkability if the address is reused. By contrast Monero uses ring signatures for mixing which doesn't require a rendezvous process the way CoinJoin does, but does have some other issues (some discussed in MRL-0001)

Since Darkwallet is based on Bitcoin it shares the rest of Bitcoins advantages and disadvantages (biggest advantage being its relatively wide adoption, but again when interacting with non-DW users your feature set is reduced). Monero is a new code base that does some things differently (for example not having a fixed block size), which again has advantages and disadvantages. The relative immaturity of the code is a big disadvantage.

Thanks for the answer! So, you can use DarkWallet completely anonymously if you know what to do, right (of course you are kind of biased to answer )?

[smooth]

In a practical sense how is Amero different from Darkwallet?

Darkwallet uses a form of stealth addresses that is similar to Monero. This won't work with regular Bitcoin users though, you will have to use regular address unless both parties are using Darkwallet (or some wallet using a compatible stealth scheme). In a sense this feature makes Darkwallet a bit like an altcoin that is sharing the Bitcoin blockchain. If you are exchanging with regular Bitcoin users you will lose the unlinkability benefit of stealth addresses (but you can still do it and you can keep unlinkability if you never reuse addresses).

Darkwallet uses CoinJoin style mixing. This has issues that have been widely discussed elsewhere, especially when there aren't a large number of people wanting to mix at the exact same time. (There is a rendezvous process in CoinJoin where people making truncations at the same time are mixed together.) This can be still be used even with regular Bitcoin addresses, but only if the sender is using Darkwallet. A Darkwallet user who receives coins from a non-Darkwallet user will receive non-mixed coins, and also will potentially have address linkability if the address is reused. By contrast Monero uses ring signatures for mixing which doesn't require a rendezvous process the way CoinJoin does, but does have some other issues (some discussed in MRL-0001)

Since Darkwallet is based on Bitcoin it shares the rest of Bitcoins advantages and disadvantages (biggest advantage being its relatively wide adoption, but again when interacting with non-DW users your feature set is reduced). Monero is a new code base that does some things differently (for example not having a fixed block size), which again has advantages and disadvantages. The relative immaturity of the code is a big disadvantage.

Thanks for the answer! So, you can use DarkWallet completely anonymously if you know what to do, right (of course you are kind of biased to answer )?

Well like I said, there are issues with CoinJoin-style mixing, and there are issues with people with whom you interact not necessarily all being DW users. It is possible that under some circumstances it will work great. Under others it probably won't. That isn't entirely in your control though.

Overall it is certainly going to be a big improvement over regular Bitcoin in terms of privacy (not saying much).

[Hunyadi]

Thanks for the answer! So, you can use DarkWallet completely anonymously if you know what to do, right (of course you are kind of biased to answer )?

Well like I said, there are issues with CoinJoin-style mixing, and there are issues with people with whom you interact not necessarily all being DW users. It is possible that under some circumstances it will work great. Under others it probably won't. That isn't entirely in your control though.

Overall it is certainly going to be a big improvement over regular Bitcoin in terms of privacy (not saying much).

Excellent, thanks for your answer! Really appreciated.

[Odalv]

Example:
I have(I know private keys) 2 unspent "addresses"  a1=5 XMR and a2=5 XMR, I want pay for goods 2 XMR (address g1.) and send the rest to a3. To confuse observer I'll use both input addresses.

Transaction
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )
I'll ring-sign with  a1 private key, Is this correct ?

Almost. You will will sign with both a1 and a2 private keys, allowing you to spend both outputs.

If you want to ring sign (it is optional) you can also include in the ring sig additional public keys from other outputs that you don't control (you just pull them from the blockchain). The observer can't tell which of the outputs was the actual source (where you hold the private key) but can verify that there is a valid private key being used for each input.

Hope that helps!

lol, I'm still confused:-)

So I'll send 2 transaction, is this possible ?
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )   -> ring-sing with a1
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g2=2 XMR, a4= 8 XMR )   -> ring-sing with a2

[smooth]

So I'll send 2 transaction, is this possible ?
input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )   -> ring-sing with a1

Let's do one at at time. This one needs to be signed using both inputs. so

input ( a1=5 XMR, a2=5XMR )  output( g1=2 XMR, a3= 8 XMR )   -> ring-sing with a1 + ring-sign with a2

You can't spent a2 without a valid signature (ring or otherwise)

[ensurance982]

Risto often points out and stresses that Bitcoin has always had a history of 'deep dips' and 'never to sell below ATH', I totally agree. But, what is your current prediction or estimate on the current market situation, Risto? Things are a bit worrisome, we're on a freaky slide right now!! I think some around here need some positive words.