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Poll
Question: Will you support Gavin's new block size limit hard fork of 8MB by January 1, 2016 then doubling every 2 years?
1.  yes
2.  no

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Adrian-x
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August 13, 2015, 06:51:27 PM
 #30401



what is the latest version of XT, is it still a test version?

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August 13, 2015, 06:55:17 PM
 #30402

What about lying? If enough miners claim to support larger blocks but actually don't, then part of the network will waste time producing blocks that won't be built on.  IMO, if we want to put the power directly in miners hands it would be better to raise the limit entirely.  However, to do so we would need to test the crap out of everything to be reasonably sure that there aren't bugs that are only uncovered by larger blocks like what happened when the soft limit was raised to 1MB.

I don't think it would be a problem.  Like Erdogan said, the miners will use the "tip-toe" method of increasing the block size.  Worst case, a large block gets orphaned and nobody tries again for a while.  But if the larger block doesn't get orphaned, then the network will assume that that size is now supported (thereby setting a new effective upper limit).

IMO, if we want to put the power directly in miners hands it would be better to raise the limit entirely.

This doesn't put the power directly in the miners' hands.  It keeps the power where it already is: in everybody's hands!  It just makes it much easier for people to exercise the power they already possess.  

Quote
However, to do so we would need to test the crap out of everything to be reasonably sure that there aren't bugs that are only uncovered by larger blocks like what happened when the soft limit was raised to 1MB.

I disagree.  For example, I would not set my node's limit to anything greater than 32 MB until I understood the 33.5 MB message size limitation better.  I expect many people would do the same thing.  Rational miners won't dare to randomly publish a 100 MB block, because they'd be worried that it would be orphaned.

Furthermore, since miners would likely use the "tip-toe" method, the effective block size limit will grow only in very small increments, helping to reveal any potential limitations before they become problems.



yes, i've called this "advancing together" but "tip toeing" is even a better descriptor as it implies small baby steps upwards as opposed to random big steps.  miners will not only do what's best for themselves but what's best for the group.  they know that all hands on deck are needed as a team to replace the existing financial order.  where BitcoinXT is going there will be plenty of profits to be had for existing cooperative players as well as new entrants.  the stakes are enormous to the upside but individual miners cannot afford to be caught being dishonest or attacking or they will be left behind or severely deprecated ala ghash.  what a shame to miss out on being the next JPM as a result of being greedy.
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August 13, 2015, 06:56:49 PM
 #30403


At this point I'd say just find a way to put the forks on the market and let's arbitrage it out. I will submit if a fork cannot gain the market cap advantage, and I suspect the small-blockers will likewise if Core loses it. Money talks.

I had a strange idea recently: what if we don't even bother with BIP100, BIP101, etc., or trying to come to "consensus" in some formal way.  What if, instead, we just make it very easy for node operators to adjust their block size limit.  Imagine a drop down menu where you can select "1 MB, 2 MB, 4 MB, 8 MB, … ."  What would happen?  

Personally, I'd just select some big block size limit, like 32 MB.  This way, I'd be guaranteed to follow the longest proof of work chain, regardless of what the effective block size limit becomes.  I'd expect many people to do the same thing.  Eventually, it becomes obvious that the economic majority is supporting a larger limit, and a brave miner publishes a block that is 1.1 MB is size.  We all witness that indeed that block got included into the longest proof of work chain, and then suddenly all miners are confident producing 1.1 MB blocks.  Thus, the effective block size limit slowly creeps upwards, as this process is repeated over and over as demand for block space grows.

TL/DR: maybe we don't need a strict definition for the max block size limit.

Nodes have the power to do that, even a right given they host the data, however they dont have the the market knowledge to know what it should be, the power to set the block size must come from the incentive schema designed as designed by Satosi to work.  I cant imagine it would work out well at all, probably better than limiting the block size but not my much.  

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August 13, 2015, 06:57:18 PM
 #30404

The network would dynamically determine the max block size as the network evolves by expressing the size of the blocks they will accept with the drop-down menu on their client.

So…is this a good idea?  If there are no obvious "gotchas" then perhaps we should write up a BIP.

I like the principle of the idea, however the idea of voting by non-miners is subject to Sybil attack - someone spinning up many fake nodes to skew the results. There have been posts on the mailing list about various voting schemes.

Going one better than simple user voting is proof-of-stake voting:

Proof-of-stake voting could be combined with miner voting (like BIP-100) to get a balance between mining power and investors/holders.
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
A drop down box, which would need supporting on the many wallet providers, then allows people to vote depending upon their coin balance. A non-vote is a "vote" for no change.

Except, the problem with proof-of-stake voting is summarized by Alan Reiner (Armory developer) in the responses to this proposal:

Quote
One major problem I see with this, no matter how well-thought-out it is,
it's unlikely that those with money will participate.  Those with the
most stake, likely have their private keys behind super-secure
accessibility barriers, and are not likely to go through the effort just
to sign votes.  Not only that, but it would require them to reveal their
public key, which while isn't technically so terrible, large amounts of
money intended to be kept in storage for 10+ years will prefer to avoid
any exposure at all, in the oft-chance that QCs come around a lot
earlier than we expected.  Sure, the actual risk should be pretty much
non-existent, but some of the most paranoid folks are probably the same
ones who have a lot of funds and want 100.00% of the security that is
possible.   They will see this as wildly inconvenient.

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August 13, 2015, 07:02:47 PM
 #30405


but back to this, you and i can't be outliers as much as LukeJr and gmax want everyone to think in terms of bandwidth speed.  we can easily handle a significant block size increase, no problem.



furthermore:

http://arstechnica.co.uk/gadgets/2015/08/samsung-unveils-2-5-inch-16tb-ssd-the-worlds-largest-hard-drive/

i really see no technical reasons why we can't have bigger blocks.  now.

Yeah I think we're past that point in the debate. It's now clear that the concern of those who make the technical claims regarding bandwidth is about ensuring that Bitcoin node-running is an all-inclusive activity. They insist that no one can be left out, or else it's not a "consensus." Well we're being left out right now, aren't we. By their logic we should be able to halt Bitcoin entirely during this debate because they don't have our consensus. There is no internal consistency in the whole "consensus" line of reasoning. It's just a feel-good buzzword except in the very narrow sense that of course the code will only run among those who are currently in consensus. The lack of any mention of market cap or other economic factor during such invocations of consensus should be a red flag.

There are aspects of the debate where intelligent people may disagree, but this part is pure reactionary stalwartism at this point. It doesn't even jive with the fundamental nature of open source software, which makes consensus a fluid concept. At this point I'd say just find a way to put the forks on the market and let's arbitrage it out. I will submit if a fork cannot gain the market cap advantage, and I suspect the small-blockers will likewise if Core loses it. Money talks.

i've flipped the question around to the Cripplecoiner's a few times, as in, what happens if Gavin is the sole dissenter when the need to slip in the spvp for SC's comes around in a year or so?  will they gracefully and quietly back off since they won't have consensus?  the angry answer i get back always sounds like they'll ram it thru anyways.

another reason Cripplecoiner's want to see 0 hard forks is they have invested or are investing in systems that could be obsoleted very easily with small tweaks to the code. I suspect if someone like Gavin who isent invested in there company can come in and make a change without there permission its very threatening to there future which may even depend on bugs in the code that cant be fixed for legacy reasons.

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HeliKopterBen
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August 13, 2015, 07:03:18 PM
 #30406

[...]
So…is this a good idea?  If there are no obvious "gotchas" then perhaps we should write up a BIP.


I'd be willing to help! But I'd also suggest to just make it about the configurable setting and leave the rest to the user. I think signalling about blocksize has to happen out-of-band for the time being. Because it is potentially a lot of code complexity. And simple IMO beats complex here.

Just make it mandatory to start bitcoind with -maxblocksizelimit (or similar) and have an edit box for bitcoin-qt that has to be filled with a value. The amount of code change should be about the same as BIP101.

Start requesting this value at some switchover date in the future - maybe at the beginning of Gavin's increase schedule. Reason for this: Time for user education on building a function Bitcoin network.

What do you think?

I think that all makes perfect sense, and I agree that simple is better!  Perhaps the BIP could only advocate for doing what you said to start, and then there could be a follow-up BIP to do the signalling in the block headers and to add the p2p "block size limit request" messages.  The nice thing is that the signalling stuff in the follow-up BIP would have nothing to do with the consensus layer, so it would be much easier to build support for it.  

I'd be willing to contribute to this too.  Realistically, I couldn't do any serious work on this until mid-September, however.  Timing wise, it would be great to have a polished proposal published for the second Scalability Workshop in Hong Kong probably in November or December: https://scalingbitcoin.org/

I'm actually quite excited about this idea.  It has a sort of inevitable feel to it.


I think you guys are on to something here.  Could you have an option in the dropdown to choose a dynamic limit that is 1 standard deviation above a 30 day moving average (or use data points of the previous 4320 blocks, which is about 1 month, to calculate variance), or something similar?  That way the user could set his limit to stay within a reasonable upper range without restricting usage.

Counterfeit:  made in imitation of something else with intent to deceive:  merriam-webster
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August 13, 2015, 07:04:44 PM
 #30407



what is the latest version of XT, is it still a test version?

0.11A is the testing version of the actual bigger block software, i think.

i'm running 0.10.2 which is the stable version but doesn't have the bigger blocks enabled.

both versions mine Core as usual, as you'd expect.
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August 13, 2015, 07:12:53 PM
 #30408

Jeff is saying that miner voting via BIP100 will be submitted (merged in the BIP library?) implemented (pull request?) within two weeks.

This is great news. I see it as compatible with BIP 101 if a mined block size conforms to the least of the prevailing maximum of 100 and 101.

http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf

Protocol changes proposed:
1. Hard fork, to
2. Remove static 1MB block size limit.
3. Simultaneously,​addanewfloatingblocksizelimit,setto1MB.
4. The historical 32MB limit remains.
5. Schedule the hard fork on testnet for September 1, 2015.
6. Schedule the hard fork on bitcoin main chain for January 11, 2016.
7. Changing the 1MB limit is accomplished in a manner similar to BIP 34, a one­way lock­in
upgrade with a 12,000 block (3 month) threshold by 90% of the blocks.
8. Limit increase or decrease may not exceed 2x in any one step.
9. Miners vote by encoding ‘BV’+BlockSizeRequestValue into coinbase scriptSig, e.g.
“/BV8000000/” to vote for 8M. Votes are evaluated by dropping bottom 20% and top 20%, and then the most common floor (minimum) is chosen.

edit: point 7 with 90% would IMHO be improved with 75% + 2 week grace period.

hey solex you seem to have a good take on BIP100, i started formulating my thoughts when NEY Liberty was pushing it over BIP 101
i would like your opinion on the idea that miners can maintain a cartel by voting?

From what I understand PIP100 gives the power to miners to set the block size (all be it with a vote?)

That's all good and well knowing miners should set there own block size, so on the service BIP100 seems fine.

Miners also dont pay the cost for large blocks, the nodes do, and as Peter_R has illustrated mathematically, Satoshi's original design optimizes block size based on market demand, while leaving nodes with ultimate control, (and removing the need for nodes or developers to manage block size)  

So the issue I see with BIP100 is if the majority of Miners collude to form a cartel to set the limit they can set it too low to suite the cartel's preferences, the difference between BIP 100 and BIP 101 to me, is that BIP100 miners cant leave the carrell and mine bigger blocks if there is a market for it, in the case with BIP100 the cartel needs to vote.

Whereas with BIP101 Miners can form a cartel but if it becomes more profitable to mine larger blocks they can break from the cartel without having to get a majority vote.

the innate incentive that limits the ability for cartels to form is important, BIP 100 is a change to an innate incentive in Bitcoin.  

Playing devils advocate here and creating a worse case scenario, imagine the optimal market equilibrium for block size and transaction cost resulted in the demand for a 16MB block, a majority of miners could form a voting cartel, and set a limit at 8MB, there would be no reason to do this in a free market because they would loose revenue, but in a controlled market for transaction fees where Sidechains exist, it becomes possible to manipulate the block size to undermine competition, a simple way to do it would be to limit your completion's revenue by limiting block size, if you were uncompetitive in block propagation that would give you an unfair advantage. In the case with SideChains the cartel could supplement revenue by being paid to Merge Mining side-chains that other miners dont have assess too.

giving the power to set block size to the miners by vote of the majority seems to me will ultimately tend towards centralization, where in BIP101 this power is vested in the market and incentives that govern it. More important, it's not a change to Satosis design which seems to have the incentive balance just right.  

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August 13, 2015, 07:13:40 PM
 #30409


At this point I'd say just find a way to put the forks on the market and let's arbitrage it out. I will submit if a fork cannot gain the market cap advantage, and I suspect the small-blockers will likewise if Core loses it. Money talks.

I had a strange idea recently: what if we don't even bother with BIP100, BIP101, etc., or trying to come to "consensus" in some formal way.  What if, instead, we just make it very easy for node operators to adjust their block size limit.  Imagine a drop down menu where you can select "1 MB, 2 MB, 4 MB, 8 MB, … ."  What would happen?  

Personally, I'd just select some big block size limit, like 32 MB.  This way, I'd be guaranteed to follow the longest proof of work chain, regardless of what the effective block size limit becomes.  I'd expect many people to do the same thing.  Eventually, it becomes obvious that the economic majority is supporting a larger limit, and a brave miner publishes a block that is 1.1 MB is size.  We all witness that indeed that block got included into the longest proof of work chain, and then suddenly all miners are confident producing 1.1 MB blocks.  Thus, the effective block size limit slowly creeps upwards, as this process is repeated over and over as demand for block space grows.

TL/DR: maybe we don't need a strict definition for the max block size limit.

Nodes have the power to do that, even a right given they host the data, however they dont have the the market knowledge to know what it should be, the power to set the block size must come from the incentive schema designed as designed by Satosi to work.  I cant imagine it would work out well at all, probably better than limiting the block size but not my much.  

that's not the pt. 

the full nodes should and will care only about what tx volume they have the capability or desire to validate.  for me, despite not getting paid, i will want to max out those validation capabilities to whatever i'm willing to pay (donate) to the network, which is much higher than it is being used today.  i want Bitcoin to grow in size and price so i'm going to donate to my hearts content trying to make that happen.   the Cripplecoiners will say that is no way to run a full node but i'll bet there are thousands of guys like me who are willing to do this for the prospect of taking the price to the next 10x level.  there is nothing wrong with wanting a higher price b/c a much higher price is essential to Bitcoin's overall success and ability to move large scale tx's as we've argued about before.  it has to be able to allow large tx's in the $millions to fund purchases of real estate, yachts, planes or bigger items so as not to perturb the overall exchange price, unlike what we have today. 

as more users come onboard, merchants will have the incentive, not to mention fiduciary responsibility to run full nodes.  that's a good thing.

but if someone designs a full node fee mkt, i won't be complaining either.
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August 13, 2015, 07:15:16 PM
 #30410



what is the latest version of XT, is it still a test version?

0.11A is the testing version of the actual bigger block software, i think.

i'm running 0.10.2 which is the stable version but doesn't have the bigger blocks enabled.

both versions mine Core as usual, as you'd expect.
thanks,

I'm ruining XT too but an older stable version that still identifies as Satoshi client.

I'm waiting for 11.0 or the bigger block stable version.

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August 13, 2015, 07:20:05 PM
 #30411


At this point I'd say just find a way to put the forks on the market and let's arbitrage it out. I will submit if a fork cannot gain the market cap advantage, and I suspect the small-blockers will likewise if Core loses it. Money talks.

I had a strange idea recently: what if we don't even bother with BIP100, BIP101, etc., or trying to come to "consensus" in some formal way.  What if, instead, we just make it very easy for node operators to adjust their block size limit.  Imagine a drop down menu where you can select "1 MB, 2 MB, 4 MB, 8 MB, … ."  What would happen?  

Personally, I'd just select some big block size limit, like 32 MB.  This way, I'd be guaranteed to follow the longest proof of work chain, regardless of what the effective block size limit becomes.  I'd expect many people to do the same thing.  Eventually, it becomes obvious that the economic majority is supporting a larger limit, and a brave miner publishes a block that is 1.1 MB is size.  We all witness that indeed that block got included into the longest proof of work chain, and then suddenly all miners are confident producing 1.1 MB blocks.  Thus, the effective block size limit slowly creeps upwards, as this process is repeated over and over as demand for block space grows.

TL/DR: maybe we don't need a strict definition for the max block size limit.

Nodes have the power to do that, even a right given they host the data, however they dont have the the market knowledge to know what it should be, the power to set the block size must come from the incentive schema designed as designed by Satosi to work.  I cant imagine it would work out well at all, probably better than limiting the block size but not my much.  

that's not the pt. 

the full nodes should and will care only about what tx volume they have the capability or desire to validate.  for me, despite not getting paid, i will want to max out those validation capabilities to whatever i'm willing to pay (donate) to the network, which is much higher than it is being used today.  i want Bitcoin to grow in size and price so i'm going to donate to my hearts content trying to make that happen.   the Cripplecoiners will say that is no way to run a full node but i'll bet there are thousands of guys like me who are willing to do this for the prospect of taking the price to the next 10x level.  there is nothing wrong with wanting a higher price b/c a much higher price is essential to Bitcoin's overall success and ability to move large scale tx's as we've argued about before.  it has to be able to allow large tx's in the $millions to fund purchases of real estate, yachts, planes or bigger items so as not to perturb the overall exchange price, unlike what we have today. 

as more users come onboard, merchants will have the incentive, not to mention fiduciary responsibility to run full nodes.  that's a good thing.

but if someone designs a full node fee mkt, i won't be complaining either.

the optimal solution is looking more and more like 101 to me. I think the sybil attack is a good reason keep nodes from forking to the wrong block size.   

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August 13, 2015, 07:22:44 PM
 #30412

My advise to you is to start looking at growth in another light. While it seems reasonable to track "adoption & growth" by an increase in the userbase, I have recently come to the conclusion that what might be even more preferable is a growth in capital.

I guess this comes back to our different idea of Bitcoin's value proposition but to put it shortly, my opinion is that more expensive transaction fees on the blockchain will hardly hinder the adoption of capital looking to buy a spot and park their money in the unforgeable ledger. That is because bitcoins are a unique collectible unlike anything the world has seen since gold. Unfortunately much like gold some characteristics limit its direct use as a mean of exchange. Gold's shortcoming is in its physicality, Bitcoin's own is the decentralization tradeoff.

This is just for the record as Peter is doing an admirable job of explaining things, I have highlighted the fundamental failings in your logic which makes you come to the wrong conclusion. I fully expect you to ignore this and hand-wave it away, but here goes...

1. Growth in capital is a reactive process, it is a market response to the growth of  the whole ecosystem. There have been altcoins with enormous early capital such as Auroracoin where $100 million in market cap rapidly went to zero, like morning mist in the sun. This was because the capital temporarily existed but there was no ecosystem to maintain it.

2. Bitcoins are not a "unique collectible" because while bitcoins are truly finite, cryptocurrency is infinite. Litecoin is just Bitcoin with a different name and a few minor software changes. Many new coins exist such as Monero and NXT and Etherium. ALL of these could do the job of Bitcoin if Bitcoin vanished. The only thing keeping Bitcoin at No.1 is a positive feedback loop: ecosystem usage (transactions) > utility value -> market price -> mining power -> PoW security of blockchain -> more public interest -> more ecosystem usage

The problem with the 1MB is that it will eventually cripple this all-important feedback loop.

Your Auroracoin false equivalence does not stand. An irrational pump & dump does not compare in any way to a collector's item.

I think Bitcoins are absolutely a unique collectible. I hate to "call up" authority but its own creator was well aware of that:

Quote
Maybe it could get an initial value circularly as you’ve suggested, by people foreseeing its potential usefulness for exchange. (I would definitely want some) Maybe collectors, any random reason could spark it. - Satoshi Nakamoto

Quote
It might make sense just to get some in case it catches on. If enough people think the same way, that becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. -Satoshi Nakamoto

Quote
Aug. 27, 2010: Bitcoins have no dividend or potential future dividend, therefore not like a stock. (They’re) more like a collectible or commodity. - Satoshi Nakamoto

This typical "cryptocurrency is infinite" reply seems shortsighted and IMO shows a misunderstanding of Bitcoin's origin of value.

If we were to derive the latter from "ecosystem usage" as you represent it : transactions on the blockchain, then we should argue Bitcoin is a pretty low value network since the velocity of transactions on the network is, frankly, very low. Have a quick look at the top 500 (you can even go up to 20,000) on the website here http://bitcoinrichlist.com/top500?page=40. A very short glance should make it very clear that most bitcoins rarely move on the blockchain.

In other words, very little people actually use Bitcoin for exchanges of goods and services traded on the blockchain. Therefore, I believe, the "utility" value in your feedback loop is incorrect. The actual primary use case of Bitcoin is for people to store wealth by exchanging fiat currency for bitcoins or, in the case of miners, work/energy. This is exactly how a collectible comes into existence. An organic process where an "unforgeably costly commodity repeatedly adds value by enabling beneficial wealth transfers." (1) Beneficial wealth transfer, in our case, is not transfer of goods or services, but an exit from the fiat system and/or also a speculative move.

By creating value that way, its market prices increases which encourages miners to put more energy into creating them therefore increasing their rarity by making them harder to forge. This increasing price and growing rarity attracts more collectors and on it goes. This is what the feedback loop looks like to me. The current rarity of Bitcoin may very well be a product of its first-mover advantage but it is pointless to dismiss it in the present. That is why Bitcoin should not be thrown into the same bucket as other crypto.

Don't get me wrong, Bitcoin will eventually evolve into a much larger network where an increasing amount of goods and services will be traded for them but I expect this "utility" to remain marginal until Bitcoin grows its collector base by a couple order of magnitudes and ultimately peak when Bitcoin is used as a unit of account.

For all these reason I believe my conclusion still stand and no, 1MB will not cripple this feedback loop.

(1) http://szabo.best.vwh.net/shell.html#Attributes of Collectibles

"I believe this will be the ultimate fate of Bitcoin, to be the "high-powered money" that serves as a reserve currency for banks that issue their own digital cash." Hal Finney, Dec. 2010
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August 13, 2015, 07:22:57 PM
 #30413

The network would dynamically determine the max block size as the network evolves by expressing the size of the blocks they will accept with the drop-down menu on their client.

So…is this a good idea?  If there are no obvious "gotchas" then perhaps we should write up a BIP.

I like the principle of the idea, however the idea of voting by non-miners is subject to Sybil attack - someone spinning up many fake nodes to skew the results. There have been posts on the mailing list about various voting schemes.

Going one better than simple user voting is proof-of-stake voting:

Proof-of-stake voting could be combined with miner voting (like BIP-100) to get a balance between mining power and investors/holders.
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
A drop down box, which would need supporting on the many wallet providers, then allows people to vote depending upon their coin balance. A non-vote is a "vote" for no change.

Except, the problem with proof-of-stake voting is summarized by Alan Reiner (Armory developer) in the responses to this proposal:

Quote
One major problem I see with this, no matter how well-thought-out it is,
it's unlikely that those with money will participate.  Those with the
most stake, likely have their private keys behind super-secure
accessibility barriers, and are not likely to go through the effort just
to sign votes.  Not only that, but it would require them to reveal their
public key, which while isn't technically so terrible, large amounts of
money intended to be kept in storage for 10+ years will prefer to avoid
any exposure at all, in the oft-chance that QCs come around a lot
earlier than we expected.  Sure, the actual risk should be pretty much
non-existent, but some of the most paranoid folks are probably the same
ones who have a lot of funds and want 100.00% of the security that is
possible.   They will see this as wildly inconvenient.

Alan is quite right about that.  forget POS voting.

i also disagree with you about the Sybil attacks by spinning up full nodes.  first off, it's not a trivial expense even today to run a full node, so there is a cost to trying to manipulate the system.  and you'd have to run them for "longish" periods of time before you'd get miners to react with bigger blocks.  and, as larger blocks come into being, those full node costs will rise making the attack even more expensive.  and really, for what point?  it's always been possible to spin up nodes but no one's bothered to do it.  as more users enter the system, honest merchants will start spinning up their full nodes in numbers that should make Sybil attacks very difficult.  finally, while running this attack, they are actually helping the network validate and relay tx's and decentralize it.  i'd think there are better ways to attack the network.
cypherdoc
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August 13, 2015, 07:29:29 PM
 #30414



what is the latest version of XT, is it still a test version?

0.11A is the testing version of the actual bigger block software, i think.

i'm running 0.10.2 which is the stable version but doesn't have the bigger blocks enabled.

both versions mine Core as usual, as you'd expect.
thanks,

I'm ruining XT too but an older stable version that still identifies as Satoshi client.

I'm waiting for 11.0 or the bigger block stable version.

it identifies as a Satoshi client but it is an XT version of it.  Bitnodes allows you to look at the details of your node to see if it's XT.
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August 13, 2015, 07:52:14 PM
 #30415

that's not the pt.  

the full nodes should and will care only about what tx volume they have the capability or desire to validate.  for me, despite not getting paid, i will want to max out those validation capabilities to whatever i'm willing to pay (donate) to the network, which is much higher than it is being used today.  i want Bitcoin to grow in size and price so i'm going to donate to my hearts content trying to make that happen.   the Cripplecoiners will say that is no way to run a full node but i'll bet there are thousands of guys like me who are willing to do this for the prospect of taking the price to the next 10x level.  there is nothing wrong with wanting a higher price b/c a much higher price is essential to Bitcoin's overall success and ability to move large scale tx's as we've argued about before.  it has to be able to allow large tx's in the $millions to fund purchases of real estate, yachts, planes or bigger items so as not to perturb the overall exchange price, unlike what we have today.  

as more users come onboard, merchants will have the incentive, not to mention fiduciary responsibility to run full nodes.  that's a good thing.

but if someone designs a full node fee mkt, i won't be complaining either.

the optimal solution is looking more and more like 101 to me. I think the sybil attack is a good reason keep nodes from forking to the wrong block size.  

I'm not sure a sybil attack is the way to look at it, with this new proposal.  What is there to sybil attack?  Every node operator independently selects the max block size that he is willing to validate.  The effective block size limit is equal to the largest block that has successfully been included in the longest proof-of-work chain.  Any miner can attempt to increase the limit, simply by publishing a slightly larger block than has ever been published before.  They can assess the probability that their block will be mined upon (rather than orphaned) by any number of methods.  If they try to publish too large a block, then it will likely be orphaned.

As sickpig suggested, it would be a recognition that the block size limit is not part of the consensus layer, but rather part of the transport layer.

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August 13, 2015, 07:55:21 PM
 #30416

that's not the pt.  

the full nodes should and will care only about what tx volume they have the capability or desire to validate.  for me, despite not getting paid, i will want to max out those validation capabilities to whatever i'm willing to pay (donate) to the network, which is much higher than it is being used today.  i want Bitcoin to grow in size and price so i'm going to donate to my hearts content trying to make that happen.   the Cripplecoiners will say that is no way to run a full node but i'll bet there are thousands of guys like me who are willing to do this for the prospect of taking the price to the next 10x level.  there is nothing wrong with wanting a higher price b/c a much higher price is essential to Bitcoin's overall success and ability to move large scale tx's as we've argued about before.  it has to be able to allow large tx's in the $millions to fund purchases of real estate, yachts, planes or bigger items so as not to perturb the overall exchange price, unlike what we have today.  

as more users come onboard, merchants will have the incentive, not to mention fiduciary responsibility to run full nodes.  that's a good thing.

but if someone designs a full node fee mkt, i won't be complaining either.

the optimal solution is looking more and more like 101 to me. I think the sybil attack is a good reason keep nodes from forking to the wrong block size.  

I'm not sure a sybil attack is the way to look at it, with this new proposal.  What is there to sybil attack?  Every node operator independently selects the max block size that he is willing to validate.  The effective block size limit is equal to the largest block that has successfully been included in the longest proof-of-work chain.  Any miner can attempt to increase the limit, simply by publishing a slightly larger block than has ever been published before.  They can assess the probability that their block will be mined upon (rather than orphaned) by any number of methods.  If they try to publish too large a block, then it will likely be orphaned.

As sickpig suggested, it would be a recognition that the block size limit is not part of the consensus layer, but rather part of the transport layer.

i never did quite get this part.  can you explain?
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August 13, 2015, 08:00:11 PM
 #30417


At this point I'd say just find a way to put the forks on the market and let's arbitrage it out. I will submit if a fork cannot gain the market cap advantage, and I suspect the small-blockers will likewise if Core loses it. Money talks.

I had a strange idea recently: what if we don't even bother with BIP100, BIP101, etc., or trying to come to "consensus" in some formal way.  What if, instead, we just make it very easy for node operators to adjust their block size limit.  Imagine a drop down menu where you can select "1 MB, 2 MB, 4 MB, 8 MB, … ."  What would happen?  

Personally, I'd just select some big block size limit, like 32 MB.  This way, I'd be guaranteed to follow the longest proof of work chain, regardless of what the effective block size limit becomes.  I'd expect many people to do the same thing.  Eventually, it becomes obvious that the economic majority is supporting a larger limit, and a brave miner publishes a block that is 1.1 MB is size.  We all witness that indeed that block got included into the longest proof of work chain, and then suddenly all miners are confident producing 1.1 MB blocks.  Thus, the effective block size limit slowly creeps upwards, as this process is repeated over and over as demand for block space grows.

TL/DR: maybe we don't need a strict definition for the max block size limit.

That is exactly what I think. The miners will have to try it out or get some feel of what they can do through other channels (social media, conferences, node versions), including associate with other miners. As long as the association is voluntary, it will not form a monopoly.


yes, this has been considered and discussed before.  The danger is that a large block miner cartel might develop naturally whose blocks put small-bandwidth players at a disadvantage.  But as others have mentioned, some people are at an electricity cost disadvantage, some bandwidth, some something else... basically it would just be another metric to take into account as you site your miners.

So I would be 100% for this if miners could only work with real txns.  But a miner could fill up a huge block with a bunch of "fake" (unrelayed, fee pays to himself) txns to artificially drive up network costs.  Its too bad Bitcoin doesn't have the "pay portion of fees to miner pool, receive portion for the next N blocks" feature... that idea closes a lot of miner loopholes.  

But regardless I'm not sure if this "loophole" really is one; it does require 51% of the network to be as connected as you are and willing to process your monster garbage block.  I have a hard time believing that miners would do so since over the long term they need bitcoin to succeed.  More likely (as you guys suggest) they'll just configure their nodes to ignore monster blocks unless > N deep in the chain.


First I am not afraid of cartels in the free market (laws against market actor collusion is rather a statist notion of fear of markets, in reality it is the regulator who is the monopolist intruding with undue force and destroying the market), and second, I don't think a miner will act to waste bandwith, if that were the case, we would already have seen it, since unrestrained block size has been the situation for the first 6 years.

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August 13, 2015, 08:11:46 PM
 #30418

The network would dynamically determine the max block size as the network evolves by expressing the size of the blocks they will accept with the drop-down menu on their client.

So…is this a good idea?  If there are no obvious "gotchas" then perhaps we should write up a BIP.

I like the principle of the idea, however the idea of voting by non-miners is subject to Sybil attack - someone spinning up many fake nodes to skew the results. There have been posts on the mailing list about various voting schemes.

Going one better than simple user voting is proof-of-stake voting:

Proof-of-stake voting could be combined with miner voting (like BIP-100) to get a balance between mining power and investors/holders.
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html
A drop down box, which would need supporting on the many wallet providers, then allows people to vote depending upon their coin balance. A non-vote is a "vote" for no change.

Except, the problem with proof-of-stake voting is summarized by Alan Reiner (Armory developer) in the responses to this proposal:

Quote
One major problem I see with this, no matter how well-thought-out it is,
it's unlikely that those with money will participate.  Those with the
most stake, likely have their private keys behind super-secure
accessibility barriers, and are not likely to go through the effort just
to sign votes.  Not only that, but it would require them to reveal their
public key, which while isn't technically so terrible, large amounts of
money intended to be kept in storage for 10+ years will prefer to avoid
any exposure at all, in the oft-chance that QCs come around a lot
earlier than we expected.  Sure, the actual risk should be pretty much
non-existent, but some of the most paranoid folks are probably the same
ones who have a lot of funds and want 100.00% of the security that is
possible.   They will see this as wildly inconvenient.

Alan is quite right about that.  forget POS voting.

i also disagree with you about the Sybil attacks by spinning up full nodes.  first off, it's not a trivial expense even today to run a full node, so there is a cost to trying to manipulate the system.  and you'd have to run them for "longish" periods of time before you'd get miners to react with bigger blocks.  and, as larger blocks come into being, those full node costs will rise making the attack even more expensive.  and really, for what point?  it's always been possible to spin up nodes but no one's bothered to do it.  as more users enter the system, honest merchants will start spinning up their full nodes in numbers that should make Sybil attacks very difficult.  finally, while running this attack, they are actually helping the network validate and relay tx's and decentralize it.  i'd think there are better ways to attack the network.

Voting with the node number is not a democracy game or even a stake game. Take the example of a change that I never would support, adjusting the total coins. Even if I was outnumbered 100 to 1, I would not accept that change in my node, and the chain would fork. So churning up lots of nodes does not give someone unrestrained power. I don't know how to name such a method of decision making, but it is perfect for the problem at hand. "Fork restrained majority decision" may be.

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August 13, 2015, 08:13:46 PM
 #30419

As sickpig suggested, it would be a recognition that the block size limit is not part of the consensus layer, but rather part of the transport layer.

i never did quite get this part.  can you explain?

Sure.  

Why do we have a consensus layer in the first place?  It is a way for us to agree on what transactions are valid and what transactions are invalid.  For example, we all agree that Alice shouldn't be able to move Bob's coins without a valid signature, and that Bob shouldn't be able to create coins out of thin air.  The consensus layer is about obvious stuff like that.  In order for Bitcoin to function as sound money, we need to agree on "black-or-white" rules like this that define which transactions are valid and which are invalid.

Notice that the paragraph above discusses valid and invalid transactions.  No where did I say anything about blocks.  That's because we only really care about transactions in the first place!  In fact, how can a block be invalid just because it includes one too many valid transactions?  

Satoshi added the 1 MB limit as an anti-spam measure to deal with certain limitations of Bitcoin's transport layer--not as a new rule for what constitutes a valid transaction.  We should thus think of every block that is exclusively composed of valid transactions as itself valid.  The size of the block alone should not make it invalid.  Instead, if a block is too big, think of it as likely to be orphaned (a "gray" rule) rather than as invalid (a black-or-white rule).  Perhaps above a certain block size, we're even 100% sure that a block will be orphaned; still we should view it as a valid block!  It will be orphaned because the transport layer was insufficient to transport it across the network--not because there was anything invalid about it.

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August 13, 2015, 08:27:47 PM
 #30420

As sickpig suggested, it would be a recognition that the block size limit is not part of the consensus layer, but rather part of the transport layer.

i never did quite get this part.  can you explain?

Sure.  

Why do we have a consensus layer in the first place?  It is a way for us to agree on what transactions are valid and what transactions are invalid.  For example, we all agree that Alice shouldn't be able to move Bob's coins without a valid signature, and that Bob shouldn't be able to create coins out of thin air.  The consensus layer is about obvious stuff like that.  In order for Bitcoin to function as sound money, we need to agree on "black-or-white" rules like this that define which transactions are valid and which are invalid.

Notice that the paragraph above discusses valid and invalid transactions.  No where did I say anything about blocks.  That's because we only really care about transactions in the first place!  In fact, how can a block be invalid just because it includes one too many valid transactions?  

Satoshi added the 1 MB limit as an anti-spam measure to deal with certain limitations of Bitcoin's transport layer--not as a new rule for what constitutes a valid transaction.  We should thus think of every block that is exclusively composed of valid transactions as itself valid.  The size of the block alone should not make it invalid.  Instead, if a block is too big, think of it as likely to be orphaned (a "gray" rule) rather than as invalid (a black-or-white rule).  Perhaps above a certain block size, we're even 100% sure that a block will be orphaned; still we should view it as a valid block!  It will be orphaned because the transport layer was insufficient to transport it across the network--not because there was anything invalid about it.

it was the term "layer" that made me question.  when i hear "transport layer" i start thinking technical like TCP/IP, SSL/TLS, http, https, etc.  

so nothing technical, just layered "concepts".
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