I appreciate you holding me in such "high" regard, and would like to refer you to the work of Jean Drèze and the aforementioned Amartya Sen; particularly the work they present in their book "Hunger and Public Action", starting at page 204. The reforms they put forth as likely having the largest responsibility for the decline in mortality in China (pre-1979) when compared to India, were related to health services ("cooperative medical systems, commune clinics, barefoot doctors, and wide-spread public health measures"), food distribution systems, and social security programs.

Here's a link to a .pdf with that chapter of the book: http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/glasgow/ps15/DrezeSen.pdf.

And here are a couple of pages with the most relevant information highlighted in red, though I'd advise you to read at least the full chapter, as it is interesting for the context and further information it provides - I would transcribe the relevant parts here, but I'm too lazy for that.






Also, don't take this to be a "defense of communism" (again, despite nothing here having much to do with Communism in the first place) - I'm just pointing out that deceptive and facile arguments, like those in the article you posted, are not very useful, unless you want to fall into the easy camp of "communism is evil, capitalism is good". Both the excesses and improvements of those systems are important, and must be understood, if we want the chance of living in a better world.

It's kind of a pretty deceptive reminder though.

First, it's questionable to what degree those really are Communist countries, and not simply Authoritarian State Capitalist or State Socialist countries. Then, the article should probably point out that the first famine in China it mentions occurred during its Republic, in a phase of civil war, and with World War Two going on in the background. But even if you don't want to bother with those details, then what about, for example, Amartya Sen's work, that studied mortality rates from 1949 to 1979, in India and China? His work not only shows China had a drastic reduction in mortality rates, starting in 1949 (due to its "communist" reforms, when the People's Republic of China was created), but goes further to state India could have saved something like 3.8 million people a year if it had the same mortality rates as China - that is, Communist China probably saved over 100 million lives when compared to Democratic Capitalist India. Is that anywhere in the comparison the article is making? Or the studies that show the increase in China's mortality rate starting in 1979 (when its "capitalist" reforms started)?

It's fine if you don't like Communism (there's certainly a lot of valid critics to be made), but that article is just silly.

Thank you J. J. Phillips.

I hope you don't mind, but rather than following the order you used in your post, I'm going to start with a few of the clarifications and sources you asked for:



A good dose of skepticism is always healthy; feel free to ask for any source you'd like - in fact, ideally, I would be providing them as I go, but that's not always how it turns out.

The following sources mention the restricted items, and provide some more background information about the blockade of Gaza:

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/amira-hass-israel-bans-books-music-and-clothes-from-entering-gaza-1.276147, "Israel bans books, music and clothes from entering Gaza".
http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/Products060610_Eng%281%29.pdf, "Partial List of Items Prohibited/Permitted into the Gaza Strip".
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8654337.stm, "Details of Gaza blockade revealed in court case".

As you can see in the linked material, the most restrictive sanctions lasted from 2007 up until 2010, at which point, international outcry pressured Israel to ease the blockade somewhat - as the occupying power, comparisons between Gaza and "open air prison" were doing wonders for Israel's image; to quote David Cameron: "The situation in Gaza has to change. Humanitarian goods and people must flow in both directions. Gaza cannot and must not be allowed to remain a prison camp".

During those three years, perhaps less than 100 different items at a time were allowed into the occupied territory, though the specific goods allowed in changed somewhat over time. I'd love to be more specific but, to quote the BBC article, "Israel has never published a list of banned items, saying it approves requests on a case-by-case basis. Items allowed have changed over time, which has left humanitarian organisations and commercial importers constantly attempting to guess what will be approved" - according to the Haaretz article, Israeli officials in charge of the sanctions apparently prefer not to leave things in writing, and prefer to use the phone...

Again quoting the BBC article: "Gisha's [an Israeli human rights group] director, Sari Bashi, says she is no security expert, 'but preventing children from receiving toys, preventing manufacturers from getting raw materials - I don't see how that's responsive to Israeli security needs.' And she says that some of the prohibitions appear to be absurdly arbitrary: 'I certainly don't understand why cinnamon is permitted, but coriander is forbidden. Is there something more dangerous about coriander? Is coriander more critical to Gaza's economy than cinnamon? This is a policy that appears to make no sense.' She argues that if there is a logic behind such decisions, the military should reveal what it is." Also, "the state argues that disclosure of what is allowed in and why would, in their words, 'damage national security and harm foreign relations'".

But, we already know what the "logic" behind such decisions was, as I posted before: 'As Israeli officials themselves put it at one point, they wanted Gaza's economy, and the over 1.5 million inhabitants "on the brink of collapse without quite pushing it over the edge", and "functioning at the lowest level possible consistent with avoiding a humanitarian crisis"'.

Fortunately, following the latest war there and renewed international pressure to ease the blockade, it seems Israel has recently started allowing a few exports out of Gaza, which should go some way in helping to restart the economy there.

As a bit of an extra, the following are a couple of interviews with Eva Bartlett, a freelance journalist and activist who lived in both Gaza and the West Bank for about 3 years - it starts off with how she got to be interested in this particular conflict, and goes on to describe daily life under sanctions in Gaza. By the way, she is also a Canadian, so maybe you know her - I'm kidding, I know there are more than 100 of you guys up there - maybe 200, tops.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfgkxF5oaWc ("Gaza Under Siege - Eva Bartlett on Reality Asserts Itself (1/2)", 16m38s)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGaj_EdXytY ("Gaza Under Siege - Eva Bartlett on Reality Asserts Itself (2/2)", 16m28s)



I find it interesting that, at the same time you're admitting something would come as a surprise to you, you immediately move to try and frame it in a way that negates any possible value coming out of it.

Anyway:

http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/Nixed-Signals, "Nixed Signals - When Hamas hinted at peace, U.S. media wouldn't take the message"
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/hamas-vows-to-honor-palestinian-referendum-on-peace-with-israel-1.328234, "Hamas vows to honor Palestinian referendum on peace with Israel - Islamist leader Ismail Haniyeh says he would accept a deal with Israel based on 1967 borders and denies that Gaza has become a stronghold for al-Qaida."
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2008/04/2008615098393788.html, "Hamas ready to accept 1967 borders - US dismisses comments as Palestinian group says it will still "not recognise Israel"

The first article I linked to is a bit long, but I think it's well worth the time, as it not only provides far more context, but also looks at a lot of the omissions most other news agencies commit when reporting this issue. The following is from that article, quoting a Hamas leader, Riad Mustafa, in 2006: "I say unambiguously: Hamas does not and never will recognize Israel. Recognition is an act conferred by states, not movements or governments, and Palestine is not a state. Nevertheless, the government's program calls for the end of the occupation, not the destruction of Israel, and Hamas has proposed ending the occupation and a long-term truce (hudna) to bring peace to this region. That is Hamas' own position. The government has also recognized President Abbas' right to conduct political negotiations with Israel. If he were to produce a peace agreement, and if this agreement was endorsed by our national institutions and a popular referendum, then - even if it includes Palestinian recognition of Israel - we would of course accept their verdict. Because respecting the will of the people and their democratic choice is also one of our principles." The article goes on to say: "In March, Hamas released its official legislative program. The document clearly signaled that Hamas could refer the issue of recognizing Israel to a national referendum. Under the heading 'Recognition of Israel,' it stated simply (AFP, 3/11/06): 'The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction, nor the government, but a decision for the Palestinian people.'" And from the Aljazeera article: "Carter said his understandings with Hamas called for a referendum to be preceded by reconciliation between the group and Abbas's Fatah faction. In his news conference, Meshaal said Hamas would 'respect Palestinian national will, even if it was against our convictions'."

But, would the Palestinian people actually vote for the explicit recognition of Israel? Well, there are several polls on this and other issues, and at times they seem to present contradictory information, both on the Palestinian and Israeli intentions. Going by polls from the Policy and Survey Research (http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/596), on the one hand, they seem to show that, were such a vote to happen now, it would probably receive no more than 40% support. However, given the somewhat abstract nature of the question, and the continued occupation Palestinians live under on a daily basis, that's probably not a very surprising result. On the other hand, when that was asked in the context of the Clinton/Geneva permanent status package, "In the Palestinian public 61% support and 37% oppose a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side. The parties will recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples. In December 2013, 63% supported and 36% opposed this item." So, recognition of Israel by itself doesn't seem to me to be the main issue here, but rather, depends on the circumstances that would come about and its likely consequences, as well as the timing of the question.

When a more practical question is brought up though, the results are more promising: the same year Hamas got its election victory, in 2006, 77% of Palestinians supported the Prisoners' Document, which among other things, called for the implementation of the two-state solution (https://web.archive.org/web/20060902162217/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=723105&contrassID=1&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=0). When asked specifically about their support for the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, 83% were in favor - maybe not explicit, but certainly an implicit recognition of Israel. Unfortunately, almost 10 years past and a number of conflicts later, particularly last year's incursion in Gaza, the support seems to have dropped to about 51% this year, with "60% [saying] that the two-state solution is no longer practical due to Israeli settlement expansion [...]" (http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/605).

The polls go on to show that Palestinians believe "The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28% while 26% of the public say that it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; 22% say it is the spread of corruption in some public institutions; and 19% believe it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings" - Israel, as the occupying power, plays a major role in most, if not all of these issues; so, addressing them would be an easy way to improve its support within the Palestinian population.

As for the possibility of Hamas going back on their word, I see it as somewhat of a moot point, since they would quickly find themselves: (even more) isolated and marginalized; expelled from the unity government they're currently in; losing popular support and the relatively insecure grasp on power they have; probably taken over by a more popular faction; and/or, risking a civil war they would be unlikely to win.





(1) - Well, if that's all the information you're providing people with, most would likely blame Palestinians for the whole affair - but with a little more context and information on what happened, they might come to a different conclusion.

Personally, I don't blame Israel for the second Intifada because Sharon took a thousand armed guards with him for a visit to Temple Mount, while knowing full well how sensitive the area is and that it would likely be interpreted as a provocation, at a time that threatened the peace talks, in a move likely aimed at strengthening his position in the Israeli political scene, no matter what (and probably in the elections being held soon after). No; rather than that, I blame Israel for its very poor, and often cruel, treatment of the Palestinian population, the illegal settlement activity, the discrimination of its own Arab-Israeli population - all of which are an integral part of the daily lives of Palestinians and Arab-Israelis, and which did much to exacerbate the situation - and mainly for, when faced with what were initially limited confrontations, mostly between protesters and security forces, adding fuel to the fire by using live ammo against protesters - obviously in an effort to show they had learnt nothing from the first Intifada, or really, just about any protest in history, ever.

But, don't take my word for it - here's what Shlomo Ben-Ami, then Israel's Security Minister and acting Foreign Minister, had to say about it: "Israel's disproportionate response to what had started as a popular uprising with young, unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed with lethal weapons fuelled the Intifada beyond control and turned it into an all-out war."

Also, in his book "The Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, 1999-2001: within reach", Gilead Sher points out: "The picture of the Israeli policeman shooting at the Al-Aqsa Mosque - shooting that was not at all a necessity under the circumstances - ignited a conflagration and anger among millions of Muslims in the world". Later on, he goes on to describe Jacques Chirac complaining to Barak about Israeli conduct in the face of mounting Palestinian casualties: "This morning, sixty-four Palestinians are dead, nine Israeli-Arabs were also killed, and you're pressing on. You cannot, Mr Prime Minister, explain this ratio in the number of wounded. You cannot make anyone believe that the Palestinians are the aggressors [...] When I was a company commander in Algeria, I also thought I was right. I fought the guerillas. Later I realized I was wrong. It is the honour of the strong, to reach out and not to shoot. Today you must reach out your hand. If you continue to fire from helicopters on people throwing rocks, and you continue to refuse an international inquiry, you are turning down a gesture from Arafat. You have no idea how hard I pushed Arafat to agree to a trilateral meeting."

And the Mitchell Report, released by an international fact-finding committee, states at one point: "The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the unarmed Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint."


(2) - Then, we should probably work to better inform that "significant percentage of Israelis".

I take it the negotiations you're alluding to were those held throughout the year 2000, the most commonly known being those at the Camp David Summit, and later at Bolling Air Force Base, which saw the introduction of the Clinton Parameters. So, what was the proposal - the so called "Barak's generous offer", as described in American and Israeli press at the time - that Arafat rejected?

In terms of territory, the proposal called for the Palestinians to give up about 27% of the West Bank - that is, less than 3/4 of the West Bank would belong to the Palestinian state, and it would be surrounded on all sides by Israel. Within a very poorly defined time frame (maybe 10 to 25 years, maybe more), the Palestinian state would be allowed to take up to 91% of the West Bank (plus 1% coming from a land swap with Israel). However, as the Israeli activist group Gush Shalom points out, those 18% of the West Bank, the Palestinian state would eventually recover, have settlements of some of the "most extreme Jewish religious zealots" - so, forget the 10 to 25 years. Further, the percentages give a somewhat deceptive image of the reality on the ground; the territory that Israel would annex would leave the Palestinian state nonviable: Israeli settlements, land, roads and checkpoints would effectively divide the Palestinian state into several smaller, separate territories, plus the Gaza Strip on the opposite side, leaving the connection between these multiple areas to the discretion, and under the complete control, of Israel - which led to the inevitable comparison with South African Bantustans. Also, control over water resources in the West Bank would remain in Israeli hands. By the way, I should also note that settlements are typically built in important and resource rich areas, with access to farmland and water supplies - many of these areas would, of course, be part of the land annexed by Israel. In East Jerusalem, Palestinians would only be allowed to keep control of some isolated pockets of territory; the rest, including Israeli settlements, being left under Israeli control or also annexed.

Then, in relation to the Palestinian refugees and their right of return, the following quote from a Haaretz article (http://www.haaretz.com/culture/books/a-summit-clouded-by-suspicion-1.75548) offers some information: "At two points in the negotiations the Israelis evinced a lack of understanding and consideration of the feelings of the other side. The Palestinians were aware of the fears nurtured by Israeli propaganda about the 3.7 million refugees waiting, keys in hand, to return to their homes. Even before the summit, relates Beilin, Arafat met with Clinton and informed him that the solution of the refugee problem would be one that would take into account Israel's demographic concerns (page 106). - Sensitive issues - Sher, who, judging from his book is a careful and balanced individual, writes that the Palestinians 'are not demanding the practical right of return to Israel - which, in my opinion, is not an element of their 'core position'' (page 156). What Barak proposed was the return of 5,000 refugees 'in one blow' or 10,000 over 10 years. 'Generosity' is also a matter of geography" - I believe the number was eventually raised to 100.000, the rest being afforded some compensation and help in resettling (though all these with significant caveats as well).

The proposal also called for a demilitarized Palestinian state, for Israeli control of Palestinian airspace, the right to deploy troops inside Palestine, and for Israeli control over whom Palestine could form alliances with.

Democracy Now had a debate between Norman Finkelstein and Shlomo Ben-Ami, back in 2006, that I really recommend you see. At one point, after Norman Finkelstein presents his case as to why the Israeli proposal at Camp David was so unfair to the Palestinian side, Shlomo Ben-Ami comments: "Okay, the last third part of the book, as Dr. Finkelstein says, there is the diplomat, and this same diplomat still behaves in a way as a historian when he says in this book that Camp David was not the missed opportunity for the Palestinians, and if I were a Palestinian I would have rejected Camp David, as well" (http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/14/fmr_israeli_foreign_minister_shlomo_ben - you can see the video, hear the full interview in mp3, or just read the transcript, if you'd like).

Forget Arafat - no one would accept this "generous" offer (to make concessions).


But, that's not the end of the story, of course: at the end of December, 2000, Clinton came out with "his" Parameters, which presented a somewhat more reasonable proposal, though still containing many of the problems of the previous one - both sides "accepted" it, while submitting their list of reservations.

Less than a month later, in January 2001, the negotiations continued in the Taba Summit, this time with a proposal partly based on the Clinton Parameters, but taking into account the reservations on both sides, and closer to the international consensus: minor border adjustments and land concession by the Palestinians; a territorially linked Palestinian state; Jerusalem being an open city, and capital of both states, with Israel keeping control of Jewish areas and Palestine keeping control of Arab areas; limited right of return for Palestinian refugees; demilitarization of the Palestinian state; and some other security related agreements. The following article provides additional information on each of these areas, as well as some insight into the experiences and expectations of the negotiators: http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=32.

Unfortunately, before a complete agreement could be reached on all issues, Israel recalled its negotiation team, in part (supposedly) due to the upcoming elections which the party in power was likely to lose - though some argue that, at least, a framework agreement could have been reached before the elections, as you can see in the link above. According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, "the pressure of Israeli public opinion against the talks could not be resisted", with some accusing him of being "ready to sell out the country for the sake of a Nobel Prize" - which is interesting, considering that, if not all, the vast majority of the concessions being made in all the negotiations, were being made by the Palestinian side; they were simply not being forced to make as many concessions at Taba. In any case, at the conclusion of the negotiations, both the Israeli and Palestinian teams acknowledged the progress made, and expressed their confidence that, as soon as the negotiations are resumed (presumably after the Israeli elections), a permanent peace settlement could be reached within a few weeks: "the political timetable prevented reaching an agreement on all the issues. However, in light of the significant progress in narrowing the differences between the sides, the two sides are convinced that in a short period of time and given an intensive effort and the acknowledgment of the essential and urgent nature of reaching an agreement, it will be possible to bridge the differences remaining and attain a permanent settlement of peace between them. In this respect, the two sides are confident that they can begin and move forward in this process at the earliest practical opportunity" http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2001/Pages/Israeli-Palestinian%20Joint%20Statement%20-%2027-Jan-2001.aspx.

So, almost 15 years later, why are we still talking about this today? Well, Israel's new government, led by Sharon, chose never to resumed those negotiations, despite knowing (or arguably because it knew) they would lead to a peace agreement (which would in turn almost certainly mean withdrawal from occupied territory and dismantlement of most of the illegal settlements in the West Bank - political suicide then, and something still controversial today, with many, if not most, Israelis against it apparently: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-peace-conference/1.601996). Of course, technically, negotiations did continue since then, but without the same commitment, and with proposals ranging from absurd (Elon Peace Plan), to worse than those presented at the Camp David Summit (which had obviously already been rejected by the Palestinians), to not significantly better; with a few of the negotiations pretty much sabotaged, to prevent any progress. Illegal settlements and land grabs, however, suffered no such setbacks.

From then on, Israel has often pursued an unilateral policy when dealing with the Palestinians; at least as much as it can get away with. Sorry for repeating myself, but I believe this is a good example, and is quite relevant here - as I had previously posted, when you mentioned the disengagement plan from Gaza in a previous post: "here's what the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's senior adviser had to say about the plan, which goes to show its intent and predictable consequences: 'The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process, and when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. [...] and 'The disengagement is actually formaldehyde [...] It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'. Asked why the plan had been devised, he stated 'Because in the fall of 2003 we understood that everything was stuck. [...] Time was not on our side. There was international erosion, internal erosion. Domestically, in the meantime, everything was collapsing. The economy was stagnant, and the Geneva Initiative had gained broad support. And then we were hit with the letters of officers and letters of pilots and letters of commandos [refusing to serve in the territories]', and 'You know, the term 'peace process' is a bundle of concepts and commitments. The peace process is the establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks that entails. The peace process is the evacuation of settlements, it's the return of refugees, it's the partition of Jerusalem. And all that has now been frozen.... what I effectively agreed to with the Americans was that part of the settlements would not be dealt with at all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn into Finns. That is the significance of what we did''."

And, just in case the pattern isn't abundantly obvious by now, Sharon, at the end of his political career and before falling ill, apparently had plans to also conduct an unilateral "disengagement" plan in the West Bank - sounds good in theory; a "they're actually willing to leave the West Bank" sort of thing, until you look at the details. In practice, the plan called for the annexation of about 1/3 of the territory, and the Palestinians would get what was left - in effect, a worse deal than what had been proposed at Camp David, not to mention the violence that such a plan would have triggered. It's hard not to come away from all this with the conclusion that Israel is playing by the rule of "either you shut up and give us what we want, or we're going to take it by force".


(3) - "A lot of evidence supports the idea that Palestinians aren't willing to live in peace with Israel under any circumstances" - such as?

I think you might be conflating half a century of Palestinian opposition and resistance to the occupation, along with its predictable effects on the population over time, with this idea of yours that Palestinians don't want peace with Israel, no matter what - those are very different things.


(4) - Yes, and just like your previous "Israel has the right to defend itself [by force]" required you to show there are no peaceful alternatives that it can take (which there are; and which it is not taking), this too requires you to show what they are actually doing, and what they are willing to give up, to reach some sort of peaceful accommodation, and to avoid perpetuating the cycle of violence. Without it, that formulation is meaningless - or worse, as it's just asserting Israel doesn't have a peace plan, or even prospects of having a peace plan, since the world doesn't conform to its expectations. And meanwhile, in the background, its actions continue to undermine any possibility of a peace plan. It's almost the same as me saying that I want my very own fortress on Mars; but unless I'm willing to find a way to travel there, then a way to build stuff there, and then some way of surviving there, I'm not going to do any of it - I'll just stay where I am, living my life as I have until now.

And then, in the real world, what often happens is people say they want peace, when in fact they mean they want peace by imposing their terms on others - and if they don't agree to your terms, you beat them over the head until they do / are in no condition to disagree.

A bit off-topic, but it kind of reminds me of that Dayan quote, when he was referring to how they could handle the Palestinian refugees, in 1967: "let's say 'we don't have a solution, and you will continue living like dogs, and whoever wants will go, and we'll see how this procedure will work out.' For now, it works out. Let's say the truth. We want peace. If there is no peace, we will maintain military rule and we will have four to five military compounds on the mountains, and they will sit ten years under the Israeli military regime. Whoever wants to go, will want. It's possible that in five years, there will be 200.000 fewer people, and that's an enormous thing." Sadly, this seems closer to the "solution" Israel has been following since: annexing the resource rich areas it wants, and the Palestinians can either shut up and leave, or keep on "living like dogs".

Underneath the veneer, this is the view expressed by Netanyahu.



It's fair to say there is a disproportionate amount of attention Israel gets at the UN, and some of its bodies; and you can even make the case that there is often a bias against it, though I disagree with the idea that antisemitism is the main drive for it. But more importantly, I (and certainly many others) would be far more sympathetic to such arguments if I saw Israel actually acting in good faith towards resolving its problems with the Palestinians: not only at the negotiating table, but also on the ground, with how it treats the population in the occupied territories. It should go without saying that, oppressing Palestinians, isn't winning much sympathy for the Israeli cause - on the other hand, acting in good faith, and participating in international processes, even if biased, will.

To quote Dayan again: "If you want to make peace, you don't talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies".

Further, I think this idea of "whenever Jews rely on non-Jews to protect them, the result is always a lot of dead Jews" is misguided and dangerous; the world is never going to be constituted of only Jewish people, and isolationism isn't going to work in this day and age - and worse, it reinforces this idea that Jews are somehow different, which is precisely the idea we should be fighting. Antisemitism is racism, and should be handled as such - nothing more.



Personally, I'm less concerned about why people devote their attention to this conflict (nor do I see how that knowledge would help solve it) than I am with Israel's actions justifying that attention in spades - enough to turn away even those who once supported it.

I mean, what do you think happened to Israel's international image when its soldiers were caught on camera carrying out Rabin's "break Palestinian bones" policy on two teenagers, during the first Intifada? Because, clearly, collective punishments and using live ammunition on what were, initially, mostly peaceful protests and acts of civil disobedience, wasn't bad enough. The international outrage was immense, and justifiably so.

A small quote from the first article I linked to below, where they describe the content of the film documenting the practice: "In the middle of the frame are two Palestinians, sprawled on the ground and surrounded by the four soldiers. At times only three of them can be seen. All of them kick the teens vigorously. At least two of the soldiers take big rocks and mercilessly smash them against the two cousins. At one point a soldier holds one of the teen's arms as another soldier savagely hits it repeatedly with a large rock. The soldiers do not seem to be in any danger, nor do they seem disturbed by the events. They are utterly focused on meting out the beating, 25 minutes of which was recorded."

And so you don't think this was an isolated incident, near the end of the article, they comment on a few other cases: "In the early days of the first intifada there were several similar incidents that were not filmed. The most famous of them was named after the Givati Brigade. [...] Two other notorious incidents were the 'bulldozer affair,' in which two Palestinians were buried alive, as punishment; and the 'Yehuda Meir affair,' named for the Givati battalion commander who ordered his troops to beat Palestinians who were arrested in the villages of Beita and Hawara."

Two articles from Haaretz on this:
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/freeze-frame-1.336986, "Freeze Frame - In February 1988 CBS cameraman Moshe Alpert filmed four soldiers carrying out Yitzhak Rabin's "break their bones" order against two Palestinian teens. Their bones didn't shatter, but Israel's self-image and its international image did. Now, 23 years later, one of the victims speaks out."
http://www.haaretz.com/news/broken-bones-and-broken-hopes-1.173283, "Broken bones and broken hopes - When Palestinians are asked about Yitzhak Rabin, they remember a man who ordered Israeli soldiers to break their arms and legs."


Or when you have Israeli security services routinely torturing Palestinians, under legalized torture, until 1999 - with credible reports this practice continued at least until 2009, though to a lesser extent.

According to a B'Tselem estimate (B'Tselem is an Israeli Human Rights organization), until 1999, about 85% of Palestinians interrogated by security forces were subject to some form of torture - that's about 850 people tortured per year. Worse still, as if that isn't bad enough, apparently it wasn't just criminals who were tortured: some were only suspects and were later released, or put under administrative detention (read: no reason given to keep them locked up, and no right to stand before trial); others still were not even suspects, but rather, family members or acquaintances of a detainee, or a suspect yet to be apprehended.

From the BBC, "Israel admits torture" from February: 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/637293.stm.
A specific case, as reported by Haaretz, "Shin Bet to compensate PFLP member for torturing him": http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/shin-bet-to-compensate-pflp-member-for-torturing-him-1.331075.
And a more recent and broader look at this by B'Tselem, from January, 2012: http://www.btselem.org/torture/background.


Or when you have civilians, farmers (and fishermen) in Gaza periodically shot at, and sometimes killed, by Israeli forces, on account of being too close to the border; despite not posing any actual danger, and "too close" being mostly up to the soldiers to decide - which in effect, cut the population off from about 35% of the farmland they depend on for food, at one point: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-troops-kill-palestinian-near-gaza-border-medical-officials-say-1.493998, http://rt.com/news/208087-israel-kills-palestinian-farmer, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/24/israel-stop-shooting-gaza-civilians, http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/20131029_shooting_at_farmers_near_gaza_fence - also, the interview with Eva Bartlett I mentioned above speaks of this, and shows some footage as well.


Or when you see the complete disregard for Palestinian lives from the Israeli security forces, when they ambush and kill an unarmed, fleeing kid - well, to be fair, he was trespassing, and apparently did intend to throw stones at Israeli soldiers, so he deserved to die, surely... (http://www.btselem.org/firearm/20130221_killing_of_samir_awad_budrus, http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20150414_state_attorney_decision_in_samir_awad_killing): "This is a new low in Israeli authorities’ disregard for the lives of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The State Attorney’s Office has sent security forces in the Occupied Territories a clear message: if you kill an unarmed Palestinian who poses no threat, we will do everything to cover it up and ensure impunity. Killing a wounded, fleeing youth who posed no threat by shooting him in the back is not a “reckless and negligent act”. The disparity between the grave action and the minor offense is incomprehensible and outrageous."


Or how Israel increasingly resembles an Apartheid state; quoting from Wikipedia: "Israel academic David Dean Shulman writing in the aftermath of the creation of separate bus lines in the West Bank to separate Palestinians and settlers, remarks that: 'Israelis often protest when the word 'apartheid' is used to describe life in the West Bank, with its settlers-only roads and its settlers' electricity grid and its settlers' water-supply and its blatantly discriminatory courts; more and more the word seems sadly close to the mark.'" And just to be clear, I don't think that, internally, Israel is an apartheid state: Israeli-Arabs are still discriminated against, but their situation has constantly improved over time - so the comparison there is unfair, I think. In the occupied territories however, it's far worse than Apartheid. To paraphrase Chomsky: South African Apartheid actually needed its black population - it was their workforce - so, they had some (very) minor interest in their well-being. But Israel doesn't need the Palestinian population - they're nothing but an obstacle to Israeli plans; so if they have to "live like dogs", are forced to go away, or even end up dying off - it seems not to cause too much of a concern.


Or settler violence and state support for them (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/opinion/nicholas-kristof-the-human-stain.html?_r=0); state attempts at covering-up said violence (http://www.btselem.org/hebron/20150402_night_search_and_confiscation); or as I previously mentioned, the sanctions and blockade regime, which left maybe up to 80% of the population of Gaza reliant on foreign aid for food, with shortages of essential products, massive unemployment, and basically a "NGO economy" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7191359.stm); the indiscriminate Dahiya military doctrine, and the periodical attacks on Gaza, that leave a huge amount of civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure; the constant illegal annexation of territory and government subsidized settlement activity; house demolitions, that affect not only criminals, but also mere suspects, along with their entire family; mass arrests of civilians; arrest of political prisoners; extra-judicial assassinations; interference with internal Palestinian political affairs; ... it just goes on, and on.


Yet, up until recently, outside major events, most of these issues received little or no attention in the West, particularly in the US - you had to go to Israeli news or Israeli Human Rights groups to find out about most of it; and they were often far more honest than their Western counterparts too - though this has fortunately been improving over time. One would expect that, if the bias against Israel ran as deep as you want to present it, reporters would pounce at every piece of news of what is often, at best, state sponsored terrorism. And yes, antisemitism, or if you prefer, Jew-hatred, clearly still exists in the world, is clearly a problem, and many conflate Israel's actions with Jews (even those who should know better); but don't take it so far in the other direction that it allows you to be completely blind to the suffering of Palestinians.

I wasn't able to reach the minimum number of posts again. But, if there is still a place for me, I would like to continue in the campaign:

Bitcoin Address: 1KnRA3dbGsAV8cw64sckjFz6uAEXJf2JCo
Post Count: 1668

Hmm, some jokes out of the program Fortune, I always found amusing:

Forget cheating, there's a chance for a threesome there (though this was the "no couples" setting, apparently).

However, I find it more interesting that, supposedly in a previous experiment, 7 out of 8 European males accepted having sex with her, in contrast to the 30 out of 100 American males. I suppose the small sample size, or perhaps the less restrictive rules could account for the difference, but I wonder if culture isn't a more likely reason (I'm guessing, maybe incorrectly, that the European experiment was conducted in Britain).

Need a hand?

Good, as in, better than the Bitcoin Scratchticket signature campaign? Probably all of them.

Of course, what campaign is best for you depends on a number of things, including: how often you post, where in the forum you post, campaign specific rules you may not like, and so on - but to keep it short, if you don't usually post a lot (about 40 or 50 posts a month), I'd say you should look at joining campaigns like BitDice.me, that pay a fixed amount each time period (2 weeks in this case), provided you reach the minimum post requirements (20 posts every 2 weeks); if you post a lot more than that (say, over 150 posts a month), then I'd probably agree with tspacepilot, and say Da Dice is a good choice - and if you don't mind the phone verification and other rules of the campaign, then maybe the Bit-x campaign as well.

Anyway, always make sure to read the rules for each campaign before joining (which you can see in the respective campaign thread, as well as, to some extent, in the OP of this thread).

You're right in saying that accounts can't gain activity only because of their age, but rather, are restricted in the activity they can gain by the 2 week periods; but, as far as I know, the periods are "stackable", in the sense that, if you have posted only a couple of times (< 14 posts) in every 2 week period since the account was created, you can later collect the missing activity you didn't gain then - or, as you put it, you can later post 100 times to collect 100 activity points instantly. Of course, all this requires caskey4521 to have had the foresight of making all those posts throughout the periods - if he didn't, then the activity is lost forever.

Did the rules change, or did I never really understand this?

I think that's really up to each signature campaign manager - not the administration of the forum (as long as you don't spam).

Most campaigns I've seen have some sort of rule against participants with multiple accounts, but many managers probably don't care about it, as long as your posts are of good quality; others will remove you from the campaign if they catch you. I'm reminded of the LuckyBit campaign, where stingleword kicked out maybe over half of the accounts participating in the campaign, at one point - don't mess with stingleword.

If possible, I would like to continue in the campaign:

Bitcoin Address: 1KnRA3dbGsAV8cw64sckjFz6uAEXJf2JCo
Post Count: 1661

He has some pretty great comics - easily one of my favorites as well.

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Where's Muhammed Zakir?

I suppose most people here already know this, but I'd just like to mention that despite the name of the video (and this thread), that isn't really an anti-gravity effect - the device is still affected by gravity; it's simply producing lift (thrust). Also, as he mentions in the video, that doesn't work in a vacuum, which shouldn't be a limitation of an anti-gravity device.

Head to Head is back at last.

This time the interview is with Asad Durrani, formerly with the ISI, Pakistan's spy agency. Some of his statements are quite appalling, but I can appreciate the blunt exposition of his views: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z__lyS-wI7c ("Pakistan: Victim or exporter of terrorism?", 47m34s).

Slightly off-topic, as it sort of involves you trusting a third party, but Vsauce did a video about whether the Earth is flat, late last year: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNqNnUJVcVs (10m30s) - it's pretty good, and informative. Also, he included a large amount of links in the video description, where you can get additional information.

Well, I suppose there would be little point in joining a campaign like Bit-X with multiple accounts; but it might be more profitable to join fixed payment campaigns with several accounts - they pay more than pay per post campaigns.

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It seems to me those were 2 hours daily you wasted.

Wouldn't it have been better to use that time to find some form of (online?) work, and then buy the btc?

Other than the options already presented here, you could also try Neteller or Payza to sell your coins; you need a verified account for that (I think), but after that, the process itself is quick and painless. In addition, if you have, for example, Neteller's debit card, you can deposit the btc in your account, get fiat, and immediately spend it through the card.

In theory, nothing stops you from having multiple accounts in this forum (it isn't against forum rules), and using them all to join signature campaigns. In practice however, there are a couple of limitations, I suppose: as you mentioned, handling several accounts and posting with them all is probably time consuming, and will likely get you banned, if post quality is poor; and some campaign managers don't like that, and will deny you payment if you get caught doing it.

I don't think so; if I'm not mistaken, it should be about 12 hours from now - or at least I hope it is, because I still haven't made all the posts I need for this period.

I'm not so sure about that - how much thinking do you do with your hands?

Or really, your heart, kidneys, or anything else people can already replace?

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Well, they apparently need to come up with the $11 million for the whole procedure first, but assuming funding isn't an issue, the operation itself may end up being performed as early as next year (going by the article tee-rex posted above) - so, I guess we'll know for sure soon enough.