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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 12:19:53 AM Last edit: July 01, 2015, 02:08:38 AM by TPTB_need_war |
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Now let's say I like to attack the network and I pay someone with a lot of hashrate to flood the network with blocks of unlimited size with 0 fee txns.
It's not zero fee if you are paying. I was going to comment about that, but I decided to see who wouldn't figure it out for themselves. What is the distinction between the two? There is one.
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iCEBREAKER
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Activity: 2156
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Crypto is the separation of Power and State.
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July 01, 2015, 01:52:08 AM |
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Peter Todd on /r/buttcoin today: Why doesnt buttcoin start its own "stress test"? I dont know anything about coding or servers or the intricate workings of bitcoin, (I'm just an ideas man), but it would be fun to be involved in setting up our own little "stress test" on the bitcoin network. Obviously it's a waste of money, but so are a lot of things (at least it goes to the nice energy companies in China). (...) Find me $5k and I'll make it happen in a big way, with proper tx creation scripts that don't just crash. This is a serious offer. Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/Buttcoin/comments/3bk12f/why_doesnt_buttcoin_start_its_own_stress_test/csn4nbz  I think this demonstrates his level of hypocrisy here. Peter is saying to the /r/buttcoin group that he is happy to implement a massive flood attack against Bitcoin for $5K in transactions (which is enough to generate 10s of millions of transactions very quickly), because he is confident that the network can handle this. Which leads one to ask, if nodes the and current P2P network can handle a flood of several 10s of millions of transactions (as Peter is saying), why can't Bitcoin handle larger blocksizes again? Handling larger blocks is fundamentally different than handling full blocks (which you dramatized as "a massive flood attack").
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justusranvier
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Activity: 1400
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July 01, 2015, 02:15:32 AM |
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One of the things that's missing from the block size debate is a usable threat model that would allow us to make objective and rational risk assessments of the various threats loosely defined as "centralization".
Before we know how worried we should be about larger blocks (potentially) reducing the number of nodes, we need to know exactly how an attacker benefits from this situation and what kinds of mitigating factors and/or countermeasures are applicable to each attack.
I haven't heard any kind of analysis along those lines yet.
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thezerg
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Activity: 1246
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July 01, 2015, 02:19:27 AM |
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Ever hear of Edward Snowden? Do you know what it means when someone in the 5-eyes says that they 'own the internet?'
As an infrastructure the global internet is no where nearly as robust as most people imagine. It can be much better, but there is little incentive and this is no accident. Most people cannot fathom designing in any other way but to maximize the capabilities granted by the owners of this resource and are dimly aware, if at all, how tenuous some of the capabilities are.
My sensibilities as an engineer and system designer had been to design for the worst plausible scenarios. In a great many cases this resulted in some wasted effort and some limitations. In a minority of cases it turned out that some of the worst fears were realized and my systems continued to perform to design. These minority of cases outweighed the majority by a mile. Part of the reason for this is that the super-systems did not become reliant on capabilities which the sub-systems were unable to deliver.
actually, i have. and he is precisely one of the reasons i think we're winning. the NSA and 5 Eyes, i believe, are going to lose in the long run precisely b/c Snowden's leak shows they can't secure data. everyone knows this now which is why Google and Apple have started encrypting as default, much to the chagrin of the gvt. and this is happening all over the internet. furthermore, with 21 Inc on the verge of releasing mini Asic chips that power devices, the chances for mass decentralization of Bitcoin goes up. also, the Internet has never had it's own monetary system or means of conveniently and cheaply paying one another in realtime. Bitcoin, for the first time in history, can provide that. OK, let's try again. Ever heard of 'packet filtering?' If you are the engineer you claim to be you know damn well how easy it would be to hide Bitcoin txns from a DPI DSP engine inside a HTTP image request, an audio or video stream, or of course via an encrypted connection. Please don't post arguments that you know are illogical but you think will convince others. It does not further the discourse.
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thezerg
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Activity: 1246
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July 01, 2015, 02:23:41 AM |
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One of the things that's missing from the block size debate is a usable threat model that would allow us to make objective and rational risk assessments of the various threats loosely defined as "centralization".
Before we know how worried we should be about larger blocks (potentially) reducing the number of nodes, we need to know exactly how an attacker benefits from this situation and what kinds of mitigating factors and/or countermeasures are applicable to each attack.
I haven't heard any kind of analysis along those lines yet.
Yes, excellent point. Because there is not much AFAIK. Really, the power is in the hands of the miners (mining pool operators), which is already ironically very centralized relative to nodes. Off the top of my head, fewer nodes would make it easier mount a Sybil attack to isolate a node or SPV client and then feed it incorrect data.
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Peter R
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July 01, 2015, 02:32:17 AM |
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justusranvier
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Activity: 1400
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July 01, 2015, 02:38:20 AM |
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Here are some attacks which are affected by the number of nodes and/or miners and/or hashrate:
Attacker: Miners Attack: Double spending. A miner can spend bitcoins on a product or service, then produce a block which invalidates the spend Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
Attacker: Miners Attack: Denial of service. A miner can engage in selective censorship of transactions Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: % success rate of censor identifying transactions they wish to block * value of the blocked transactions
Attacker: Nodes Attack: Double spending. An attacker can defraud a target who is using an SPV wallet by providing them with invalid block headers which allow the attacker to pay the target with a transaction which references non-existant inputs Probability of success: 0% unless the attacker can prevent the target from communicating with any honest nodes Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 02:44:28 AM |
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The only technically knowledgeable people who support this inane system design do so because they see clearly that it will consolidate the infrastructure into a form that is as easily controlled as fiat money is currently. To many many people, this consolidation of control is a good thing. Most people love Big Brother whether they realize it or not and have the reflexes trained to support him.
this is precisely why we disagree on everything. i believe that the internet can allow the ppl to take back control of their money as it should be. don't forget that central banks are still a relatively new concept in the modern age. with that, i mean, going back 100 yrs or so. maybe it's naive, maybe not. but it certainly is worth the effort and risk to try. which is why i support lifting the block limit just to see what happens. i believe we will cope. Ever hear of Edward Snowden?
actually, i have. and he is precisely one of the reasons i think we're winning. the NSA and 5 Eyes, i believe, are going to lose in the long run precisely b/c Snowden's leak shows they can't secure data. everyone knows this now which is why Google and Apple have started encrypting as default, much to the chagrin of the gvt. and this is happening all over the internet. furthermore, with 21 Inc on the verge of releasing mini Asic chips that power devices, the chances for mass decentralization of Bitcoin goes up. also, the Internet has never had it's own monetary system or means of conveniently and cheaply paying one another in realtime. Bitcoin, for the first time in history, can provide that. You apparently lack an economics education on the concept of an undersupplied public good, i.e. free-of-speech doesn't guarantee that participants will act unselfishly to avert catastrophic outcomes.
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tvbcof
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Activity: 5390
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July 01, 2015, 02:53:01 AM |
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OK, let's try again. Ever heard of 'packet filtering?'
If you are the engineer you claim to be you know damn well how easy it would be to hide Bitcoin txns from a DPI DSP engine inside a HTTP image request, an audio or video stream, or of course via an encrypted connection. Please don't post arguments that you know are illogical but you think will convince others. It does not further the discourse. In my experiments with steganography many years ago, I find it cuts down available bandwidth by orders of magnitude. At that time it was unclear if it was even theoretically possible to hide things fully, although it was pretty clear that one could cause the waste of huge amounts of an attacker's CPU if you made him look. The utility I used most was 'steghide'. A while ago I looked it up again. The source code was still available but it had not been changed in years. In looking just now I notice that there is a French version of wikipedia which has an entry but I can find no English one and Google translate doesn't work on it. Weird. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/SteghideActually, there is a point to be made that individual transactions could be hidden steganographically for spends no matter what the network transaction rate and it is kind of questionable whether the backbone itself could run fully steganographically hidden even with 1MB blocks under dedicated attack by funded and motivated attackers (who own the network.) Ideally I'd like to see it practical for the backbone network to be operation fully on side-channels which make no use of the global internet at all. In any real attack situation it is very unlikely that any infrastructure operator would enjoy the streaming class of network traffic that we know today. That is another reason I would like to avoid developing a reliance on real-time behavior (or even ~10 min/conf expectations) or structured block formations and so on. The Blockstream folks making mention of expectations in the days range gives me hope that they are designing for worst-case scenarios (which is exactly what I need to feel comfortable about storing significant value in Bitcoin.) Edit: BTW, I've got very little expectation that encrypted connections without government backdoors will survive indefinitely. No design that I trust for longer duration work will make that expectation.
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sig spam anywhere and self-moderated threads on the pol&soc board are for losers.
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 02:55:54 AM |
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Here is the rebuttal in one image. /\ <------- privileged members of the TPTB that control the centralized public good ~~~~~~~~~~/ \~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> water level globally / \ / \ so much "spam" down here, choking off the entropy of miners / \ / TPTB \ everybody else down here transacting perhaps, / \ but fully submerged in totalitarianism
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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July 01, 2015, 02:57:27 AM |
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Here are some attacks which are affected by the number of nodes and/or miners and/or hashrate:
Attacker: Miners Attack: Double spending. A miner can spend bitcoins on a product or service, then produce a block which invalidates the spend Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
Attacker: Miners Attack: Denial of service. A miner can engage in selective censorship of transactions Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: % success rate of censor identifying transactions they wish to block * value of the blocked transactions
Attacker: Nodes Attack: Double spending. An attacker can defraud a target who is using an SPV wallet by providing them with invalid block headers which allow the attacker to pay the target with a transaction which references non-existant inputs Probability of success: 0% unless the attacker can prevent the target from communicating with any honest nodes Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
How about this one: Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 03:01:54 AM |
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How about this one:
Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
Sustainable for only until the cumulative the fees equals their net worth, i.e. unsustainable.
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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July 01, 2015, 03:10:36 AM |
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How about this one:
Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
Sustainable for only until the cumulative the fees equals their net worth, i.e. unsustainable. F2pool is paying the spam to itself.
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 03:12:41 AM |
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Here are some attacks which are affected by the number of nodes and/or miners and/or hashrate:
Attacker: Miners Attack: Double spending. A miner can spend bitcoins on a product or service, then produce a block which invalidates the spend Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
The actual severity can be much greater. There can be a run on the coin affecting all HODLers. You apparently fail to grasp the wealth effect (i.e. that the mcap != amount of capital invested) is mostly built on CONFIDENCE. Attacker: Miners Attack: Denial of service. A miner can engage in selective censorship of transactions Probability of success: 100% when the hash rate of the attacker exceeds the hash rate of the rest of the network Severity: % success rate of censor identifying transactions they wish to block * value of the blocked transactions
Again you fail to account for out-of-band entropy. The ability to censor key transactions (even if a minute, undetectable %) could lead to immense power-structures, i.e. you threaten to censor the wealth of someone you need to coerce on major political outcome, e.g. a speaker of the house. Attacker: Nodes Attack: Double spending. An attacker can defraud a target who is using an SPV wallet by providing them with invalid block headers which allow the attacker to pay the target with a transaction which references non-existant inputs Probability of success: 0% unless the attacker can prevent the target from communicating with any honest nodes Severity: Number of bitcoins controlled by the attacker * number of attacks performed
Yes Sybil attacks are another vector and there are lot more cases of attacks that you have not enumerated.
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justusranvier
Legendary

Activity: 1400
Merit: 1069
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July 01, 2015, 03:13:17 AM |
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Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
You just described a version of the "denial of service" attack already mentioned.
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 03:16:48 AM |
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How about this one:
Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
Sustainable for only until the cumulative the fees equals their net worth, i.e. unsustainable. F2pool is paying the spam to itself. How can it spam the network when the blocks it can create are capped to 1MB? It might as well charge 0 txn fees to itself. That wouldn't affect the fees of other regular users whose transactions can appear on blocks created by the other miners. If you are arguing that centralization of mining can create a monopoly on fees, then yes I agree. But that is true regardless of block size. It would help if you would at least think before posting. Most of what you post is incorrect.
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iCEBREAKER
Legendary

Activity: 2156
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Crypto is the separation of Power and State.
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July 01, 2015, 03:17:19 AM Last edit: July 01, 2015, 04:57:09 AM by iCEBREAKER |
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blocks full again with TPS unacceptably high --> unconf tx set ~ 3000, more than double normal. pools taking defensive action. when will Blockstream devs do something?:  Why do you call this "defensive" action? when Chinese pools face a series of what they consider to be "large blocks", which in this case means full blocks as you can see from the data, they automatically switch to mining "header" blocks with 0 tx's during the time it takes to process all the tx's in the preceding large block. this is b/c large blocks take a bit more time to process and check all the signatures so the argument goes that they can't afford to waste that precious time so for defensive purposed they just go ahead and start hashing the next block with only the "header" that in this case contain no tx's that might have included an invalid input from the preceding large block. So they switch back to working on a full block if they aren't able to solve the block header in the time it takes to fully process everything? Yes, that's right. Large miners always try for 0-tx freebie blocks while processing the pool, then switch to fee-grabbing mode when it's done. The larger the block, the more (non-trivial) CPU time must be devoted to processing. It's a linear relationship, so 20MB blocks take 20 times longer. This is bad for an antifragile diverse/diffuse/defensible/resilient system designed to remain functional thrive under load, but not under bloat.
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| "The difference between bad and well-developed digital cash will determine whether we have a dictatorship or a real democracy." David Chaum 1996 "Fungibility provides privacy as a side effect." Adam Back 2014
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cypherdoc (OP)
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July 01, 2015, 03:19:11 AM |
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Current situation where blocks are getting full from artificial 1MB cap: Attacker: large miners like f2pool Attack: spam network from one of its wallets to another. Drive up overall fees of regular users. Success: 100%
You just described a version of the "denial of service" attack already mentioned. Not sure i follow. Right now we could be having a situation where f2pool is spamming the network with TX's paid to itself which raises everyone's fees of which they will mine 21%of the time in proportion to their current hashrate. Yes, they lose 79% of the fees used to do this but overall it might work out in their favor.
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TPTB_need_war
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July 01, 2015, 03:23:31 AM |
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Yes, they lose 79% of the fees used to do this but overall it might work out in their favor.
They would be giving their money away to other miners thus decreasing their relative hashrate in a downward toilet bowl spiral for themselves. Illogical.
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cypherdoc (OP)
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July 01, 2015, 03:28:44 AM |
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Yes, they lose 79% of the fees used to do this but overall it might work out in their favor.
They would be giving their money away to other miners thus decreasing their relative hashrate in a downward toilet bowl spiral for themselves. Illogical. No, spam fees are minimal or even 0. Regular users have to exceed those fees to fit into a limited 1MB block. F2pool wins blocks 21%of the time. Depending on how high they can drive up these fees compared to the minimal spam fees they lose 79% of the time, it could be profitable.
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