cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 23, 2015, 09:40:21 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
it gets even more complicated than this. turns out, you can have multiple wallets loaded into the Trezor all based off of one seed. to do this, you click "Enable Passphrases" in advanced settings. each time it asks you for the passphrase, enter in a different one, and you will generate multiple wallets. a different passphrase acts like an additional 25th word of the original 24 word seed thus creating a new wallet. you could deposit all your cold storage savings in one wallet then deposit 1-2 BTC in another. then if someone rubber hoses you simply reveal the passphrase to the 1-2 BTC wallet for plausible deniability. it's a clever little device.
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marcus_of_augustus
Legendary

Activity: 3920
Merit: 2352
Eadem mutata resurgo
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February 23, 2015, 09:41:47 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
If I did get one this is how I'd use it too. Keep the "cold" wallets off trezor and secured as backups only, and keep the "hot" wallet on trezor for daily use. I should have qualified that with a conditional, multiple trezors might be useful in respect of back-up hardware, in case one fails or for spoof wallet, leave one around with a few millibits in it to hand over to thugs gubmint or otherwise, etc.
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 23, 2015, 09:43:01 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
If I did get one this is how I'd use it too. Keep the "cold" wallets off trezor and secured as backups only, and keep the "hot" wallet on trezor for daily use. I should have qualified that with a conditional, multiple trezors might be useful in respect of back-up hardware, in case one fails or for spoof wallet, leave one around with a few millibits in it to hand over to thugs gubmint or otherwise, etc. you don't need the backup hardware. just load the recovery seed into Mycelium. totally compatible.
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rocks
Legendary

Activity: 1153
Merit: 1000
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February 23, 2015, 09:47:57 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
If I did get one this is how I'd use it too. Keep the "cold" wallets off trezor and secured as backups only, and keep the "hot" wallet on trezor for daily use. I should have qualified that with a conditional, multiple trezors might be useful in respect of back-up hardware, in case one fails or for spoof wallet, leave one around with a few millibits in it to hand over to thugs gubmint or otherwise, etc. Yes, there are those useful purposes to having more than one. But you'd still have "unloaded" wallets for colder storage. In end, what I really want is a single secure back-end that secures multiple wallets. Some wallets are "cold" and used as permanent storage and which are usually in a fully "offline" state. Some wallets are "hot" and used for daily spending with only nominal amounts loaded on them. Today I can mostly replicate that with Armory. It sounds with current planned development Trezor+Armory front-end will be able to support that as well.
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molecular
Donator
Legendary

Activity: 2800
Merit: 1023
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February 23, 2015, 09:49:18 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
it gets even more complicated than this. turns out, you can have multiple wallets loaded into the Trezor all based off of one seed. to do this, you click "Enable Passphrases" in advanced settings. each time it asks you for the passphrase, enter in a different one, and you will generate multiple wallets. a different passphrase acts like an additional 25th word of the original 24 word seed thus creating a new wallet. you could deposit all your cold storage savings in one wallet then deposit 1-2 BTC in another. then if someone rubber hoses you simply reveal the passphrase to the 1-2 BTC wallet for plausible deniability. it's a clever little device. now that you've posted this your denial is implausible, so I will use monkey wrench attack until I get at least 5 passwords from you (or you die). (sorry to put it that drastically. this is not really my plan, of course, just making a point)If you want your money safe against such attack, you better have a component involved that you really "don't know" and that isn't "on you", like a seed in a safe somewhere. Shamirs secret sharing sounds like a good idea. In the end, an attacker can always abduct a loved one and extort coins from you, no matter which way you have secured them. There's nothing better for safety than a world in which everyone participates sufficiently in prosperity.
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PGP key molecular F9B70769 fingerprint 9CDD C0D3 20F8 279F 6BE0 3F39 FC49 2362 F9B7 0769
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 23, 2015, 10:45:46 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
it gets even more complicated than this. turns out, you can have multiple wallets loaded into the Trezor all based off of one seed. to do this, you click "Enable Passphrases" in advanced settings. each time it asks you for the passphrase, enter in a different one, and you will generate multiple wallets. a different passphrase acts like an additional 25th word of the original 24 word seed thus creating a new wallet. you could deposit all your cold storage savings in one wallet then deposit 1-2 BTC in another. then if someone rubber hoses you simply reveal the passphrase to the 1-2 BTC wallet for plausible deniability. it's a clever little device. now that you've posted this your denial is implausible, so I will use monkey wrench attack until I get at least 5 passwords from you (or you die). (sorry to put it that drastically. this is not really my plan, of course, just making a point)If you want your money safe against such attack, you better have a component involved that you really "don't know" and that isn't "on you", like a seed in a safe somewhere. Shamirs secret sharing sounds like a good idea. In the end, an attacker can always abduct a loved one and extort coins from you, no matter which way you have secured them. There's nothing better for safety than a world in which everyone participates sufficiently in prosperity. Nowhere did I say I am doing this. I'm just quoting from their help documents what is possible.
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 23, 2015, 11:22:03 PM |
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Why would you need multiple trezors?
The seed is the key, the trezor is like a blank that can be loaded with any key, wiped then loaded with a different key.
In fact having loaded trezors around is riskier than having an empty one with seeds stored elsewhere, off-site, divided up etc.
it gets even more complicated than this. turns out, you can have multiple wallets loaded into the Trezor all based off of one seed. to do this, you click "Enable Passphrases" in advanced settings. each time it asks you for the passphrase, enter in a different one, and you will generate multiple wallets. a different passphrase acts like an additional 25th word of the original 24 word seed thus creating a new wallet. you could deposit all your cold storage savings in one wallet then deposit 1-2 BTC in another. then if someone rubber hoses you simply reveal the passphrase to the 1-2 BTC wallet for plausible deniability. it's a clever little device. now that you've posted this your denial is implausible, so I will use monkey wrench attack until I get at least 5 passwords from you (or you die). (sorry to put it that drastically. this is not really my plan, of course, just making a point)If you want your money safe against such attack, you better have a component involved that you really "don't know" and that isn't "on you", like a seed in a safe somewhere. Shamirs secret sharing sounds like a good idea. In the end, an attacker can always abduct a loved one and extort coins from you, no matter which way you have secured them. There's nothing better for safety than a world in which everyone participates sufficiently in prosperity. hey molecular, next time you come over, look in the Altoid tin:  
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D05GTO
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February 23, 2015, 11:35:58 PM |
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Man, that would suck if someone threw away your altoids. Use a Trezor myself. Really impressed with it so far. Only have one little gripe.. the usb cable that came with it was flaky but I have at least 10 micro usb cables laying around.
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▄████▄ ▄████████▄ ▄████████████▄ ▄████████████████▄ ████████████████████ ▄█▄ ▄███▄ ▄███▄ ▄████████████████▀ ▄██████████ ▄▄▄▀█████▀▄▄▄▄▀█████▀▄▄▄ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ██ ▄█████▄▀▀▀▄██████▄▀▀▀▄█████▄ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▄█▄ ▀██████████████▄ ████████████████████████████ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀█▀ ██ ▀████████████████████████▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ▄█▄ ▀██▄ ▄██▀ ██ ▀████████████████████▀ ▀███▀ ▀███▀ ▀█▀ ▀███▀ ▄███████████████████████████████████▀ ▀████████████████▀ ▀████████████▀ ▀████████▀ ▀████▀
| ║║ ║█ ║█ ║║ | .
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║║ ██ ║║
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║║ ██ ║║
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 23, 2015, 11:47:05 PM |
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justusranvier
Legendary

Activity: 1400
Merit: 1069
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February 24, 2015, 12:43:35 AM |
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i foresee the Trezor replacing the offline wallet and its pc and being more secure since the offline wallets can be susceptible to a USB malware attack. as far as i know, there is no way to get privkeys off a Trezor so in that sense it is safer I think this is a dangerous assumption to make. Trezor has a larger attack surface than an offline laptop, since you have to plug it in directly to a potential hostile machine every time you use it. You can reduce your attack surface with an offline laptop by using CD-R media instead of USB drives, or maybe by using the audio cable transfer method.
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Kupsi
Legendary

Activity: 1193
Merit: 1053
9.9.2012: I predict that single digits... <- FAIL
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February 24, 2015, 12:55:03 AM |
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The main question is if you have just the private key for one or more addresses in a deterministic wallet, are the other addresses at risk or are they secure.
A full Armory wallet is just
1x Root Private Key 1x Root Public Key 1x Chaincode
A watching-only Armory wallet is just
1x Root Public Key 1x Chaincode
So basically watching-only wallets don't have any private key data at all, and the chain code is just a constant that is carried through all the calculations. With the priv key + chaincode, you can compute all private keys. With public key + chain, you can compute all public keys that match the private keys produced on the full/offline wallet.
The chaincode and public key are not security-sensitive. Someone getting them is a breach of privacy, not security. All internet security is based on the fact that the public key is widely distributed (i.e. "public") and that the scheme maintains full security as long as no one else has the private key.
How about any derived private key, which is not the root key? How serious a leak would that make? Does it compromise all the other private keys as well, if the attacker knows the chain code? (which I assumed is the same for both, private and public chains).
You should always assume that revealing a private key from a deterministic wallet will reveal all siblings. In Armory wallets, if private key x is revealed with the chaincode, all private keys >= X+1 are revealed. But I don't spend much time worrying about this. We do not support or claim to support any use cases where private keys are intentionally revealed. And if your wallet is unintentionally compromised, they will all be revealed anyway.
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Kupsi
Legendary

Activity: 1193
Merit: 1053
9.9.2012: I predict that single digits... <- FAIL
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February 24, 2015, 12:57:24 AM |
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i foresee the Trezor replacing the offline wallet and its pc and being more secure since the offline wallets can be susceptible to a USB malware attack. as far as i know, there is no way to get privkeys off a Trezor so in that sense it is safer I think this is a dangerous assumption to make. Trezor has a larger attack surface than an offline laptop, since you have to plug it in directly to a potential hostile machine every time you use it. You can reduce your attack surface with an offline laptop by using CD-R media instead of USB drives, or maybe by using the audio cable transfer method. Trezor & Offline Armory multisig FTW 
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Adrian-x
Legendary

Activity: 1372
Merit: 1000
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February 24, 2015, 01:31:00 AM |
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How about any derived private key, which is not the root key? How serious a leak would that make? Does it compromise all the other private keys as well, if the attacker knows the chain code? (which I assumed is the same for both, private and public chains).
You should always assume that revealing a private key from a deterministic wallet will reveal all siblings. In Armory wallets, if private key x is revealed with the chaincode, all private keys >= X+1 are revealed. But I don't spend much time worrying about this. We do not support or claim to support any use cases where private keys are intentionally revealed. And if your wallet is unintentionally compromised, they will all be revealed anyway. Thanks for that just to clear up my understanding it is bad practice to distribute private keys from a deterministic wallet. However is it still true one would need the chaincode and a private key from that chaincode to reveal the resulting private keys of the children keys?
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Thank me in Bits 12MwnzxtprG2mHm3rKdgi7NmJKCypsMMQw
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 24, 2015, 02:43:52 AM |
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How about any derived private key, which is not the root key? How serious a leak would that make? Does it compromise all the other private keys as well, if the attacker knows the chain code? (which I assumed is the same for both, private and public chains).
You should always assume that revealing a private key from a deterministic wallet will reveal all siblings. In Armory wallets, if private key x is revealed with the chaincode, all private keys >= X+1 are revealed.But I don't spend much time worrying about this. We do not support or claim to support any use cases where private keys are intentionally revealed. And if your wallet is unintentionally compromised, they will all be revealed anyway. Thanks for that just to clear up my understanding it is bad practice to distribute private keys from a deterministic wallet. However is it still true one would need the chaincode and a private key from that chaincode to reveal the resulting private keys of the children keys?
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 24, 2015, 02:52:10 AM |
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nice find: "As established above, any so-called feature that allows Bitcoin to play nice with competing tokens only serves to make it more vulnerable to being usurped.
The argument that Sidechains will promote a vibrant innovative cryptocurrency ecosystem is misguided at best and disingenuous at worst. Thus far, I've yet to see any charges of treason being discussed by Bitcoin's collective mind of core developers and mining pool decision makers. We'll see if it becomes wise before it's too late."what am i? chopped liver?
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cypherdoc (OP)
Legendary

Activity: 1764
Merit: 1009
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February 24, 2015, 03:28:21 AM |
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i foresee the Trezor replacing the offline wallet and its pc and being more secure since the offline wallets can be susceptible to a USB malware attack. as far as i know, there is no way to get privkeys off a Trezor so in that sense it is safer I think this is a dangerous assumption to make. Trezor has a larger attack surface than an offline laptop, since you have to plug it in directly to a potential hostile machine every time you use it. You can reduce your attack surface with an offline laptop by using CD-R media instead of USB drives, or maybe by using the audio cable transfer method. Trezor & Offline Armory multisig FTW  yeah, this would be.
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marcus_of_augustus
Legendary

Activity: 3920
Merit: 2352
Eadem mutata resurgo
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February 24, 2015, 05:06:18 AM |
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molecular
Donator
Legendary

Activity: 2800
Merit: 1023
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February 24, 2015, 06:19:58 AM |
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The piece contains a pretty cool description of Bitcoin: Private keys that represent some sort of token are an obvious solution, and when we combine them with two cups of economic scarcity, a Merkle tree root, a spoonful of clever bootstrapping, and a dash of HashCash, we end up with, you guessed it, Bitcoin!
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PGP key molecular F9B70769 fingerprint 9CDD C0D3 20F8 279F 6BE0 3F39 FC49 2362 F9B7 0769
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Zangelbert Bingledack
Legendary

Activity: 1036
Merit: 1000
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February 24, 2015, 09:16:36 AM |
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 The lack of understanding continues right up to the eve of Ethereum's planned release. No comprehension of the ledger, still thinking in terms of "tokens" and "blockchain tech is the important thing, not the money."
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