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Poll
Question: Will you support Gavin's new block size limit hard fork of 8MB by January 1, 2016 then doubling every 2 years?
1.  yes
2.  no

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Author Topic: Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP.  (Read 1805076 times)
iCEBREAKER
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July 14, 2015, 05:38:56 PM
 #28781

(Matonis is clueless to claim there is a fee-market - though my estimation of him is now down to zero as he talks about monkeying with the 21M limit).
+KB blocks now.

his whole thesis is, "ZOMG, if we yield on the block size limit, it's a foregone conclusion we'll get a supply increase!"

furtheremore, listening to him dissemble over the technicalities of the block size limit is painful to listen to.  as little understanding as iCEBlow.

...says the hobbyist who frequently argues unsuccessfully with core devs about how Bitcoin works under the hood.

Matonis' point is that abandoning reason and giving into the mob mentality, whether the issue is larger blocks or higher emission, leads to disaster.

It's like the time Marge opposed the Springfield Monorail, only to be overruled by the giddy crowd of rubes.

Of course fixing Main Street isn't as glamorous as an impressively larger blocksize or emission, but it's the responsible thing to do.   Smiley

The difference between bad and well-developed digital cash will determine whether we have a dictatorship or a real democracy.  David Chaum 1996
Fungibility provides privacy as a side effect.  Adam Back 2014
"Monero" : { Private - Auditable - 100% Fungible - Flexible Blocksize - Wild & Free® - Intro - Wallets - Podcats - Roadmap - Dice - Blackjack - Github - Android }


Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016
Blocks must necessarily be full for the Bitcoin network to be able to pay for its own security.  davout 2015
Blocksize is an intentionally limited resource, like the 21e6 BTC limit.  Changing it degrades the surrounding economics, creating negative incentives.  Jeff Garzik 2013


"I believed @Dashpay instamine was a bug & not a feature but then read: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg13017231#msg13017231
I'm not against people making money, but can't support questionable origins."
https://twitter.com/Tone_LLT/status/717822927908024320


The raison d'être of bitcoin is trustlessness. - Eric Lombrozo 2015
It is an Engineering Requirement that Bitcoin be “Above the Law”  Paul Sztorc 2015
Resiliency, not efficiency, is the paramount goal of decentralized, non-state sanctioned currency -Jon Matonis 2015

Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016

Technology tends to move in the direction of making surveillance easier, and the ability of computers to track us doubles every eighteen months. - Phil Zimmerman 2013

The only way to make software secure, reliable, and fast is to make it small. Fight Features. - Andy Tanenbaum 2004

"Hard forks cannot be co
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iCEBREAKER
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July 14, 2015, 05:48:44 PM
 #28782

Make all the grandiose claims and populist appeals you wish.  Like you, they have no power here.

The Gavinistas will continue to discover what it means to attack a system that is defensible, diffuse, diverse, and resilient.

I hope these teachable moments will educate them on the principles of Bitcoin Sovereignty!   Smiley

If you're so sure about that, why did you chicken out when PeterR proposed the bet?

I am very sure about what I said in the above quote.

As for Peter's tangentially related bet, that's already been covered:

Care to make a wager, iCEBREAKER?  1 BTC that the longest proof-of-work chain contains a block larger than 1 MB by this time next year (10-Jul-2016).

If you lose, I want real Bitcoin.  If you win, expect to be paid in doublespent Gavincoins.   Cool

1MB blocks may become a harmful constraint by this time next year, given some black swan for fiat or rapid deployment of sidechain/Lightning.  But we're are not even on course to begin getting there yet, given the unwelcome distraction of the Gavinista insurgency inciting the get-rich-quick XT mob.  TX fees are still orders of magnitude below their cost in electricity, etc., demonstrating fee pressure insufficient for develop mature markets.

I suspect we agree that should 1MB blocks become an undeniably urgent concern (EG, if we see actual congestion resulting in appropriate fees no longer prioritizing their tx) the controversy will rapidly dissipate and be replaced by emergent rough consensus.

There's also the possibility we do get a technically and politically feasible velvet divorce, in which case we can forget all this nasty controversy about the "best" block size and start a new nasty controversy about which is the "real" Bitcoin.

Please keep up with the discussion and try not to slow down the rest of the class. 

The difference between bad and well-developed digital cash will determine whether we have a dictatorship or a real democracy.  David Chaum 1996
Fungibility provides privacy as a side effect.  Adam Back 2014
"Monero" : { Private - Auditable - 100% Fungible - Flexible Blocksize - Wild & Free® - Intro - Wallets - Podcats - Roadmap - Dice - Blackjack - Github - Android }


Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016
Blocks must necessarily be full for the Bitcoin network to be able to pay for its own security.  davout 2015
Blocksize is an intentionally limited resource, like the 21e6 BTC limit.  Changing it degrades the surrounding economics, creating negative incentives.  Jeff Garzik 2013


"I believed @Dashpay instamine was a bug & not a feature but then read: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg13017231#msg13017231
I'm not against people making money, but can't support questionable origins."
https://twitter.com/Tone_LLT/status/717822927908024320


The raison d'être of bitcoin is trustlessness. - Eric Lombrozo 2015
It is an Engineering Requirement that Bitcoin be “Above the Law”  Paul Sztorc 2015
Resiliency, not efficiency, is the paramount goal of decentralized, non-state sanctioned currency -Jon Matonis 2015

Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016

Technology tends to move in the direction of making surveillance easier, and the ability of computers to track us doubles every eighteen months. - Phil Zimmerman 2013

The only way to make software secure, reliable, and fast is to make it small. Fight Features. - Andy Tanenbaum 2004

"Hard forks cannot be co
cypherdoc
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July 14, 2015, 06:13:13 PM
 #28783

(Matonis is clueless to claim there is a fee-market - though my estimation of him is now down to zero as he talks about monkeying with the 21M limit).
+KB blocks now.

his whole thesis is, "ZOMG, if we yield on the block size limit, it's a foregone conclusion we'll get a supply increase!"

furtheremore, listening to him dissemble over the technicalities of the block size limit is painful to listen to.  as little understanding as iCEBlow.

...says the hobbyist who frequently argues unsuccessfully with core devs about how Bitcoin works under the hood.

you mean the parts where nullc says, "UTXO is not in RAM", but yet we see this from him just 2 mo ago?:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/35asg6/gavin_andresen_utxo_uhoh/cr2za45

or this part?:

OK.  Provide me with your estimates for the following (and explain how you arrived at your numbers) and I'll update my table using your numbers:
1.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assume the outputs are spent.
2.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assuming the outputs are unspent.
I may be missing the context as this thread is high volume and I've not read any of the backlog...

But for a full verifying node, the on-going cost cost of 1GB of additional transactions with all outputs spent is 0; all the cost related to that 1GB of data is related to the bandwidth to get it to you and the verification cost, and for short term storage until its burried, after that it need not be stored.
The cost for unspent is some non-zero number which depends on your estimation of storage costs.

This thread can be hard to follow if you're not following it all the time!  

The question was in reference to a debate I was having with Odalv about these "order of magnitude" estimates shown in this table.  I was suggesting that, under the conditions considered in the table, it is cheaper for miners to write the spam to the Blockchain and more costly for the spammer, than continually rejecting it:



Does CreateNewBlock currently take longer to execute if there are more TXs in a miner's mempool to pick from?  If so, this would add credence to Cypherdoc's hunch that miner's are producing more empty blocks when mempool swells.  
Yep, I already pointed that out to you specifically! It's superlinear in the mempool size (well, ignoring caching)  But thats unrelated to f2pool/antpool and the other SPV miners, as they're not ever calling createnewblock in that case, as they're mining without even validating.   One can mine on a validated chain with no transactions while waiting for createnewblock (which is what eligius does, for example).  

Sorry, yes I know you explained that.  The point I'm trying to make is that if CreateNewBlock is super-linear in mempool size, then it would not be surprising to see more empty blocks (what Cypher was calling "defensive blocks") when mempool swells (the miners are mining on an empty block for longer while waiting for CreateNewBlock to finish). This was Cypher's point from the very beginning that many people, including myself, were suggesting was probably not the case!  

Furthermore, how can f2pool/antpool mine a non-empty block without calling createnewblock?
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July 14, 2015, 06:43:16 PM
 #28784

any dev here want to work on adding a turing complete scripting platform (already existing, not ethereum) to the bitcoin core through a currently existing blockchain implementation? It will act as a testbed for bitcoin rolling forward. You will be compensated in existing blockchain tokens fairly. Looking for someone with good core bitcoin knowledge, it is a bit of work and it will truly decentralize things including all bitcoin clones (no need for sidechains). So if you want to take part in something that really will change things for the better let me know.
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July 14, 2015, 06:49:14 PM
 #28785

(Matonis is clueless to claim there is a fee-market - though my estimation of him is now down to zero as he talks about monkeying with the 21M limit).
+KB blocks now.

yep. 

his whole thesis is, "ZOMG, if we yield on the block size limit, it's a foregone conclusion we'll get a supply increase!"

furtheremore, listening to him dissemble over the technicalities of the block size limit is painful to listen to.  as little understanding as iCEBlow.

Well, that was sort of just him trolling, (but he won't call it that), call it link-bait or whatever, but Matonis never really said any such thing.
Lawyerly parsing of his statements just say that many of the the arguments are in a similar form, not that he advocates for either.

I called him on it directly also.

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July 14, 2015, 06:50:52 PM
 #28786

I support Satoshi's ideas.

I have never heard that Satoshi propose exponential growth of block. (doubling size every 2 years)

that's a compromise Gavin did for you folk, Satoshi didn't support a limit at all.

The block size limit is a short term hack.  Someday we might get beyond such a limit, but it could be quite a while.  BIP100 looks promising though.

"a short term hack" is how I see it, what concerns me is developers appear to be leveraging it to push through other hacks. (hacking the hack - postponing indefinably until such time as other hard fork changes could be bundled in with this one.)

BIP100 is good in that it removes the hard fork limit, my reservations though are that it does nothing to erode the centralized control system that has evolved. I prefer Bib 101 as it implies some central gate keepers need to eat humble pie, however nether are my first choice.  

At this stage I'd like to start seeing more decentralized development, the notion that Bitcoin is resilient in that if the protocol is modified the ideals will never be eroded because it is open source and can be forked to keep the original intent appears to only be valid so long as we share the same motives as the centralized development team.

The very idea of forking that was originally proposed to protect Bitcoin Values was vehemently opposed by the centralized developers who expressed disdain that they were not consulted and their process for seeking permission to propose change was not adhere too, even going so far as calling the idea of forking to remove the hard limit a threat to the very success of bitcoin.

I think there is a distortion of perception and lack of empathy all round. ultimately it is the people who put economic energy into the idea that make it viable, and while developers are all important, they are not the gods who conduct this experiment, its the people who put in there economic energy.    

Your reasoning is interesting to me.  Mostly because your evaluation appears to contradict your conclusion.  And so, I suspect you have a some well thought out ideas and nuances that you've not yet communicated.

Both 100 and 101 provide a mechanism for more block size.  Choosing between the two may depend on your perspectives and assessment of different risk levels within the operating groups.

Do you see more centralized control among developers or miners?
- If development is more centralized, BIP100, (developers giving controls to miners).
- If mining is more centralized, BIP101, (developers retaining control over block size increases and schedules).

Both remain fairly centralized, though both are less so than they previously have been.  From your discourse, it would seem your evaluation would be the devs are more centralized and so would favor BIP100, (irrespective of who authored it).

my take on this is that BIP 101 would be more favorable b/c it doesn't involve "voting" twice, imo.  formal vote once and then again with the block versioning.  example might be they formally vote yes and then change their minds and vote no thru versioning for whatever reason.  giving miners that much say doesn't seem proportionate to everyone else's (nodes, merchants, users) participation.

i like 101 b/c it is automated and imo attempts to remove as much core dev decision making in the process.  knowing Gavin, he'd like to remove himself from the process as much as possible, except for routine maintenance on core.  he has the big picture and all his actions to date have demonstrated a willingness to let Bitcoin Run with a hands off approach as well as from a charity perspective as demonstrated by giving away 10000 BTC, Satoshi's trust in him, his refunding of BTCGuild for lost rewards from 0.8.1, and his overall demeanor and presentation.

personally, i like No Limit b/c of the free mkt dynamic it creates by placing all the control on to a user/miner negotiation.  miners have every incentive to prevent bloat and adverse network affects from that. 

Fundamentally, anyone with a vote, could also sell their vote.

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July 14, 2015, 07:24:12 PM
 #28787

I support Satoshi's ideas.

I have never heard that Satoshi propose exponential growth of block. (doubling size every 2 years)

that's a compromise Gavin did for you folk, Satoshi didn't support a limit at all.

The block size limit is a short term hack.  Someday we might get beyond such a limit, but it could be quite a while.  BIP100 looks promising though.

"a short term hack" is how I see it, what concerns me is developers appear to be leveraging it to push through other hacks. (hacking the hack - postponing indefinably until such time as other hard fork changes could be bundled in with this one.)

BIP100 is good in that it removes the hard fork limit, my reservations though are that it does nothing to erode the centralized control system that has evolved. I prefer Bib 101 as it implies some central gate keepers need to eat humble pie, however nether are my first choice.  

At this stage I'd like to start seeing more decentralized development, the notion that Bitcoin is resilient in that if the protocol is modified the ideals will never be eroded because it is open source and can be forked to keep the original intent appears to only be valid so long as we share the same motives as the centralized development team.

The very idea of forking that was originally proposed to protect Bitcoin Values was vehemently opposed by the centralized developers who expressed disdain that they were not consulted and their process for seeking permission to propose change was not adhere too, even going so far as calling the idea of forking to remove the hard limit a threat to the very success of bitcoin.

I think there is a distortion of perception and lack of empathy all round. ultimately it is the people who put economic energy into the idea that make it viable, and while developers are all important, they are not the gods who conduct this experiment, its the people who put in there economic energy.    

Your reasoning is interesting to me.  Mostly because your evaluation appears to contradict your conclusion.  And so, I suspect you have a some well thought out ideas and nuances that you've not yet communicated.

Both 100 and 101 provide a mechanism for more block size.  Choosing between the two may depend on your perspectives and assessment of different risk levels within the operating groups.

Do you see more centralized control among developers or miners?
- If development is more centralized, BIP100, (developers giving controls to miners).
- If mining is more centralized, BIP101, (developers retaining control over block size increases and schedules).

Both remain fairly centralized, though both are less so than they previously have been.  From your discourse, it would seem your evaluation would be the devs are more centralized and so would favor BIP100, (irrespective of who authored it).

I'm not sure I see the contradiction, my understanding is based on the situation we have now and it's a typical political one.

The moment we started to see mining pools and solo miners contributing hashing power with little regard to hard forks is when this trajectory started, I cant remember what the BIP was back in 2011/2, where miners had to choose which fork to support, back then I didn't care as it was the fundamentals that were important to me and that wasn't considered one given my limited understanding back then.  ( i just supported my "political mining pool by giving them my vote" to use as they saw fit.)

anyway I think all developers need a reason to develop and I'm happy with the idea that some will be commercial, however developers are just developing the code that runs the protocol. The people that invest in Bitcoin invest because they understand the incentive structure that makes the protocol possible.

Bitcoin is more about the network of current users than it is about the code, changing the code and protocol to appeal to old world industrious is not how we should be working, we want them to change to adopt Bitcoin.

I may be underestimating the concerns with centralized mining but I dont see it as an issue, miners will always mine the bitcoin that has the most users, and that typically is misunderstood as the most nodes, so long as miners do not have a say in changing the incentives in the protocol I see no problems moving forward with larger blocks. (Blockstream have crossed this line)

I am concerned that development is very centralized just a handful of people determine the code that runs on almost 99% of nodes, I favor many implementation of the code, not just Core, so in my view BIP100 and BIP101 are a political compromise to keep centralized development in the hands of a few.



 

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July 14, 2015, 08:17:50 PM
 #28788


[extensive wailing]


[gnashing of teeth]


The 1MB "short term hack" got Bitcoin to where it is today.

Go ahead and make all the noise you want.  Stamp your feet and hold your breath.

Enlist Reddit as your personal army.  Issue threats.  Spin up XT nodes.

It won't make a difference; the block size is staying at 1MB for the foreseeable future.

Nobody except your fellow Gavinistas cares how many times you fatuously repeat 'ZOMG TEMPORARY 1MB LIMIT IS TEMPORARY RAISE IT NOW.'


It won't stay, because the Gavinistas are the majority and you represent a minority.

Since when Bitcoin is about majority?!

It is about a majority of brain cells and intellectual authority.

"Staat nenne ich's, wo alle Gifttrinker sind, Gute und Schlimme: Staat, wo alle sich selber verlieren, Gute und Schlimme:
Staat, wo der langsame Selbstmord aller – »das Leben« heisst."
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July 14, 2015, 09:26:28 PM
 #28789


The block size limit is a short term hack.  Someday we might get beyond such a limit, but it could be quite a while.  BIP100 looks promising though.

"a short term hack" is how I see it, what concerns me is developers appear to be leveraging it to push through other hacks. (hacking the hack - postponing indefinably until such time as other hard fork changes could be bundled in with this one.)

BIP100 is good in that it removes the hard fork limit, my reservations though are that it does nothing to erode the centralized control system that has evolved. I prefer Bib 101 as it implies some central gate keepers need to eat humble pie, however nether are my first choice.  

At this stage I'd like to start seeing more decentralized development, the notion that Bitcoin is resilient in that if the protocol is modified the ideals will never be eroded because it is open source and can be forked to keep the original intent appears to only be valid so long as we share the same motives as the centralized development team.

The very idea of forking that was originally proposed to protect Bitcoin Values was vehemently opposed by the centralized developers who expressed disdain that they were not consulted and their process for seeking permission to propose change was not adhere too, even going so far as calling the idea of forking to remove the hard limit a threat to the very success of bitcoin.

I think there is a distortion of perception and lack of empathy all round. ultimately it is the people who put economic energy into the idea that make it viable, and while developers are all important, they are not the gods who conduct this experiment, its the people who put in there economic energy.    

Your reasoning is interesting to me.  Mostly because your evaluation appears to contradict your conclusion.  And so, I suspect you have a some well thought out ideas and nuances that you've not yet communicated.

Both 100 and 101 provide a mechanism for more block size.  Choosing between the two may depend on your perspectives and assessment of different risk levels within the operating groups.

Do you see more centralized control among developers or miners?
- If development is more centralized, BIP100, (developers giving controls to miners).
- If mining is more centralized, BIP101, (developers retaining control over block size increases and schedules).

Both remain fairly centralized, though both are less so than they previously have been.  From your discourse, it would seem your evaluation would be the devs are more centralized and so would favor BIP100, (irrespective of who authored it).

I'm not sure I see the contradiction, my understanding is based on the situation we have now and it's a typical political one.

The moment we started to see mining pools and solo miners contributing hashing power with little regard to hard forks is when this trajectory started, I cant remember what the BIP was back in 2011/2, where miners had to choose which fork to support, back then I didn't care as it was the fundamentals that were important to me and that wasn't considered one given my limited understanding back then.  ( i just supported my "political mining pool by giving them my vote" to use as they saw fit.)

anyway I think all developers need a reason to develop and I'm happy with the idea that some will be commercial, however developers are just developing the code that runs the protocol. The people that invest in Bitcoin invest because they understand the incentive structure that makes the protocol possible.

Bitcoin is more about the network of current users than it is about the code, changing the code and protocol to appeal to old world industrious is not how we should be working, we want them to change to adopt Bitcoin.

I may be underestimating the concerns with centralized mining but I dont see it as an issue, miners will always mine the bitcoin that has the most users, and that typically is misunderstood as the most nodes, so long as miners do not have a say in changing the incentives in the protocol I see no problems moving forward with larger blocks. (Blockstream have crossed this line)

I am concerned that development is very centralized just a handful of people determine the code that runs on almost 99% of nodes, I favor many implementation of the code, not just Core, so in my view BIP100 and BIP101 are a political compromise to keep centralized development in the hands of a few.

BIP100 essentially takes the block size it out of the hands of developers and gives it to the miners.  They will decide if it grows or not.
BIP101 keeps block size as a centrally managed resource, pre-determined by developers, and if modification up or down is needed, it would need to be done by developers.

The weighting of your discussion suggests the developer centralization is a more serious concern, which suggests that BIP100 would be a strong favorite for you.

Personally I like BIP100 more also just because it does not have the hubris to attempt to predict what future changes to block size may be best suited for the protocol, and leaves those decisions to the future folks who will know better than we could possibly do now.
I also like that it decentralizes the management of the decision to the miners, which to me is a fine place for it.

That you favored BIP101 was the surprising part for me, I don't see why that would be the case considering your concerns.

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July 14, 2015, 09:48:03 PM
 #28790

OK.  Provide me with your estimates for the following (and explain how you arrived at your numbers) and I'll update my table using your numbers:
1.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assume the outputs are spent.
2.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assuming the outputs are unspent.
I may be missing the context as this thread is high volume and I've not read any of the backlog...

But for a full verifying node, the on-going cost cost of 1GB of additional transactions with all outputs spent is 0; all the cost related to that 1GB of data is related to the bandwidth to get it to you and the verification cost, and for short term storage until its burried, after that it need not be stored.
The cost for unspent is some non-zero number which depends on your estimation of storage costs.

This thread can be hard to follow if you're not following it all the time!  

The question was in reference to a debate I was having with Odalv about these "order of magnitude" estimates shown in this table.  I was suggesting that, under the conditions considered in the table, it is cheaper for miners to write the spam to the Blockchain and more costly for the spammer, than continually rejecting it:



Does CreateNewBlock currently take longer to execute if there are more TXs in a miner's mempool to pick from?  If so, this would add credence to Cypherdoc's hunch that miner's are producing more empty blocks when mempool swells.  
Yep, I already pointed that out to you specifically! It's superlinear in the mempool size (well, ignoring caching)  But thats unrelated to f2pool/antpool and the other SPV miners, as they're not ever calling createnewblock in that case, as they're mining without even validating.   One can mine on a validated chain with no transactions while waiting for createnewblock (which is what eligius does, for example).  

Sorry, yes I know you explained that.  The point I'm trying to make is that if CreateNewBlock is super-linear in mempool size, then it would not be surprising to see more empty blocks (what Cypher was calling "defensive blocks") when mempool swells (the miners are mining on an empty block for longer while waiting for CreateNewBlock to finish).  This was Cypher's point from the very beginning that many people, including myself, were suggesting was probably not the case!  

Furthermore, how can f2pool/antpool mine a non-empty block without calling createnewblock?

So pretty much it is more costly to the spammer if miners just write the spam (or accept the tx) into the block chain.

Interesting.

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July 14, 2015, 09:57:01 PM
 #28791

It is about a majority of brain cells and intellectual authority.
The value of money comes from future economic output.

The majority of entities that will produce the most economic value in the future is the majority that matters.

In many cases, people who have accumulated a large amount of money in the present have done so because they have a high capacity to produce economic value and so in their case they contribute significantly to the economic majority.

This is not true in all cases, however. Someone who obtained large amounts of money through luck or via processes which are not repeatable in the future don't contribute as much to the economic majority as their current holdings would suggest.

This is the primary flaw behind who try to frame debates in terms of "rich" vs "poor". They aren't being sufficiently precise.
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July 14, 2015, 10:04:01 PM
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The block size limit is a short term hack.  Someday we might get beyond such a limit, but it could be quite a while.  BIP100 looks promising though.

"a short term hack" is how I see it, what concerns me is developers appear to be leveraging it to push through other hacks. (hacking the hack - postponing indefinably until such time as other hard fork changes could be bundled in with this one.)

BIP100 is good in that it removes the hard fork limit, my reservations though are that it does nothing to erode the centralized control system that has evolved. I prefer Bib 101 as it implies some central gate keepers need to eat humble pie, however nether are my first choice.  

At this stage I'd like to start seeing more decentralized development, the notion that Bitcoin is resilient in that if the protocol is modified the ideals will never be eroded because it is open source and can be forked to keep the original intent appears to only be valid so long as we share the same motives as the centralized development team.

The very idea of forking that was originally proposed to protect Bitcoin Values was vehemently opposed by the centralized developers who expressed disdain that they were not consulted and their process for seeking permission to propose change was not adhere too, even going so far as calling the idea of forking to remove the hard limit a threat to the very success of bitcoin.

I think there is a distortion of perception and lack of empathy all round. ultimately it is the people who put economic energy into the idea that make it viable, and while developers are all important, they are not the gods who conduct this experiment, its the people who put in there economic energy.    

Your reasoning is interesting to me.  Mostly because your evaluation appears to contradict your conclusion.  And so, I suspect you have a some well thought out ideas and nuances that you've not yet communicated.

Both 100 and 101 provide a mechanism for more block size.  Choosing between the two may depend on your perspectives and assessment of different risk levels within the operating groups.

Do you see more centralized control among developers or miners?
- If development is more centralized, BIP100, (developers giving controls to miners).
- If mining is more centralized, BIP101, (developers retaining control over block size increases and schedules).

Both remain fairly centralized, though both are less so than they previously have been.  From your discourse, it would seem your evaluation would be the devs are more centralized and so would favor BIP100, (irrespective of who authored it).

I'm not sure I see the contradiction, my understanding is based on the situation we have now and it's a typical political one.

The moment we started to see mining pools and solo miners contributing hashing power with little regard to hard forks is when this trajectory started, I cant remember what the BIP was back in 2011/2, where miners had to choose which fork to support, back then I didn't care as it was the fundamentals that were important to me and that wasn't considered one given my limited understanding back then.  ( i just supported my "political mining pool by giving them my vote" to use as they saw fit.)

anyway I think all developers need a reason to develop and I'm happy with the idea that some will be commercial, however developers are just developing the code that runs the protocol. The people that invest in Bitcoin invest because they understand the incentive structure that makes the protocol possible.

Bitcoin is more about the network of current users than it is about the code, changing the code and protocol to appeal to old world industrious is not how we should be working, we want them to change to adopt Bitcoin.

I may be underestimating the concerns with centralized mining but I dont see it as an issue, miners will always mine the bitcoin that has the most users, and that typically is misunderstood as the most nodes, so long as miners do not have a say in changing the incentives in the protocol I see no problems moving forward with larger blocks. (Blockstream have crossed this line)

I am concerned that development is very centralized just a handful of people determine the code that runs on almost 99% of nodes, I favor many implementation of the code, not just Core, so in my view BIP100 and BIP101 are a political compromise to keep centralized development in the hands of a few.

BIP100 essentially takes the block size it out of the hands of developers and gives it to the miners.  They will decide if it grows or not.
BIP101 keeps block size as a centrally managed resource, pre-determined by developers, and if modification up or down is needed, it would need to be done by developers.

The weighting of your discussion suggests the developer centralization is a more serious concern, which suggests that BIP100 would be a strong favorite for you.

Personally I like BIP100 more also just because it does not have the hubris to attempt to predict what future changes to block size may be best suited for the protocol, and leaves those decisions to the future folks who will know better than we could possibly do now.
I also like that it decentralizes the management of the decision to the miners, which to me is a fine place for it.

That you favored BIP101 was the surprising part for me, I don't see why that would be the case considering your concerns.

that's a good point.

so what do you think about No Limit, which i would contend is a blend of the two BIPS, ie, it takes the block size determination out of the hands of core dev and puts it into the hands of a decentralized negotiated optimum btwn miners and users on a realtime basis going forward?
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July 14, 2015, 10:21:27 PM
 #28793

OK.  Provide me with your estimates for the following (and explain how you arrived at your numbers) and I'll update my table using your numbers:
1.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assume the outputs are spent.
2.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assuming the outputs are unspent.
I may be missing the context as this thread is high volume and I've not read any of the backlog...

But for a full verifying node, the on-going cost cost of 1GB of additional transactions with all outputs spent is 0; all the cost related to that 1GB of data is related to the bandwidth to get it to you and the verification cost, and for short term storage until its burried, after that it need not be stored.
The cost for unspent is some non-zero number which depends on your estimation of storage costs.

This thread can be hard to follow if you're not following it all the time!  

The question was in reference to a debate I was having with Odalv about these "order of magnitude" estimates shown in this table.  I was suggesting that, under the conditions considered in the table, it is cheaper for miners to write the spam to the Blockchain and more costly for the spammer, than continually rejecting it:



Does CreateNewBlock currently take longer to execute if there are more TXs in a miner's mempool to pick from?  If so, this would add credence to Cypherdoc's hunch that miner's are producing more empty blocks when mempool swells.  
Yep, I already pointed that out to you specifically! It's superlinear in the mempool size (well, ignoring caching)  But thats unrelated to f2pool/antpool and the other SPV miners, as they're not ever calling createnewblock in that case, as they're mining without even validating.   One can mine on a validated chain with no transactions while waiting for createnewblock (which is what eligius does, for example).  

Sorry, yes I know you explained that.  The point I'm trying to make is that if CreateNewBlock is super-linear in mempool size, then it would not be surprising to see more empty blocks (what Cypher was calling "defensive blocks") when mempool swells (the miners are mining on an empty block for longer while waiting for CreateNewBlock to finish).  This was Cypher's point from the very beginning that many people, including myself, were suggesting was probably not the case!  

Furthermore, how can f2pool/antpool mine a non-empty block without calling createnewblock?

So pretty much it is more costly to the spammer if miners just write the spam (or accept the tx) into the block chain.

Interesting.

Sorry, but this cannot be true. It is like perpetuum mobile. The bigger block the cheaper it is => let's are try 1 TB block => it must be free
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July 14, 2015, 10:26:40 PM
 #28794

Make all the grandiose claims and populist appeals you wish.  Like you, they have no power here.

The Gavinistas will continue to discover what it means to attack a system that is defensible, diffuse, diverse, and resilient.

I hope these teachable moments will educate them on the principles of Bitcoin Sovereignty!   Smiley

If you're so sure about that, why did you chicken out when PeterR proposed the bet?

I am very sure about what I said in the above quote.

As for Peter's tangentially related bet, that's already been covered:

Care to make a wager, iCEBREAKER?  1 BTC that the longest proof-of-work chain contains a block larger than 1 MB by this time next year (10-Jul-2016).

If you lose, I want real Bitcoin.  If you win, expect to be paid in doublespent Gavincoins.   Cool

1MB blocks may become a harmful constraint by this time next year, given some black swan for fiat or rapid deployment of sidechain/Lightning.  But we're are not even on course to begin getting there yet, given the unwelcome distraction of the Gavinista insurgency inciting the get-rich-quick XT mob.  TX fees are still orders of magnitude below their cost in electricity, etc., demonstrating fee pressure insufficient for develop mature markets.

I suspect we agree that should 1MB blocks become an undeniably urgent concern (EG, if we see actual congestion resulting in appropriate fees no longer prioritizing their tx) the controversy will rapidly dissipate and be replaced by emergent rough consensus.

There's also the possibility we do get a technically and politically feasible velvet divorce, in which case we can forget all this nasty controversy about the "best" block size and start a new nasty controversy about which is the "real" Bitcoin.

Please keep up with the discussion and try not to slow down the rest of the class.  

You've conveniently forgot this:

Care to make a wager, iCEBREAKER?  1 BTC that the longest proof-of-work chain contains a block larger than 1 MB by this time next year (10-Jul-2016).
If you lose, I want real Bitcoin.  If you win, expect to be paid in doublespent Gavincoins.   Cool

Did you just agree to the bet?  I can't tell.  

We'd both deposit 1 BTC to a multisig address (3rd key held by neutral party).  If the chain forks, the winner would automatically have coins spendable on both sides.  

Did you agree?

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July 14, 2015, 10:33:21 PM
 #28795

OK.  Provide me with your estimates for the following (and explain how you arrived at your numbers) and I'll update my table using your numbers:
1.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assume the outputs are spent.
2.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assuming the outputs are unspent.
I may be missing the context as this thread is high volume and I've not read any of the backlog...

But for a full verifying node, the on-going cost cost of 1GB of additional transactions with all outputs spent is 0; all the cost related to that 1GB of data is related to the bandwidth to get it to you and the verification cost, and for short term storage until its burried, after that it need not be stored.
The cost for unspent is some non-zero number which depends on your estimation of storage costs.

This thread can be hard to follow if you're not following it all the time!  

The question was in reference to a debate I was having with Odalv about these "order of magnitude" estimates shown in this table.  I was suggesting that, under the conditions considered in the table, it is cheaper for miners to write the spam to the Blockchain and more costly for the spammer, than continually rejecting it:



Does CreateNewBlock currently take longer to execute if there are more TXs in a miner's mempool to pick from?  If so, this would add credence to Cypherdoc's hunch that miner's are producing more empty blocks when mempool swells.  
Yep, I already pointed that out to you specifically! It's superlinear in the mempool size (well, ignoring caching)  But thats unrelated to f2pool/antpool and the other SPV miners, as they're not ever calling createnewblock in that case, as they're mining without even validating.   One can mine on a validated chain with no transactions while waiting for createnewblock (which is what eligius does, for example).  

Sorry, yes I know you explained that.  The point I'm trying to make is that if CreateNewBlock is super-linear in mempool size, then it would not be surprising to see more empty blocks (what Cypher was calling "defensive blocks") when mempool swells (the miners are mining on an empty block for longer while waiting for CreateNewBlock to finish).  This was Cypher's point from the very beginning that many people, including myself, were suggesting was probably not the case!  

Furthermore, how can f2pool/antpool mine a non-empty block without calling createnewblock?

So pretty much it is more costly to the spammer if miners just write the spam (or accept the tx) into the block chain.

Interesting.

Sorry, but this cannot be true. It is like perpetuum mobile. The bigger block the cheaper it is => let's are try 1 TB block => it must be free

spammers don't control size of blocks in a no limit scenario.  miners do.  so we won't have 1TB blocks b/c miners have the incentive to not destabilize or destroy the network so they will construct large enough blocks that are efficiently optimized so as to not get orphaned and not create significant decentralization of full nodes.  they will also raise their minfee to keep their mempool from destabilizing their full nodes and to keep users access open and readily accessible.  spammers will actually have to pay instead of just recycling their unwritten spam fees.
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July 14, 2015, 10:34:46 PM
 #28796

You've conveniently forgot this:

Care to make a wager, iCEBREAKER?  1 BTC that the longest proof-of-work chain contains a block larger than 1 MB by this time next year (10-Jul-2016).
If you lose, I want real Bitcoin.  If you win, expect to be paid in doublespent Gavincoins.   Cool

Did you just agree to the bet?  I can't tell.  

We'd both deposit 1 BTC to a multisig address (3rd key held by neutral party).  If the chain forks, the winner would automatically have coins spendable on both sides.  

Did you agree?

I've conveniently forgotten nothing.  Your poor reading comprehension is pitiful, so I will charitably aid you by bolding the parts you most need to sound out until comprehension sets in.

1MB blocks may become a harmful constraint by this time next year, given some black swan for fiat or rapid deployment of sidechain/Lightning.  But we're are not even on course to begin getting there yet, given the unwelcome distraction of the Gavinista insurgency inciting the get-rich-quick XT mob.  TX fees are still orders of magnitude below their cost in electricity, etc., demonstrating fee pressure insufficient for develop mature markets.


I suspect we agree that should 1MB blocks become an undeniably urgent concern (EG, if we see actual congestion resulting in appropriate fees no longer prioritizing their tx) the controversy will rapidly dissipate and be replaced by emergent rough consensus.

There's also the possibility we do get a technically and politically feasible velvet divorce, in which case we can forget all this nasty controversy about the "best" block size and start a new nasty controversy about which is the "real" Bitcoin.


The difference between bad and well-developed digital cash will determine whether we have a dictatorship or a real democracy.  David Chaum 1996
Fungibility provides privacy as a side effect.  Adam Back 2014
"Monero" : { Private - Auditable - 100% Fungible - Flexible Blocksize - Wild & Free® - Intro - Wallets - Podcats - Roadmap - Dice - Blackjack - Github - Android }


Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016
Blocks must necessarily be full for the Bitcoin network to be able to pay for its own security.  davout 2015
Blocksize is an intentionally limited resource, like the 21e6 BTC limit.  Changing it degrades the surrounding economics, creating negative incentives.  Jeff Garzik 2013


"I believed @Dashpay instamine was a bug & not a feature but then read: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.msg13017231#msg13017231
I'm not against people making money, but can't support questionable origins."
https://twitter.com/Tone_LLT/status/717822927908024320


The raison d'être of bitcoin is trustlessness. - Eric Lombrozo 2015
It is an Engineering Requirement that Bitcoin be “Above the Law”  Paul Sztorc 2015
Resiliency, not efficiency, is the paramount goal of decentralized, non-state sanctioned currency -Jon Matonis 2015

Bitcoin is intentionally designed to be ungovernable and governance-free.  luke-jr 2016

Technology tends to move in the direction of making surveillance easier, and the ability of computers to track us doubles every eighteen months. - Phil Zimmerman 2013

The only way to make software secure, reliable, and fast is to make it small. Fight Features. - Andy Tanenbaum 2004

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July 14, 2015, 10:53:49 PM
 #28797

OK.  Provide me with your estimates for the following (and explain how you arrived at your numbers) and I'll update my table using your numbers:
1.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assume the outputs are spent.
2.  The cost per node to store 1 GB of additional blockchain data for 5 years, assuming the outputs are unspent.
I may be missing the context as this thread is high volume and I've not read any of the backlog...

But for a full verifying node, the on-going cost cost of 1GB of additional transactions with all outputs spent is 0; all the cost related to that 1GB of data is related to the bandwidth to get it to you and the verification cost, and for short term storage until its burried, after that it need not be stored.
The cost for unspent is some non-zero number which depends on your estimation of storage costs.

This thread can be hard to follow if you're not following it all the time!  

The question was in reference to a debate I was having with Odalv about these "order of magnitude" estimates shown in this table.  I was suggesting that, under the conditions considered in the table, it is cheaper for miners to write the spam to the Blockchain and more costly for the spammer, than continually rejecting it:



Does CreateNewBlock currently take longer to execute if there are more TXs in a miner's mempool to pick from?  If so, this would add credence to Cypherdoc's hunch that miner's are producing more empty blocks when mempool swells.  
Yep, I already pointed that out to you specifically! It's superlinear in the mempool size (well, ignoring caching)  But thats unrelated to f2pool/antpool and the other SPV miners, as they're not ever calling createnewblock in that case, as they're mining without even validating.   One can mine on a validated chain with no transactions while waiting for createnewblock (which is what eligius does, for example).  

Sorry, yes I know you explained that.  The point I'm trying to make is that if CreateNewBlock is super-linear in mempool size, then it would not be surprising to see more empty blocks (what Cypher was calling "defensive blocks") when mempool swells (the miners are mining on an empty block for longer while waiting for CreateNewBlock to finish).  This was Cypher's point from the very beginning that many people, including myself, were suggesting was probably not the case!  

Furthermore, how can f2pool/antpool mine a non-empty block without calling createnewblock?

So pretty much it is more costly to the spammer if miners just write the spam (or accept the tx) into the block chain.

Interesting.

Sorry, but this cannot be true. It is like perpetuum mobile. The bigger block the cheaper it is => let's are try 1 TB block => it must be free

spammers don't control size of blocks in a no limit scenario.  miners do.  so we won't have 1TB blocks b/c miners have the incentive to not destabilize or destroy the network so they will construct large enough blocks that are efficiently optimized so as to not get orphaned and not create significant decentralization of full nodes.  they will also raise their minfee to keep their mempool from destabilizing their full nodes and to keep users access open and readily accessible.  spammers will actually have to pay instead of just recycling their unwritten spam fees.

lol, I do not understand why you do not want to create 1TB block. The bigger block the more spammers have to pay and the more miners will earn. I'll suggest to use infinite blocks and miners will earn infinite amount of $ and BTC.
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July 15, 2015, 12:08:07 AM
 #28798

lightening transactiosn can support up to 2 tx per day for 7 billion people, within 2TB storage space and 133MB blocks.
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July 15, 2015, 12:12:42 AM
 #28799

TX fees are still orders of magnitude below their cost in electricity, etc., demonstrating fee pressure insufficient for develop mature markets.


I had forgotten this gem.  Roll Eyes  Fortunately your personal opinions don't matter; this is not a centrally planned economy.

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July 15, 2015, 12:21:39 AM
 #28800


I suspect we agree that should 1MB blocks become an undeniably urgent concern (EG, if we see actual congestion resulting in appropriate fees no longer prioritizing their tx) the controversy will rapidly dissipate and be replaced by emergent rough consensus.


And I guess we will have to ask you if the fees are "appropriate" or not.

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